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ABSTRACT 
The thesis looks at Singapore and asks in that nation's 
continuing process of nation-buildin~ which includes 
attempts to hold on to consistent economic growth, whether 
through the proposal to formulate a national ideology with 
a delineation of "shared values", a civil religion was also 
in the process of being constructed. 
There is a short summary of Singapore's history, with 
emphasis given to how the nation has developed and grown 
because of its awareness as a economic centre or 
"commercial emporium" in its geographical locality. Account 
is also given of the role of the ruling party, and 
government - the Peoples' Action Party - in terms of its 
policies in guiding the young nation to economic success. 
An examination of the ideology of the ruling party is then 
undertaken. This leads on to an account of the Singapore 
government's efforts to implement a National Ideology 
through a list of Shared Values and the reasons why this is 
thought necessary for the sake of the nation. 
The category or concept of civil religion is then 
introduced, with specific examples from the American 
situation. There is further discussion of the Shared Values 
to show clearly the ideological impulses and Confucianist 
influences behind them, and after due reference to what 
"Asian values" might mean, and how Confucian values may 
have influence on the economic success of East Asian 
countries, it is reaffirmed that the Singapore government 
was promoting what can be called a civil religion in the 
form of the National Ideology (which incorporated such 
Confucian values) to enhance and continue the economic 
growth that makes up so much of the perceived destiny of 
the nation. 
The concluding sections deal with the role (or lack of it) 
of Christians and the Church in the ongoing political, 
economic and social life of the nation. Does it matter if 
a Singaporean civil religion or a National Ideology may be 
in conflict with a Christian ideology? Does the Singapore 
Church care? 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1991 the Government of Singapore institutionalized 
a formal code of conduct which was to be the National 
Ideology, but later called the Shared Values. This set of 
five values had been spelt out in a White Paper, discussed, 
and subsequently adopted in Parliament. 
A political exercise like this raises questions as 
well as eyebrows of course. Can belief systems and human 
moral values be simply proposed, debated in Parliament and 
then, after the customary acceptance, just be written into 
legislation? How and why were these values chosen? Would 
the end result be something that a Singaporean would be 
proud to be identified with, and accept, regardless of any 
religious beliefs or considerations he or she might have? 
Would adherence to these values produce the ideal 
Singaporean and a model citizen? "Ideal" and "model" in 
whose eyes? What will happen to Singaporeans who do not 
subscribe to, or accept some or all of these values? 
The raising of questions such as these brings up the 
suspicion that there might be more than the dubious or 
contentious notion that the introduction of these values 
will make Singapore a better, more moral, more Asian place 
to live in. And indeed, it will be proposed that the Shared 
Values is indeed an ideology. Formulated by the Government, 
it of course reflects its interests. But we will see that 
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the ideology also reflects and functionally supports the 
economic system of Singapore - economic post-Confucianism. 
We will suggest also that this Shared Values/National 
Ideology enterprise is a form of a civil religion or a 
possible civil religion in the making. Incorporating the 
Shared Values, this civil religion could on one level be 
understood as the expression of the cohesion or the 
integration of the nation. On the other hand, it promotes 
nationalism. The civil religion is seen as important to the 
task of nation-building, and may also be interpreted as the 
response of a continually and anxiously modernizing 
Government to the specific problems of nation-building. 
Singapore's history illuminates these problems. It has 
survived basically because it has served the economic needs 
of all who have called upon it. A multi-racial, multi-
religious, multi-cultural society of mainly immigrants now 
make up the nation. Different religious traditions and 
cultural practices always carry the potential for civil 
conflict, and thus a civil religion is formed not just to 
control and disarm the different religions, but also to 
channel fundamental allegiance to the nation. National 
loyalties and a transcendent meaning to the nation is thus 
promoted, made possible by the privatized nature of the 
religions. Such devotion to the nation and the sense that 
the nation is special and should be sacred to the citizen 
is legitimised by the constant hectoring that the nation's 
survival depends on its people giving their all to the 
2 
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nation. The Shared Values and the civil religion is a creed 
to enable them to do so, and such commitment to the civil 
religion will be rewarded, it is promised, by more economic 
success - further proof of the survival of the nation - and 
more of the Good Life. 
civil religion has different, complex, multifaceted 
forms. It is a slippery concept, and is hard to define 
completely. Is the Singapore version a new form or is it 
unique to the local situation? Its roots appear to lie in 
Confucian values derived from local culture and which seem 
ideal for a civil religion that would ultimately justify 
its presence by economic growth in the name of the nation. 
What of the Church's response, which surely should be 
in the name of the Father? Has it identified the presence 
of the civil religion, and realised that its sacralizing of 
nationalism may be idolatry? will it be able to hold its 
ground, or even justify its existence against a civil 
religion that in time to come, may claim the allegiance and 
devotion of all who would enjoy the fruits of the economy; 
the Good Life of affluence and consumerism? In not wanting 
to rock the boat, has it already been seduced into being 
merely a part of the legitimising ideological structure of 
the State? What indeed is the role of the Church in the 
face of a Government quietly but firmly promoting a civil 
religion? 
We shall explore some answers in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SINGAPORE 
When the "Miss Universe" contest was hosted by 
Singapore in 1987, the tagline used to promote the country 
on satellite television allover the world was "Surprising 
Singapore". An apt description indeed, when one, after 
knowing of its economic success, then learns it is only a 
small island 42 kilometres in length, 23 kilometres in 
breadth, and 580.6 square kilometres in area. Its 
international renown appears disproportionate to its size! 
Another aspect that may be surprising about Singapore is 
that as a nation-state it is relatively new. Singapore 
became in any sense important only after 1819 when it was 
established by the British East India Company. Also, 
political independence was not obtained until 1965 - a 
late starter (although development socially, politically 
and economically was already going on) compared to other 
nations in South-East Asia. The major span of Singapore's 
modern history thus occurred between 1819 and 1965. This 
chapter will provide a basic sketch of that history, as 
well as post-1965 developments. 
A. 1819 - 1959. 
singapore lies approximately 136.8 kilometres north of 
the Equator,and has as its immediate neighbours Malaysia 
and Indonesia. The resident population at June 30, 1991 was 
calculated to be 2,762,700, consisting 77.7 % Chinese 
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residents, 14.1 % Malays, 7.1 % Indians, with other ethnic 
groups making up 1.1 %. This much can be ascertained in 
1993. However, we cannot be so certain about the Singapore 
past before 1819. There can be no precise date for the 
beginnings of Temasek (or Tumasik) the old name for 
Singapore. The Javanese Nagarakretagama of 1365 does 
mention a Temasek or Sea Town. There is also a third-
century Chinese account which describes Singapore as Pu-
luo-chung or "island at the end of a peninsula". Be that as 
it may, by the end of the 14th century, Temasek was in the 
middle of a conflict between the Javanese Majapahit Empire 
and Siam (Thailand) for the control of the Malacca Strait 
and the Malayan Peninsula. Temasek gave allegiance to Siam 
until the governor (sent by the Siamese) was murdered by 
Parameswara, a prlnce of Palembang who had been given 
asylum there from Majapahit. Parameswara then installed 
himself as Temasek' s new ruler. 1 He was soon driven out 
however, north to the Malayan peninsula. Around 1400 
Temasek became a Siamese vassal state. This led to the end 
of the island's commercial activity and became instead a 
centre for piracy, until it sank into subsequent 
obscurity, only re-appearing in the light of history with 
the arrival of Stamford Raffles. 
By the end of the 18th century Britain, which had 
lLegend attributes the name "Singapura", "city of the lion", 
to Parameswara or one of his ancestors who, landing at Temasek, 
saw a strange animal resembling a lion. It is possible too that 
Parameswara named his settlement thus to signify he was 
reestablishing there his Palembang lion-throne. 
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developed trade with China, was In urgent need of a 
sheltered port - a half-way house - on the long sea route 
between India and China, to refit, resupply, and protect 
its fleet against the Dutch navy and local pirates. As a 
result Penang was established as a trading post in 1786, 
but it was soon found that Penang was too far from the 
Malacca Strait to be truly advantageous to the East India 
Company. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen (off west 
Sumatra), Thomas Stamford Raffles was then instructed to 
find a new trading post at the most central point possible 
in the region of the straits. On 28 January 1819 Raffles 
disembarked at Singapore. He had determined that it was at 
the southern approach to the Malacca Strait, that it had 
suitable harbours, and that there were no Dutch already in 
Singapore! 2 
"Modern Singapore dates from 30 January 1819, when the 
local chief tan, the Temenggong of Joho~e, signed a 
preliminary treaty with ... Raffles, agent of the East India 
Company, permitting the British to set up a trading post".] 
A formal treaty was then signed on 6 February 1819 with the 
SuI tan of Johore and the Temenggong. "From the beg inning 
Raffles regarded Singapore as a commercial centre. He had 
written in June 1819, 'Our object is not territory but 
2R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Singapore, The Legacy of Lee 
Kuan Yew. (Boulder: westview Press, 1990), p.42. 
]C. M. Turnbull, A History of singapore« 1819-1988, second 
edition, (singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.1. 
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trade; a great commercial emporium ... ' ,," And indeed, 
Singapore proved to be a prized catch. By 1820 it was 
earning revenue, and Raffles wrote to his cousin in July 
that year: "My settlement continues to thrive most 
wonderfully; it is all and everything I could wish and if 
no untimely fate awaits it, promises to become the emporium 
and the pr ide of the East". 5 
1824 was a decisive year - Raffles' "settlement" was 
acknowledged as a permanent British possession as a result 
of two treaties. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty, signed in March 
1824 had the Dutch ceasing all further objections to the 
British being in Singapore; and a Treaty of Friendship and 
Alliance (August 1824) ln which Sultan Hussein and the 
Temenggong ceded the island and all islets within ten miles 
of its shores to the British. 6 
singapore grew rapidly from then on. "In 1825-40, the 
sheltered deep-water harbour established itself as a 
rendez-vous for large European merchant vessels and the 
boats of Chinese and other local owners, the former with 
goods from India (textiles, arms, opium) for redistribution 




and tin".7 Although 
~ilne and Mauzy, op.cit., p, .43. 
European merchants 
7Philippe Regnier, Singapore, City-State In South-East Asia, 
(London: Hurst & company, 1987) , p.17. 
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controlled British and Indian trade, Singapore was also an 
important centre for Asian-dominated Indonesian, Siamese, 
Chinese, and Malaysian trade. The majority of immigrants 
were indeed attracted to Singapore precisely because it was 
a trading centre. Although in January 1819 Singapore had 
about 1,000 inhabitants, the first official census in 1842 
showed that the population had increased to nearly 11,000. 
By 1860, the population was over 80,000, of whom about 
50,000 were Chinese, 13,000 were Indians, and 11,000 were 
Malays. Europeans present remained a small minority, made 
up mainly of senior administrators and merchants. 8 
The next development was in 1826, when the East India 
Company united Singapore with Penang and Malacca to form 
the Straits Settlements. Penang was made the capital then, 
but by 1832, Singapore became the centre of government of 
the Settlements. On April 1, 1867, the straits Settlements 
were converted into a Crown Colony, under the Colonial 
Office in London. Three factors arose next which combined 
steadily to accelerate and consolidate her growth in the 
last quarter of the 19th century: the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869, the extension of British protection (and 
involvement) to the Malay States, which began in 1874 and 
was known as the British "forward movement", and the steady 
conversion of cargo shipping to steam from the mid-1860s. 
Singapore ceased to be an isolated settlement, 
divorced from the hinterland, looking out to sea, 
living on her nerves and her wits 1n the 
8Milne & Mauzy, op.cit., p.43. 
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uncertainties of international trade. She 
acquired permanent status as a major entrepot on 
the leading East-West Straits of Malacca trade 
route, the focus for the trading wealth of the 
Malay peninsula and the Dutch East Indies, and 
one of the most vital commercial key points of 
the British Empire. 9 
With the development of rubber planting in Malaya, 
especially after the 1870s, Singapore also became the 
world's main sorting and exporting centre of the commodity. 
with trade expanding eightfold between 1873 and 1913, 
Singapore enjoyed unprecedented prosperity. 
Singapore became strategically significant again after 
World War I when Japanese armed power became obvious to the 
West. The Washington Naval treaties of 1922, as part of a 
major power agreement to restrict the building of 
battleships, had Britain agreeing not to construct a naval 
base anywhere east of 110 degrees longitude. This left out 
Hong Kong, and made Singapore the logical site. 
"Construction of the Fortress Singapore naval base, with 
its big guns designed to fire armor-piercing shells against 
battleships as the key to its sea defense, began shortly 
thereafter and was completed just before the beginning of 
World War 11".10 
In the meantime, what of colonial rule in the late 
1930's? The limited objectives of such rule were satisfied. 
The wealthy and well-educated had a say in the running of 
government which was usually heeded, al though ultimate 
~Turnbull, op.cit., p.76. 
l~ilne & Mauzy, op.cit., p.45. 
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control or power was not theirs'. Thr rest of the 
population was indifferent but not hostile to the ruling 
powers. Singapore was still just a collection of immigrant 
communities, with their varying cultures, interests and 
loyalties rooted to their foreign native countries, and 
having the ultimate ambition often to return "home", 
whether it was Britain, India or China. The Singapore 
residents were content to leave government in the hands of 
the colonial authorities, and by and large, a reasonable 
level of eff icient administration was achieved. It was 
therefore a time of peace, increasing comfort and leisure 
for the well-off upper and middle levels of Singapore 
society.In what can be termed a "supply-side/trickle down 
effect", some of the benefits from improved public works 
and amenities did permeate through to the mass of the 
population. However, as a young American was quoted as 
saying in 1937, "The Government of the Colony is run by a 
small group of insiders living a life the comforts and 
luxuries of which are rarely inspired by too close contact 
with the sordid poverty which has set its stamp on the 
great bulk of the population" and "it is still no 
exaggeration to say that it is a government run by and for 
those who have won through to power and wealth, and devil 
take the hindermost". Britsh colonial rule had apparently 
lost the zest and vitality which had been present in the 
early part of the century. Instead, it had become jaded, 
smug, complacent, yet seemed as firmly rooted in Singapore 
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as ever. "Imperialism appears always to be committed to 
perpetuating its own rule unless it is challenged by a 
force which makes it necessary or expedient for it to 
wi thdraw" . II 
The challenge arrived, and peace and prosperity (and 
for some, the easy life) came to an end when Japanese 
aircraft bombed Singapore in the early morning of December 
8, 1941. The Japanese had also landed troops near the Thai-
Malayan border and were marching and bicycling down the 
peninsula towards Singapore. Morale was hardly boosted when 
two of the mightiest capital ships of the British Royal 
Navy, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, were sunk by the 
Japanese air force off Kuantan on the east coast of the 
peninsula. Britain clearly did not consider the possibility 
of a Japanese invasion by land from the Malayan peninsula, 
which was only separated by a narrow stretch of water from 
the island I s practically undefended northern shore. And 
thus, the siege of "impregnable" Fortress Singapore lasted 
just two weeks. with the "big guns" useless against a land 
army and pointing the wrong way, food and water dwindling 
fast, with no fleet or aerial defence to defend itself, 
civilians and troops alike in panic and disarray, on 
February 15, 1942 General Arthur Percival surrendered the 
pearl of the British empire in South-East Asia to the 
Japanese, without too much of a fight. Winston Churchill 
called it "one of the greatest disasters in British 
IITurnbu 11, op. cit.« p. 155. 
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history". It was obviously disastrous too for the civilian 
population of Singapore - renamed "syonan" (light of the 
south) - during the three-and-a-half year occupation by the 
Japanese forces. Unprecedented hardship was the common lot, 
with the Chinese singled out for atrocities because of old 
historical hatreds. 
One lesson (or reminder of singapore's strategic 
geographical position) came from the fact that between 1942 
and 1945 the Japanese placed Singapore at the centre of 
their "Co-prosperity Sphere" in South-East Asia. They 
obviously knew how to benefit from Singapore's unique 
geographical features, and "Syonan" was also made the base 
for their administrative and military command in Malaya and 
throughout the region. "The visit of Prime Minister Tojo in 
1943 confirmed Singapore as the cornerstone in the 
construction of 'Grand East Asia' and as the communication 
centre for the New Order" .12 
The "New Order" came to an end when the British forces 
returned in September 1945, and until March 1946, Singapore 
came under the British Military Administration. When 
Singapore fell in 1942, The Times in London carried the 
headline "More than the evacuation of a town, it was the 
end of an era". And indeed it was. After the suffering of 
the last three-and-a-half years, the British were welcomed 
back as liberators. However, colonized South-East Asia was 
not the same as before the war the myth of "whi te 
12' . t 22 Regnler, Op.Cl ., p. . 
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supremacy" had been forever shattered. 
But it was a different Singapore and a changed 
South-East Asia to which the Commonwealth troops 
returned in 1945 ... the statue of Raffles, which 
the British restored to Empress Place, had 
somehow faded in colour. 'The halo of victory 
must shine on the Union Jack, but today there 
remains little vestige of its glory of former 
times.' The regime was welcomed back with genuine 
relief because it was benign, its weaknesses were 
sins of omission, its memory was not marred by 
cruel ty or dragooning the population. But the 
only ultimate justification for a colonial power 
was its ability to protect and in this the 
British colonial regime had been tried and found 
wanting. The old unquestioning trust in British 
protection had been shattered for ever ... For the 
moment, the return of the British meant the end 
of a nightmare. Another ten years were to pass 
before the emergence of leaders of a new 
generation, who had experienced the shock of the 
surrender and occupation and the exhilaration of 
the post-war winds of change, and who were to 
challenge the British right to rUle. 13 
B. Political Awakening: Towards Self-Government (1946-1959) 
British civilian rule was reestablished in April 1946, 
and with it, the straits Settlements was disbanded. Malacca 
and Penang were joined with the other Malay states to form 
the Malayan Union, while Singapore was made a separate 
Crown colony. The colonial authorities then aimed to work 
gradually towards internal self-government and to build up 
feelings of common loyalty towards Singapore as a permanent 
home. By this time, singapore's inhabitants still 
cosmopolitan and mixed comprised approximately 78% 
Chinese, 12 % Malays and Indonesians, 7% Indians, and 3 % 
Europeans, Eurasians and others. The people, especially the 
13ATurnbull, op.cit., p.214. 
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merchant class, were by now clamouring for a say in the 
government. The 1947 census also revealed a surprisingly 
large proportion of local-born Singaporeans, and this 
strengthened calls for developing political responsibility 
and self-government. Plans were then made to transfer power 
to Singaporeans gradually by developing the existing 
executive and legislative bodies into separate Councils 
(accomplished in July 1947), and by widening 
representation. The British were also becoming concerned 
over the growing influence of the Communists inside 
Singapore's trade unions and Chinese middle schools. The 
political division emerging in Singapore then was between 
the English educated of all races and the Chinese-educated 
Chinese. "The former were stereotyped as privileged, 
politically apathetic, exam oriented, competitive, 
individualistic, and not culturally 'solid'. The latter 
were identified as cultural chauvinists and either 
Communist or pro-Communist" .14 Thus the policy of the 
British was to ensure the gradual transfer of some power 
specifically to the non-Communist English-educated straits-
born subjects of Singapore, since there were internal 
secur i ty problems posed by the Communists, and the fear 
that they would use postwar nationalist sentiments for 
their own ends, unless some progress was seen to be made in 
the direction of political liberalization. These "political 
divisions" could be seen when Singapore's first election -
14Milne & Mauzy, op.cit. I p.46. 
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with limited francise - was held on March 20, 1948. This 
was for six elected seats in the Legislative Council, but 
only a fraction of the populace was eligible to vote, and 
of these, only a fraction actually bothered to register and 
vote. The Progressive Party enjoyed significant support and 
won three seats - the elected members were all English-
speaking lawyers and political moderates. The Party itself 
continued to win seats on the Municipal Commission in 1949 
and in the 1951 Legislative Council elections, but it was 
very pro-British and "was badly out of touch with the 
masses" . 15 
At the end of 1953, the British government appointed 
a commision under Sir George Rendel to review Singapore's 
constitutional position and to make recommendations for 
change. Its report came out in 1954, and the "Rendel 
Constitution" thus came into force in 1955, providing for 
the automatic registration of voters and a legislative 
assembly with an elected majority.The leader of the 
majority party would also become the chief minister and 
would select a cabinet. Some degree of self-rule would be 
given, but Britain would still have control over some 
important subjects or areas. The British governor would not 
even be required to accept any advice given by the elected 
chief minister! The Rendel proposals were duly accepted by 
the Government, and elections were called for April 1955 
which motivated the formation of several new political 
ISIbid. ,p.47. 
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parties. The Labour Front was formed in late 1954 by David 
Marshall and Lim Yew Hock under the banner of being a 
liberal but moderate left-wing party. Recognising that the 
future belonged to politicians who could command the 
loyalty of the Chinese-educated, another party, the 
People's Action Party (PAP) was inaugurated in October 1954 
in the Victoria Memorial Hall at a gathering of more than 
1500 people. Lee Kuan Yew was made the leader of a 
committee comprising trade unionists and Chinese- and 
English-educated radicals. The presence at the inauguration 
of Tunku Abdul Rahman, head of the united Malay National 
Organisation from Malaya, and Sir Tan Cheng Lock, leader of 
the Malayan Chinese Association, underlined the PAP's 
intention to move away from narrow, parochial Singapore 
affairs to a wider Malayan horizon. "The party pledged 
itself to agitate in the coming elections for immediate 
independence in union with the Federation, for the repeal 
of the emergency regulations, 16 a common Malayan 
citizenship, complete Malayanization of the civil service, 
free compulsory education, the encouragement of local 
industry, the amendment of trade union legislation and for 
a workers' charter" . 17 The PAP had support from pro-
communist trade unionists and Chinese students who could 
garner support from the Chinese-educated Chinese and the 
I~hen the Communist Party of Malaya tr ied to take over 
Malaya and Singapore by force, a state of emergency was declared 
in June 1948, which lasted 12 years. 
17Turnbull,op.cit.,p.248. 
16 
lower-economic classes. Its clenched fist salutes and 
singing of international communist songs helped also in 
giving the PAP a radical, socialist, anticolonial image. 
Another party, the Democratic Party, was formed in February 
1955, as a conservative and communal party with the aim of 
defending and enhancing Chinese culture. The Progressive 
Party (PP) also intended to contest the election, as did 
the Alliance, a coalition of separate ethnic groups, like 
its parent body in Malaya. 
The 1955 election was the first lively political 
contest in Singapore's history. Automatic registration had 
increased the number of voters from 75,000 to over 300,000 
and, for the first time, it included large numbers of 
Chinese-educated voters who had previously been politically 
indifferent. The election thus marked a vigorous, 
vociferous political awakening in various ways. It began 
years of energetic and persistent constitutional struggle 
when new nationalist leaders emerged and issues truly 
affecting the majority of the Singapore people were brought 
into the political arena. "The 1955 election was the 
funeral of conservative politics ... the future belonged to 
politicians of the left who aimed to seize self-government 
as quickly as possible and to build up mass support against 
colonial rule". 18 The Labour Front won ten out of twenty 
five seats, and with the support of three seats from the 
Alliance, and two nominated members, it formed the 
18Ibid. ,p.252. 
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government with David !·:arshall as chief minister. The PP 
and the Democrats did badly. The PAP won three seats, with 
strong support from pro-government organizations. 
Marshall's term as chief minister, lasting fourteen 
months, were marked by riots and strikes, not helped by his 
apparent unwillingness to take any sort of firm action. 
However, he did bring about talks on constitutional reform 
in which he demanded complete self-rule for Singapore. The 
first All-Party Constitutional Mission to London took place 
April-May 1956, and although the British finally agreed to 
almost everything the delegates had wanted, with the 
exception of control over emergency internal security 
powers, the talks broke down when Marshall (against the 
urging of Lee Kuan Yew and other delegates present) refused 
to accept the package offered. In June 1956 Marshall 
resigned. 
Lim Yew Hock, the former deputy leader of the Labour 
Front, became the new chief minister, Faced immediately 
with the same sort of problems Marshall had in singapore, 
Lim acted differently by hi tting back at the unions and 
Chinese students. There was an extensive anti-Communist 
security crackdown involving widespread use of powers such 
as detention, banishment, deregistration of organizations 
and societies, closure of two Chinese middle schools, and 
even calling in the British army when he deemed it 
necessary. These actions led to him being perceived by the 
people as a tool of British imperialism and a colonial 
18 
stooge, and he made it worse for himself by uSlng as ~uch 
force against the students as against unruly unionists -
and thus perceived as attacking Chinese culture. 19 The PAP 
was greatly helped by a wave of arrests ordered by the Lim 
government on August 22, 1957. The sweep netted thirty five 
pro-Communists, five of whom were on the PAP Executive 
committee. These arrests were significant for the PAP 
because at its party conference elections on August 4, the 
pro-Communists had planned to seize control of the party 
from the moderates through "fixed" elections. The moderates 
grasped the opportunity the arrests gave them to regain 
control of the party and to alter the PAP constitution to 
prevent any further "coups". 
Lim was also politically committed to seeking 
constitutional reform, and the March 1957 constitutional 
mission to London led by him succeeded in obtaining the 
main terms of a new singapore Constitution. On May 28, 1958 
the Constitutional Agreement was signed in London. And so 
it was that in August 1958, the British Parliament passed 
a state of Singapore Act, which converted the colony into 
a state with control over all domestic affairs. Internal 
security would be handled by the Internal security Council, 
comprising representatives from Singapore, the Federation 
of Malaya and Britain. There would be an elected 51-member 
Legislative Assembly. The Prime Minister would select his 
cabinet, and after a short while, a local Chief of state 
19 • • t 49 Mllne & Mauzy,op.Cl .,p .. 
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(Yang Di-Pertuan Negara) would be chosen. The British 
government would retain control of defence and foreign 
affairs, and could only suspend the constitution and assume 
full powers of government through its commissioner in the 
event of a grave emergency. "The only controversial point 
was the British insistence that known subversives should be 
excluded from the first elections, which were scheduled to 
be held in May 1959 to bring the new constitution into 
force" .20 
Coming into the election, the Lim Yew Hock government 
had big problems - the economy was a mess with declining 
trade; unemployment was rising; there were severe shortages 
in housing, schools, and health clinics; and even the local 
birthrate was getting too high. The PAP, on the other hand, 
looked a wlnner. Besides affirming its continuing 
commi tment to complete independence through merger wi th 
Malaya, the focus of the campaign was on bread-and-butter 
issues - the kind that was hurting the Li~ government -
with merger as the ultimate cure for Singapore's economlC 
problems. As Turnbull so succintly puts it, 
Claiming to be 'a party founded on principle, not 
opportunism', PAP leaders promised 'honest and 
eff icient government', which would tackle the 
problems of education, labour, trade unions, 
social security, housing, rural development, 
health and the status of women. They pledged to 
work towards uniting Singapore with the 
Federation. Their primary aim was to 'infuse into 
our multiracial society the spirit of belonging 
to a nation', and the next priority was to 
transform Singapore from a trading to an 
2~urnbull,op.cit.,p.261. 
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industrial society, 'to obtain for the general 
masses of tte people a happy, full and secure 
livelihood' .21 
It nust be said that the state of affairs in Singapore 
in 1993, including its "success", was largely due to the 
PAP keeping its pledges in its own inimitable way after it 
swept into power in the May 1959 election. The Party 
contested all 51 seats and won 43, obtaining 53.4 % of the 
total votes. 4 seats went to the Singapore People's 
Alliance (Lim Yew Hock's new party), 3 to UMNO-MCA 
Alliance, and the remaining seat to an Independent. 
with this then, and for the first time, Singapore had 
a fully elected government and one with a strong working 
majority. On the evening of June 3, 1959, with huge 
celebrations going on, Singapore was proclaimed a state by 
the Governor, Sir William Goode, who also became the first 
Yang Di-Pertuan Negara. The first Government of the State 
of Singapore was sworn in on June 5, with Lee Kuan Yew as 
Prime Minister. 
c. 1959 Present: Towards stability, Progress, and 
prosperity. 
The PAP had achieved power in a united front with the 
Communists to fight British colonialism. As has been 
mentioned earlier, the Communists were also in control of 
many mass organisations, especially of worker unions and 
students. It was thus an uneasy alliance between the PAP 
2lIbid. ,p.263. 
21 
leaders who were moderates, and the pro-Communists 
another example of politics bringing together "strange bed-
fellows", but also one in which each side was seeking to 
use the other for its own particular objective. The PAP 
moderates wanted full independence for Singapore as part of 
a non-Communist Malaya; the Communists wanted a take-over. 
Lee Kuan Yew had no illusions over this: he was quoted 
during the 1959 election campaign as saying that the "real 
fight" between the PAP and the Malayan Communist Party 
(many of whose members were in the PAP) would begin after 
the election. 22 
still, the new government soon got to work. It knew it 
had to "deliver the goods"; that it would survive, or 
continue . 1n power, only if it performed effectively. A 
Central Executive Committee Policy statement, dated 
December 31, 1960, had these words: "At the end of our term 
of office, the people will judge us not on the basis of our 
capacity for slogan-shouting ... but on whether we have been 
able to protect the livelihood of the people ... and to 
expand the social, health, housing, 
cuI tural services for the people". 23 
educational and 
In short, the PAP government had to gain the 
confidence and allegiance of the people in spite of (and 
because of) the ever-present Communist influence at the 
22M i In e & M au z y , 0 p . cit. c p . 52 • 
23Raj K. Vasil, Governing Singapore, rev.ed. (Singapore: 
Times Books International, 1988), p.10. 
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grass-roots. In fact, the government machinery started 
establishing its own grass-roots organisations, such as the 
People's Association, Ci tizens ' Consultative Committees, 
and community centres to build support for its own policies 
and to counter the pro-Communist influence. The government 
also stopped using the party or legislature to discuss 
policies. It might thus be said that out of the internal 
PAP struggle between the "moderates" and the "radicals/pro-
Communists" , the style or pattern in the PAP of "no 
discussion and little consultation", and of ignoring the 
party membership and ordinary membership between elections 
developed, into a working style for the PAP for years to 
come.24 
Another side to this governing style , a combination 
of style and substance, one might say, was seen in the way 
the leaders dressed: white short-sleeved cotton shirts as 
befitting busy, hard-working, dedicated government servants 
intent on turning ideas into action for the sake of the 
nation. 25 And for the sake of the nation, the trade unions 
were targeted for reform (and as such, also undermining 
Communist influence). Industrialization was seen as one 
important answer to such economic woes as Singapore's high 
unemployment. Singapore thus needed industrialization, and 
to achieve that it needed industrial peace. The Trade 
24Milne & MauzY,op.cit. « pp.55-56. 
2ST. J • S. George, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1974), p.52. 
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Unions (Amendment) Act of 1959 was passed to curb splinter 
unions, for example. It was not till 1967 and 1968 that 
legislation stripped unions of most of their powers, and by 
then the National Trades Union Congress had been set up as 
the official "umbrella" organisation for unions, as well as 
being an open partner of the government. 
The tension between the PAP and the pro-Communists 
finally led to an open split in 1961. In May Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, prime minister of Malaya, had suggested in a 








protectorate Brunei might be united as "Malaysia". The 
Tunku meant it as a tentative suggestion; Lee and his 
associates acted as if the Tunku's speech was an official 
invitation! This was understandable since merger with 
Malaya (and thus a common market) was seen as another 
answer to Singapore's economic problems. Merger was also a 
solid issue to use in the inevitable confrontation with the 
"radicals" in the PAP. A vote of confidence on merger was 
therefore called in the Assembly on July 21, 1961 and the 
PAP barely made it with 27 votes out of 51. 13 PAP 
assemblymen had deserted it for the opposition. The 
Communists were totally against merger - Malaya's stringent 
internal security laws were obviously anathema to them -
and they were prepared to do battle with the PAP moderates 
(and perhaps show the government could not survive without 
Communist backing) over this issue. 
24 
And so the split occurred. On July 26, the 13 
assemblymen and 22 branch officials were expelled from the 
PAP. They announced in turn that they were forming a new 
political party, the Barisan Sosialis. Very quickly, 35 of 
51 branch committees, 19 of the 23 paid organising 
secretaries, and about 70% of the PAP ordinary members went 
over to the Barisan. As Goh Keng Swee, then Minister of 
Finance, commented: "What shook us was not that we had lost 
the fight to the communists, but that it was done with such 
contemptuous ease: just one flick of the hand, and we were 
down on the floor".26 
The PAP nevertheless began hard selling of "merger" to 
the people through radio talks, debates, speeches in 
constituencies, and ln newspapers. A White Paper stating 
the PAP's stand on the conditions for merger was released 
in November 1961, and a referendum on merger was scheduled 
for September 1, 1962. The referendum itself did not offer 
voters the choice of no merger - just 3 different sets of 
terms of merger. The result: 71% of the votes went to the 
PAP's own favoured terms of central government 
responsibility for defence, foreign affairs and internal 
security, and local autonomy in education and labour. 
Under the Malaysia Agreement, finally concluded in 
MOennis Bloodworth,The Tiger and the Trojan 
Horse, (Singapore: Times Books Internatio~al, 1986), pp.243-244. 
This book as well as John Drysdale, Slngapore~ Struggle for 
Success, '(Singapore: Times Books International, 1984) are 
authoritative, well-written accounts of the tumultuous 1950s and 
'60s in Singapore. 
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July 1963, Singapore, Sara-,.,ak, North Borneo (now Sabah) 
were federated with the existimg states of Malaya to form 
Malaysia. While Singapore kept powers over her finance, 
labour and education affairs, she relinquished control over 
foreign affairs, defence and internal security to the 
central government. 15 seats were allotted in the 127-
member federal legislature to Singapore, who retained her 
own executive government and Assembly as well as her own 
Yang Di-Pertuan Negara and Public Service commission. She 
was responsible for her own executive administration and 
day-to-day policies. In terms of division of revenues, she 
was obliged to pay to the central government 40 % of her 
income from taxes, which came to 27 % of her total revenue. 
"Lee Kuan Yew declared Singapore's freedom unilaterally on 
31 August 1963, the date originally set for the corning into 
being of the new federation, so that the island enjoyed an 
anomalous fifteen days of full independence before becoming 
part of Malaysia". 27 Malaysia was off icially formed on 
September 16, 1963. While the Phillipines and Indonesia 
were both against the merger, it was President Sukarno of 
Indonesia who actively opposed it during 3 years of 
"Confrontation". 
During this transitional period, the PAP was also 
gearing up for another battle with the Barisan, through a 
snap election called for September 23, 1963. In February 
1963, police in what was called Operation Cold Store 
27Turnbu 11, op. cit.« p. 274 . 
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arrested 107 pro-Communists alleged to be subversives. 
Those detained included 24 Barisan members (in fact, most 
of its executive committee) and 21 union leaders. Seven 
Barisan assemblymen were later arrested when a 
demonstration they were in turned violent. The PAP also 
froze the funds of 3 of the largest unions affliated to the 
Barisan and dissolved 5 mass organisations. 
The PAP won the September 1963 election with 37 out of 
51 seats. The Barisan obtained 13 seats. The PAP had shown 
its effectiveness as a government by then in tackling 
unemployment and in building more low-cost housing, schools 
and hospitals, and a crucial winning factor was its success 
in achieving merger and ending colonial rule. 
The merger proved to be short-lived, traumatic and 
unhappy. After 23 months Singapore was expelled from the 
federation on August 9, 1965. The events during this period 
leading to the separation have been extensively analysed28 
(with, doubtless, doctoral dissertations written on them) , 
so I shall only focus on some highlights. 
There were already incompatibilities and divisions 
existing from the sheer fact of Singapore being an urban, 
commercial and industrial society, and that of Malaya being 
a rural, racially divided society still largely traditional 
in its outlook. The lack of understanding already present 
was emphasised in the differences between the styles and 
28See for example, Tae Y. Nam, Rac ism« Nationa 1 ism« and 
Nation-Building in Malaysia and Singapore (Meerut, India: Sadhna 
Prakashan, 1973). 
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personalities of the Malayan Alliance ruling coalition 
government and those of the PAP leaders. One economic goal 
which was important to Singapore - that of a common market 
- failed to materialise, apparently because the Malaysian 
finance minister who was also president of the Malaysian 
Chinese Association, Tun Tan Siew Sin, objected to any 
possible increase of Singapore's economic advantages at the 
expense of local MeA businessmen. 
Politically, the "ultra-conservatives" of the united 
Malays National Organization (UMNO) - the dominant party in 
the Alliance distrusted the PAP's support of 
multiracialism and of it being "socialist"; understandable, 
when recognising the inherent conservatism and communalism 
found in federal Malaysian politics. The PAP on its part 
seemed oblivious to any ethnic and political sensitivity 
necessary, and charged into federal politics without 
appearing to 
. recognl.se the delicate fabric of the new 
federation, and the always-present tension (perhaps even 
irreconcilable division) between Malay and Chinese. This 
came out in earnest when the PAP stated its intention of 
fielding candidates in the federal elections of 1964 
throughout the peninsula against Tunku Abdul Rahman's 
Alliance party. This only angered the Tunku and increased 
ethnic tensions in the process. On July 12, 1964, an UMNO 
"ultra", Syed Jaafar Albar organised a Muslim convention in 
Singapore which sought to protest against the perceived 
"victimization" of Malays by the PAP. This of course had 
28 
the predicted (and desired?) result of stoking up ethnic 
emotions and hatreds which soon flashed into race riots 9 
days later, after a religious procession of 25,000 Muslims 
in honour of Prophet Muhammad's birthday. The riots lasted 
11 days and left 21 dead and 460 injured. More race riots 
broke out in September; more were left dead. While these 
disturbances occurred in Singapore, there was the fear that 
they would soon spread throughout the whole Malay 
peninsula, and was thus a distinct factor leading to 
Singapore's ultimate ejection from Malaysia. 
The last straw for the Malaysian politicians may well 
have been the formation of the Malaysian Solidarity 
Convention in Singapore on May 9, 1965. This comprised the 
PAP and four opposition parties from the Malayan states and 
Sarawak. The Convention's slogan was "a democratic, 
Malaysian Malaysia", and it called for an end to communal 
politics, and for political affiliation on the basis of 
"common political ideologies and common social and economic 
aspirations". It was distinctly formed as an alternative to 
the Alliance, and thus to Malays this represented 
provocation. 
While the Malaysian Solidarity Convention claimed 
to be non-communal, organized on ideological and 
socio-economic lines, in practice it appealed 
mainly to non-Malays, particularly to the 
Chinese, and the equality it sought implied the 
ultimate withdrawal of Malay privileges. 
Consequently, instead of reducing communal 
tensions, the Malaysian Solidarity Convention 
widened racial rifts. 2'J 
~Turnbull, op.cit., p.284. 
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At the UMNO General Assembly one week after the 
convention I S formation there were persistent and angry 
demands for the arrest of Lee Kuan Yew. 
And so it was that, while convalescing in London, the 
Tunku finally decided that Singapore had to be expelled 
because of the threat of further race riots, and also 
because of the pressure on him to arrest Lee and administer 
Singapore under emergency regulations. A sorrowing (and 
tearful) Lee thus went on radio and television on the 
evening of 9-10 August 1965 to announce the separation, 
saying "For me it is a moment of anguish because all my 
adult life, I have believed in the merger and unity of 
these two territories". Now he and the PAP had to govern a 
sovereign and independent nation. 
D. surviving Independence 
Singapore cannot be understood or viewed in isolation 
from its external environment. The story is not fully told 
of Singapore's struggle for survival after independence if 
one just narrates facts like these: that Singapore was 
admitted to the united Nations on September 21, 1965, that 
it became a member of the Commonwealth of Nations on 
October 15, 1965, or that on December 22, 1965, it became 
a republic with Yusof bin Ishak as the first President. The 
fact remained that for the first time, singapore was on its 
own. The Indonesian-Sukarno policy of "confrontation" was 
still on (it lasted till 1966), and the bad feelings 
engendered in Malaysia by the separation intensified the 
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problem of Singapore's survival. The PAP leaders were now 
"acutely conscious of how precarious were Singapore's 
traditional commercial functions, and thus of the need to 
diversify the economy. In the political field, they saw 
with stark clarity how vulnerable the island was to any 
hostile move by its neighbours". 30 Independence for the 
people of Singapore was thus sudden, shocking, and 
sobering. 
Economically, the island had no natural resources, not 
even enough water for its own needs (even today it buys 
water from Johore), and its domestic market was too small 
to really support its economy. Recognising all this, 
Singapore's strategy for survival and development was 
essentially to take advantage of its location and the 
favourable world economy. 
The leaders quickly got down to work. Sociopolitical, 
economic, and security priorities obviously had to be 
determined. The overall goals had to be political 
stability, economic prosperity, and security - goals still 
valid and being promoted today as always necessary for the 
continued success and survival of Singapore. To survive, 
the nation needed a "rugged society'; the PAP insisted the 
people of Singapore had to be (and must be willing to be) 
dedicated, committed, able to accept (and even understand) 
that the government's goals required allegiance and 
loyalty, order, discipline, and a community-spirit, all 
J(~ e g n i e r, 0 p . cit . « p . 2 4 . 
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willing to work togther as a team. "At the leadership level 
it demanded unified purposefulness; at the administrative 
level, eff iciency; and at the popular level, obedience". 31 
These, according to the PAP, were the traits needed for 
small nation-states to survive. And since the PAP had 
adopted multiracialism as a principle for the nation, it 
then took steps to build up and inculcate what it hoped 
would be a genuine Singaporean national identity - one that 
would be multiethnic, but also cohesive, integrated, 
"tightly knit". 
"The PAP government wanted a compliant citizenry so 
that it could get on with building the new state and 
nation ... because the PAP enjoyed extensive voluntary 
compliance from the citizenry, the government did not 
indulge in many liberal sentiments over sectors of society 
it deemed troublesome. ,,32 The Barisan Sosialis had 
denounced Singapore I s independence as "phoney", and had 
boycotted Parliament when it convened in December 1965. In 
the new few months, some Barisan MPs were arrested, others 
fled the country, while still others quit Parliament with 
the result that by October 1966, no Barisan MP remained in 
Parliament. with decreasing popular support, the party 
found itself increasingly isolated from the public. The PAP 
government also undermined the Barisan' s support bases 
among the students and the unions. Students applying for 
J1Drysdale, op . cit. « p. 182. 
32 • • t 63 Mllne & Mauzy, Op.Cl . « p. . 
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entrance into the university had first to obtain 
"suitability certificates". Teaching in the university, 
particularly in the political science, and philosophy 
departments was carefully checked. When in October and 
November 1966 students staged protest sit-ins and 
examination boycotts, many of them were arrested and 
expelled. The press (then as now) came under close scrutiny 
and control. Again, in the eyes of the PAP, such measures 
were necessary for the sake of the nation; full attention 
could now be given to tackling the economic and social 
problems that face the country. 
Economically, the government launched . a maSSIve 
industrialisation programme with the extension of the 
Jurong industrial estate and the creation of smaller 
estates in Kallang Park, Tanjong Rhu, Redhill, Tiong Bahru 
and Tanglin Halt. But to modernise quickly and 
successfully I taking advantage of "the favourable world 
economy", the PAP leaders also realised Singapore needed 
the capital and technology of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) I which were invited to take part in Singapore's 
economic growth. Acknowledging Singapore's advantageous 
geographical location, policies were made not just to 
promote trade with its neighbours In the 
. regIon, but 
ultimately to see the world as singapore's market place or 
"hinterland" (as observed in early 1993 with calls by the 
government for more singaporeans to take risks by having 
more business ventures overseas, and to be true 
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"entrepreneurs") . But to attract MNCs and trade to 
Singapore's shores, the government also decided that it 
must be regarded as a "safe" place to invest in, so 
conditions such as a politically stable environment, an 
educated and skilled work force, no graft or corruption, 
necessary support industries and institutions had to be 
present. Most of all, there had to be industrial peace and 
established wage policies, as well as "compliant" unions. 
It did not therefore bothered the PAP very much if the 
policies and legislation it had designed to achieve such 
conditions were called repressive or undemocratic. And so 
in August 1966 the government passed far-reaching labour 
legislation, with the purpose of turning union 
confrontation into co-operation and thus providing an 
attractive climate for investment. The new laws sought to 
increase productivity by permitting longer working hours, 
reduced holidays, restricted overtime and bonus payments, 
and limited white-collar workers' fringe benefits. 
Noncitizens and those with criminal records were banned 
from being union officeholders. However the laws also gave 
compensating benefits for the majority of workers, 
providing for sick leave and retrenchment benefits, and 
increasing employers' contributions to the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) .33 Further legislation in 1967 and 
33The CPF was set up in 1955 to provide financial protection 
for workers when they were old or were unable to work. Today it 
has evolved into a comprehensive social security scheme, 
providing for a member's retirement, home ownership and health 
care needs. 
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1968 restricted areas of union activity. Later in 1971 a 
National Wages Council was formed, comprising government, 
trade union and employers ' representatives to set 
guidelines on wage policy and pre-empt industrial action. 
In the eyes of the PAP leaders, the next few years 
showed that what they considered to be their resolve, clear 
thinking, and courage to be tough along with the 
willingness of the citizenry to follow - were paying off 
for Singapore. A new nation-state was indeed being built; 
Singapore had not only survived but had begun to prosper. 
"Singapore in the 1970s gives the impression of a people 
generally satisfied with their government. Lee can 
appreciate the wisdom of an ancient Chinese sage who 
advised a king that if he wanted his subjects to remain 
peaceful, he should keep their stomachs full and their 
heads empty. The majority of Singaporeans appear happy with 
the prosperity that has come their way. More and more young 
people are being turned out with no notion of broad 
democratic values and apparently quite content with the 
good life they are enjoying". J4 One would not be 
exaggerating if it is stated that the economic history of 
Singapore from, say 1968, could be summarised 1n an 
impressive series of statistics and achievements. But that 
would make the rest of this chapter rather pedantic. It 
would be sufficient to note that the government has always 
sought fresh responses and new ways to meet perceived new 
~George, op.cit., p.202. 
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problems. So in 1968, for example, the Economic Development 
Board was re-organised; the Development Bank of Singapore 
(the name says it all) was set up, and in 1970 the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore was established to formulate and 
implement the nation's monetary policies. All these boom 
conditions and foreign capital enabled Singapore to move 
beyond the first labour-intensive stage of industrial 
development; breaking away from a "sweat-shop/cheap labour" 
image, the government tried to encourage more sophisticated 
industries which would develop the technical skills of the 
labour force. Educational policies were modified in the 
late 1970s to expand technical and computer education. 
By the mid-1980s Singapore was no longer 
dependent on entrepot trade, as she had been up 
to the time of independence, but had a 
diversified economy based on commerce, industry 
and a tertiary service sector. Industry was 
steadily moving upmarket, enhancing the skills 
and earning capaci ty of her labour force. In 
addition to a large and increasingly prosperous 
professional and middle class, the mass of the 
population were literate, fully employed and 
decently housed. It was a healthy but 
materialistic and not particularly caring 
society, despite government attempts from the 
early 1980s to instil moral values by promoting 
religious instruction, and especially 
Confucianism, in schools ... Singapore still 
largely followed the West in her economy, 
capitalist style of business, opposition to 
communism, promotion of free trade and respect 
for technology and modernization. Yet the 
republic was far from being a western clone, and 
she rejected competitive politics, individualism 
and the concept of the welfare state. 35 
This extended quote remains largely true for Singapore in 
the early 1990s. It boasts one of the highest living 
35Turnbull, op.cit. « p.326. 
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standards ln Asia; recently it was proudly reported that 
Singapore has been ranked the 18th richest nation in the 
world in per capita terms, using purchasing power parity 
(PPP) , thus putting it ahead of the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. 36 The economy is still thriving: growth was 
8.3% in 1990, 6.7% in 1991, 5.8% in 1992, and the Prime 
Minister, Goh Chok Tong in his National Day message for 
1993 reported "strong growth" of 10.1 % for the April-June 
quarter of 1993, leading to a projected 7.5 to 8 % growth 
for 1993 as a whole. 37 The Prime Minister calmly said "Our 
economy is doing well this year", and later in his speech 
made some comments on the present-day woes of the Western 
industrialised world. 
So everyone in Singapore should be happy, shouldn't 
they, with the call for economic progress being met, and 
the demand for "more good things" apparently being 
fulfilled? We end this chapter with a look at the elections 
in Singapore, from 1968 to 1991, noting the issues from 
"the people" rising up to confront the PAP with each 
successive call for a fresh mandate to govern the country. 
In 1968, with the Barisan Sosialis boycotting the 
general election, the PAP won all 58 of the parliamentary 
seats (51 were uncontested). The PAP also won every seat in 
the next 3 elections 1972, 1976, and 1980 - scorlng 
~he Straits Times, July 8, 1993. PPP essentially indicates 
the goods and services a country's currency can buy at home -
Singapore's was US$15,880. 
37The straits Times, August 9, 1993. 
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between 69 and 75 % of the popular vote against the usual 
handful of 6 to 8 contesting opposition parties. J. B. 
Jeyaretnam of the Workers' Party ended the PAP's monopoly 
in ParI iament when he won a by-election in the Anson 
constituency on October 31, 1981. This victory could be 
regarded as a turning-point of sorts because it shattered 
the myth of PAP invincibility, and at the same time both 
encouraged new opposition party efforts and stimulated the 
interest of Singaporeans in the concept of an opposition. 
In the by-election campaign, the PAP (perhaps believing in 
its invulnerability) made some decisions which angered the 
electorate: blocks of flats in Anson itself were demolished 
to build a new Port of Singapore Authority container 
complex, and this was not helped by the fact that the PAP 
Anson candidate was related to the head of the port 
Authority. Another factor may have been the Speak Mandarin 
campaign, which was unpopular with many of the 78% Chinese 
in Anson. The threat by a second-generation minister that 
the government might pull back on certain benefits for 
Anson if the PAP candidate was not elected, was obviously 
not well-received. 
More surprises came in the December 1984 general 
elections. The PAP was determined to recapture the Anson 
seat, but it also brought into the election a series of 
again unpopular social-remedy policies. There was the 
raising of the CPF withdrawal age, which especially raised 
the hackles of the 45-to-55 age group, since they would now 
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have to wait longer before withdrawing their enforced 
savings, and even bitterly complained that they might not 
live long enough to enjoy the fruits of their labour! A 
compulsory health insurance scheme called Medisave, paid 
through a person's own CPF savings, was introduced. 
"streaming" of students into faster or slower levels of 
learning (based on exam performance) was implemented at 
Primary 3 level. And there was the unforgettable "graduate 
mother" scheme of incentives which gave such mothers and 
some other educationally qualified women priority . l.n 
registering their children for school at certain stages. 
This, and some other incentives came out of Lee Kuan Yew's 
views on the necessity for an elite talent pool, on the 
importance of heredity in producing talent, and from the 
observation that only a low percentage of female college 
and tertiary graduates were married - and those who were 
married were having less children than those women with 
primary or no education! This scheme was obviously branded 
as "elitist", opposed strongly as such, and the policy was 
abandoned in 1985. 
The opposition parties had really little to offer in 
terms of alternative programmes or policies, but they 
apparently struck a responsive note with the electorate 
wi th the simple complaint that the PAP government was 
elitist, arrogant, continually meddling in one's personal 
life, and unfeeling. The election results left the 
opposi tion rej oicing and the PAP sombre and hurt. True, 
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only 2 seats were lost out of 79 - Jeyaretnam retained 
Anson, and Chiam See Tong, leader of the Singapore 
Democratic Party (SOP) captured the Potong Pasir 
constituency - but the PAP was alarmed by its popular vote 
declining by 12.6% to 62.9 %, and it was clear that the 
electorate was delivering a loud protest to the government. 
There were several developments in the political life 
of Singapore before the next election in 1988. On January 
1, 1985 there was a "changing of the guards" in the cabinet 
which now comprised the successor /second generation of 
leaders, Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister, and two other "old 
guards". Goh Chok Tong, the first deputy prime minister, 
also stated that Lee would not be involved in the daily 
administration of the country, and that the new team did 
not expect to be overruled by Lee unless urgent issues were 
involved that affected national security.38 The new team 
also affirmed that it intended to be more open and to 
consult the people on maJor 
. lssues, and admitted to 
mistakes in the past when criticisms had not been listened 
to, or government policies more fully explained. But it was 
reiterated that this new team did not want to be perceived 
as giving in to popular pressure or as seeking short-term 
popularity at the expense of long-term effectiveness 
In early 1987 the government proposed the 
establishment of a "team MP system", which evolved into 
Group Representation constituences (GRCs). This would mean 
38The straits Times, January 1, 1985. 
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three consti tuences be ing combined into a single "super" 
one, and each voter would have to choose between 3-person 
teams offered up by any party contesting in the GRC. All 3 
candidates in a team would thus become MPs if they won that 
consti tuency. Combined with this GRC concept was also a 
plan to have MPs as town councillors to manage the Housing 
& Development Board (public housing) estates in the new 
town areas, and as such, to make local decisions directly 
affecting the lives of constituents. Bearing in mind the 
fact that 87% of the population lived in HDB flats, the PAP 
political rationale seemed obvious and logical: electors 
would be careful about voting for unqualified or 
potentially untrustworthy candidates (in other words, 
opposition candidates) if these people might become their 
own MPs and town councillors! The response was equally 
obvious and logical: the opposition and many Singaporeans 
complained before and during the Parliamentary Select 
Committee hearings in January 1988 that this plan was aimed 
at "fixing" the opposition by changing the electoral rules. 
The opposition consistently had problems attracting into 
its ranks good, qualified, and courageous candidates, and 
the need now to put up a 3 -person team only compounded 
them. The government countered such charges by pointing 
out that the GRC teams would be required to include 
minorities (i.e. non-Chinese), and that Lee Kuan Yew had, 
as early as 1982, proposed such a system as a method of 
ensuring continued minority especially Malay 
41 
representation in Parliament. After much discussion, with 
some attendent unhappiness from the Malays and Indians at 
being singled out, the GRCs legislation was passed in 
Parliament in May 1988. The MP/town councils legislation 
was also passed one month later, in June. 
Another major constitutional move raised in 1988 was 
the proposal for an elected president, to replace the 
customary "figurehead" president as head of state. When Lee 
Kuan Yew first mooted this idea in a National Day speech in 
1984, critics said he wanted the job for himself. The issue 
next came up for debate in mid-1988 when the government 
presented the proposal before Parliament and issued a 
government white paper on the subject. And speculation that 
it as an institution was specially designed for Lee arose 
again. In July 1988 S.Rajaratnam, then a Cabinet Minister, 
said that Lee might be elected President within a year. In 
his National Day Rally speech that year, however, Lee 
dismissed such speculation, and ruled out himself becoming 
the first elected President. 
The proposal provided for a President to be elected 
for a 6-year term in a nation-wide vote, and he would have 
powers beyond the largely ceremonial role played by 
previous Presidents. Chief among these powers is a veto on 
the government's Budget, as well as those of some statutory 
boards and key government companies, if they spent reserves 
accumulated during the term of a previous government in a 
manner which the President considers unwise or dangerous 
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for the welfare of the nation. The President could also 
veto or block appointments to key civil service posts. The 
proposal was thus intended as a safeguard in the event of 
the opposition gaining power because of a "freak" election 
result, and the fear that it could then raid the carefully 
built-up national reserves or dismantle quickly what the 
PAP considered the attributes of an honest civil service. 
This proposed Elected President Bill became a key 
issue during the 1988 general election, debated hotly at 
rallies and in several television debates. A Parliamentary 
Select committee was set up to gather feedback on the Bill, 
and 2 public hearings were held in November 1990. Finally 
the Bill, officially known as the Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore (Amendment No.3 ) Bill was passed 
into law on January 3, 1991. 
81 seats were at stake ln the September 3, 1988 
general election, and the PAP found itself challenged for 
70 of them. As before, the PAP campaigned on its record of 
achievements, this time under the slogan "More Good Years". 
The opposition, as usual, focused on alleged PAP repression 
and abuse of power (as in the 1987 arrests under the 
Internal Security Act of Catholic social workers, known as 
the "Marxist conspiracy"), and the need to check perceived 
authoritarianism in Singapore politics. Thus the Workers' 
Party's slogan was "It's Time!". The PAP won 80 of 81 
seats, losing again Potong Pasir to the incumbent, Chiam of 
the SDP. (J.B. Jeyaretnam had lost his parliamentary seat 
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in November 1986 after being convicted for false 
declarations about his party accounts.) The PAP obtained 
63.2 % of the total votes cast. The opposition had also 
nearly won a handful of seats, especially those with a high 
Malay vote. Prime Minister Lee seemed positive about the 
election result. The Sunday Times, September 4, 1988, 
reported him saying, "This is the people's verdict on the 
new guard ... Their consultative style has won them support". 
There was already talk that Lee would step down as PM 
"within two years" of the 1988 election, and indeed it came 
to be. Lee Kuan Yew resigned as Prime Minister on November 
26, 1990, and Goh Chok Tong was formally sworn in as the 
second Prime Minister of independent singapore on November 
28, 1990. Lee would then become Senior Minister in the 
Prime Minister's Office. 
The end of the 1980s saw a definite change in the 
nature of the electorate. There had been 215,000 new voters 
in 1984, and 206,000 new ones in 1988. They tended to be 
younger, English educated, middle class and therefore 
potentially less compliant and less accepting of 
authoritarianism, and interested in concepts of political 
rights and freedom, and political opposition. 39 How was the 
"new guard", the new team to respond or react to them? 
Although a new style of governing had been promised ( more 
of consensus and openness), the new team had also shown it 
shares the same values, philosophies, and political ideas -
JQMilne & Mauzy, op.cit., pp.68,75. 
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the same substance - of Lee and the PAP "old guard". For 
example, after it had taken over in early 1985, it had been 
willing to take tough, controversial actions in a series of 
events soon after, including the "Marxist. conspiracy", 
restricting the circulation of some foreign publications 
(including Time and Far Eastern Economic Review) for having 
"dabbled in local politics", and restricting the political 
activities of the Singapore Law Society. The new PM Goh 
Chok Tong decided to call for another general election, 
ahead of time, in a call to the people of Singapore to give 
him and his team a strong mandate to govern the nation. He 
wanted the PAP to improve on the 1988 results, and strongly 
stressed that anything less than a 65 % of the popular 
votes for the PAP would be considered a disappointment, and 
not the "strong" mandate he was seeking. 
There were 81 seats this time, and on Nomination Day 
on August 21, 1991, the PAP retained 41 seats unopposed. 
The general election was held on August 31, with the final 
result being a victory for the PAP of 77 seats out of 81 -
i. e. more than 95 % of the seats. And yet the PAP was 
clearly disappointed with the outcome. The total percentage 
of votes the PAP recei ved this time was 61%; by most 
yardsticks a very credible result, but not to the PAP 
leaders. The Prime Minister expressed his feelings clearly 
at the Post-Elections Press Conference when he said "The 
results show that while the voters had given the PAP the 
mandate to govern Singapore, they have not given me the 
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clear endorsement I had hoped for ... That solid endorsement 
did not come. I will have to study the detailed results, to 
reflect over them to understand the meaning and then to 
decide whether and how to continue with my open 
consultative style of government".~ A veiled threat issued 
in the midst of despondency? It was not until November 17, 
1991, at the PAP Convention that Goh showed he had got over 
his disappointment and was getting on with the task of 
. th t I h h . d II • th govern1ng e coun rYe n a speec e sa1 ... we 1n e 
Party and the Government have done very well ... We can be 
proud of our achievements and of the fact that we have 
planned for the future." At the same time he found himself 
puzzled: 
I cannot understand why Singaporeans are still so 
dissatisfied. Some give the reason that people 
now expect more. But I really don't know why. 
I'll be quite frank with you. I haven't thought 
of an answer. Mr. Lee was authoritarian, he came 
down very hard on people who gave wrong views. 
The Government has changed its style. It is now 
more open, consultative, friendly ... Did the votes 
go up or go down? So what do people want? Year 
after year, our lives become better in terms of 
standards, in terms of incomes. The votes go 
down. So there is a negative correlation: The 
more open and friendly we are, the better we do 
for Singaporeans, the worse for votes. 41 
One answer to this "puzzlement" is simple: a large section 
of the voters obviously wanted an opposition in Parliament. 
If this is so, then even if the PAP consistently performed 
credibly and efficiently, it would have to understand that 
~Business Times, (Malaysia), September 2, 1991. 
41The straits Times, November 18, 1991. 
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credible opposition candidates would continue to be voted 
into Parliament, if nothing more than to ensure that the 
government continues to deliver the goods "efficiently" and 
excellently! 
And this brings into focus another major consequence 
of the 1991 election: that there were economic woes, in the 
midst of apparent plenty, among a sizable section of the 
populace. Premier Goh, 4 days after the election, himself 
commented that "style" of governing was of no matter to 
those who voted for the opposition. "Their concerns are 
bread-and-butter issues, and we are going to have to pay 
attention to them". He concluded that there was "a big 
group of Singaporeans who really only care about daily life 
- less taxes, less levies, cheap hospital charges, cheap 
educational services ... All they are interested in 
. 
1S 
stability, progress and prosperity". 42 This awareness of 
disaffection arising primarily from bread--and-butter 
issues was echoed later that same month by Dr. John Chen, 
then Chairman of the Publicity and Publications committee 
of the PAP in an editorial printed in Petir, the PAP 
magazine. Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng Cheong cited as 1 
of 4 broad groups who voted against the PAP, "those who 
could not improve their standard of living", in a speech to 
the Chinese Press Club on September 16. As a local 
political scientist puts it, while Singapore may be one of 
the richest countr ies in the world, and may have very 
42Ibid. c September 5, 1991. 
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impressive foreign reserves, " yet to 80 per cent of the 
population these are meaningless as many of them still live 
a hand-to-mouth existence. The (General Election) 
demonstrated that there were many policies which the 
populace saw as nothing more than 'money-making' ones and 
they showed their anger by voting against the rUling 
party". He identifies policies relating to health, 
education, housing, transportation and telecommunications 
as those arousing anger as they were perceived to be more 
concerned with generating revenue rather than solving the 
people's problems. 43 
There was also the implication from the election 
results that there was now a class problem; a class 
division existing in Singapore politics. As one writer 
noted, there were many Singaporeans were deprived and could 
not make it on their own no matter how hard they tried. 
Between the top 20% and the bottom 20% was an earning gap 
which was growing as a resul t of modernization. "So is 
class resentment. And unless it is raised, society may one 
day be split by class friction". Thus, the class dimension 
of Singapore politics could be discerned in two trends made 
evident in the 1991 election: liThe first is that some of 
those who are left behind are becoming resentful of society 
and blaming the Government for their plight, as reflected 
in the recent general elections". Secondly, there are some 
4JB i I vee r Sing h , \~h i the r PAP's Dom ina n c e ? A nAn a 1 y sis 0 f 
Singapore's 1991 General Elections, (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk 
PUblications, 1992), p.135. 
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who seek to pressurize the Governr.'.ent "to pull back the 
efforts of high achievers to allow themselves or their 
children to catch up". Since these people cannot "level 
up", they want the society to "level down to bring about an 
equalitarian society".44 This "level down" phrase was used 
again, ln a negative way, some time later by the Labour 
Minister Lee Boon Yang. He criticised the opposition 
Singapore Democratic Party for practising "politics of 
envy", and urged it to stop arousing the resentment of the 
poor against the rich. According to him, this would only 
divide society, and such politics would end up making every 
Singaporean poorer. "By doing so, the SDP is attempting to 
level down. Those who have worked harder, done better for 
themselves will be brought down. That will be the result of 
the SDP's politics of envy". This invective was in response 
to the SDP assistant secretary-general Chee Soon Juan who, 
in letters to The straits Times, had portrayed the poor as 
a discontented lot in Singapore. The Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong also got into the act, ticking off the SDP in 
Parliament "for trying to play the haves against the have-
nots" (surely an interesting, significant if defensive 
admission of class divisions in Singapore society), and 
cited figures to show that the Government's policies had 
indeed benefited the poor.H 
""Seah Chiang Nee, Mirror of Opinion, September 4, 1991, 
No.202/91, p.6. 
45The straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, March 20, 1993. 
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The 1991 election did, however, legitimised Goh Chok 
Tong and the second generation's leadership. They no longer 
had to feel themselves under the gigantic shadow of Lee 
Kuan Yew, although he continued to be influential both in 
the government and the country. However, 
What the discourse on the 1991 Singapore GE has 
shown is that as Singapore progressed and became 
successful, it also exacerbated many gaps in the 
country, especially between the rUling party and 
the people. After more than 30 years of growth 
and progress, the country seemed to be 
experiencing the fallouts of success - physical 
and psychologial dislocations, poverty in 
affluence and increasing alienation. There is no 
doubt that political, economic, ethnic and 
psychological divides exist in the country.~ 
The political process goes on. On August 3, 1993 it 
was announced that the Deputy Prime Minister, Ong Teng 
Cheong had decided to run for the post of (the first 
elected) President of the Republic of Singapore. He had 
been nominated by the National Trades Union Congress, of 
which he is secretary-general. He thus resigned as DPM, as 
a member of Parliament, as PAP member, and as Chairman of 
the PAP on August 16 to be eligible for the election. Chua 
Kim Yeow, former Accountant-General and banker, also 
announced his intention to contest the corning election. He 
stated that he had been persuaded by former Deputy Prime 
Minister Goh Keng Swee and current Finance Minister Richard 
Hu to stand for election so that there would be a contest. 
The unique aspect about this election lay in the fact 
that both candidates for the post of Elected President were 
~Singh, oo.cit" p.173. 
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acceptable to the PAP Government, although the National 
Trades Union Congress was solidly behind Mr. Ong, who had 
been its chief for 10 years. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew both came out openly for 
Ong, with Goh even saying he wanted Mr. Ong to win. 
The election was thus held on August 28, 1993 and Mr. 
Ong Teng Cheong won it with 58.7% of the valid votes. Mr. 
Chua Kim Yeow obtained (some would say, a surprising) 41.3 
% of the votes. In the inevitable analysis that followed, 
several political observers commented they had expected Ong 
Teng Cheong to "perform better". Expectations had been that 
the new President would receive at least a 60% or even a 70 
% win, but it was agreed that Ong's victory was enough to 
give him a clear mandate to be the President and to 
exercise the powers of an Elected President. 
Could the 41.3 % of received votes be interpreted as 
a protest vote against the PAP Government? Some observers 
felt that Mr. Ong would have received more votes if not for 
his close connection to the PAP Government. Local 
sociologist Dr. Chiew Seen Kong commented: "I don't think 
it was a contest between two candidates as such, it was a 
question of the politics of the presidency. What it boiled 
down to was whether the people could accept a government 
man as President" .47 Indeed, the turning-point in the 
whole, rather smooth and dull, campaign may well have been 
the moment ln his on-the-eve Election broadcast on 
47The straits Times, August 30, 1993. 
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television when Chua Kin Yeow boldly asked voters if they 
wanted the PAP to also dominate the Presidency! His message 
must have articulated the unease many voters felt about Mr. 
Ong's PAP past, according to Nominated MP Kanwaljit Soin. 
And thus this could have cost Mr. Ong the support of two 
groups: firstly, those Singaporeans who believe on 
principle that the President should be non-partisan. 
Secondly, Singaporeans who wanted to voice their disquiet 
to the Government would have used their votes as protest 
ones. A lawyer noted: "AI though a Presidential Election, 
there 1S a clear signal for the ruling party ... You can't 
run away from the fact that Mr. Ong had the backing of the 
Prime Minister. So whether you like it or not, the vote is 
reflective of support for the Government". Political 
Science lecturer Hussin Mutalib agreed with this 
assessment: "I suspect many voters went for the election 
with somewhat the same mindset as for a General Election, 
seeing it as a party candidate versus a non-party 
candidate" . .t~ 
The Government has not commented much on such 
observations, other than saying that the people had 
understood the role of the Elected President and had 
expressed their choice accordingly, and that Chua Kim Yeow 
could get 41 % of the votes reflected well on the growing 
maturity of the electorate. Another stage (or drama) 
therefore accomplished in the political life of Singapore 
48Ibid. 
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as a nation, and one the PAP is happy with, remembering 
that the role of the Presidency was changed to enable 
greater protection for Singapore, as the city-state 
continues its brand of nation-building into the future. 
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CHAPTER II 
IDEOLOGY, NATIONAL VALUES, AND NATION-BUILDING 
A. The Relation Between the State and Ideology. 
Does the PAP have an ideology, and if so, what exactly 
is it? If "ideology" is used in the everyday sense of a set 
of ideas, or a pattern of beliefs and concepts, integrated 
and coherent, seeking to explain complex social phenomena 
and also directed toward action - the answer can be "yes". 
The PAP does have a coordinated set of ideas, policies, 
events, plans, and beliefs, taken from several sources, yet 
constituting a system of interconnected and mutually 
reinforcing parts, and therefore not traceable to a single, 
logically consistent, and orthodox dogma. The PAP in the 
1950s and 1960s did espouse "democratic socialism", with 
the Party's commitment to this concept being shown by 
providing adequate health, educational, and housing 
services and on the goal of attaining a more just and 
equitable society.) 
This last goal was important for the PAP when 
Singapore was part of Malaysia. In order to establish 
itself as a viable national, non-communal multi-racial 
political force, the PAP had to garner support from the 
(largely rural) Malays. The only basis this could be 
accompl ished was to stress the PAP's "social democratic" 
character, its policies and programmes, emphasising a fair 
IMilne & Mauzy, op.cit. p.86. 
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distribution of the good things of life. This political 
context changed ln 1965 when Singapore left Malaysia. The 
PAP was now ruling an independent city-state, and policies 
and priori ties had to be based on the (now different) 
social and economic realities of Singapore. "Democratic 
socialism, beyond being a token symbolic faith, had little 
to offer although it had made sense when Singapore merged 
with Malaya. ,,2 To the PAP, Socialism was now irrelevant and 
of doubtful value in bringing about prosperity and progress 
for Singapore. In 1965, the year Singapore became 
independent, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, speaking at the 
Young Asian Socialist Conference in Bombay, opined that the 
reason why some of the non-socialist governments in Asia 
had made greater and more rapid economic progress than 
those that were staunchly socialist was that the former, 
II in the absence of constraints imposed by the socialist 
dogmas, had pursued more pragmatic, and therefore 
successful policies to cope wi th these problems". The 
lesson to the PAP leadership was that an inflexible 
adherence to socialism "would be a serious barrier to 
economlC change and progress".3 Concentration was to be on 
economic expansion and growth, and social justice was 
exercised in the provision of minimum standards of 
education, health and housing for all Singaporeans through 
state action. In recent times, the Party has labeled its 
2Vasil, op.cit. p.59. 
3Ibid., p.60. 
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ideology "socialism in the final analysis"; this meaning a 
mixture of state capitalism (or "market socialism,,)4, 
company welfarism, and socioeconomic self-reliance, meaning 
less reliance on government welfare. This last point can be 
seen in the way the PAP, in recent years, has been 
increasingly moving towards a "user pay" principle. The 
underlying thinking is since most of the people are now 
enjoying greatly improved standards of living, full 
employment, and high levels of income - thanks to economic 
progess achieved under PAP rule they themse 1 ves can 
afford to pay the full or near-full cost of health, housing 
and education. To the PAP, it does not make sense to tax 
the people and then spend the revenue on these very 
amenities, and the Party regards this increasing transfer 
of this responsibility to the Singapore people as a part of 
the nation's success story and a measure of its 
achievements. "You pay for what you want, and what you get 
is what you are willing to pay for", and from April 1994, 
a new indirect taxation scheme, the Goods and Services Tax 
(similar to the United Kingdom's VAT) of 3% will be 
implemented. The state will continue, however, to provide 
welfare, though on a diminishing scale, to those who are 
just not able to provide for themselves or their families. 
The PAP has never pretended it practises any liberal 
version of Western-style democracy. Singapore is democratic 
4Perhaps similar to Japan's "Cooperative capitalism", with 
the government allied wi~h business, and with unions non-
confrontional and cooperatIve. 
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in that certain sets of institutions are present, and 
certain democratic processes are practised, such as 
periodic general elections where the government seeks a 
fresh mandate from the people . Political stability lS 
always a PAP top priority (then and now) because it is a 
perceived prerequisite for development and continued 
economic progress. The rule of law and the requirements of 
order are put ahead of the protection of individual 
freedoms; any sacrifice of any such freedoms is for the 
good of the whole or the community, a concept very much a 
part of Asian political cultures. There tends to be a 
constant apprehension about the transferabili ty of 
"Western" or Westminster democracy to an Asian society. 
And if nothing else but to show that certain political 
fundamentals or principles remain the same for the PAP even 
after 28 years of Singapore nation-building, in November 
1992 Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, now Senior Minister (and presumably 
in his role as Senior Statesman), reiterated that democracy 
cannot guarantee good government. He was speaking at a 
forum on nation states in the changing world held in Tokyo, 
Japan, and it would be instructi ve to summarise 
comprehensively here what he said in Japan, since to a very 
great extent even today, the PAP's beliefs and values 
reflect closely Lee's own beliefs. 
The subject he was asked to address was democracy and 
human rights, in particular whether democracy had universal 
validity, a theme he had focused on in many past speeches 
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and interviews. He challenged the notion that American and 
European standards of democracy and human rights could 
apply to other nations and said what people everywhere 
needed was good government. At the same time he cautioned 
developed nations against . uSl.ng foreign aid to try 
converting developing countries into democracies or 
pressure them on human rights. Western nations, he stated, 
should not force the pace of change unless they were 
prepared, when a target delinquent government collapsed, to 
intervene directly and help put that country back together 
again. 
Lee did not think that the preconditions necessary for 
democracy to work, such as the existence of civil society 
and an educated electorate, were to be found anywhere 
outside the developed nations. The crucial point was that 
people who disagreed over issues must be able to live with 
their differences, and cooperate with one another. Applying 
these pre-conditions , it was not diff icul t to see why 
democracy had such a chequered history in Asia, and Lee 
mentioned Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan as 
examples. He felt it was just not realistic to expect 
developing nations, many of them former colonies with none 
of the required cultural or historical factors, to become 
democracies upon independence when democracy took some 200 
years to evolve in the United states and Britain. In fact, 
he said, there was no guarantee that the present 
democracies would surVl.ve if there was a prolonged world 
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depression, given that several in Europe had given way to 
dictatorships when hard times struck in the 1930s. A 
country must first have economic development, and then 
democracy might follow - here, perhaps implicitly referring 
to Singapore's own history. "with a few exceptions, 
democracy has not brought good government to new developing 
countries ... Democracy has not led to development because 
the governments did not establish the stability and 
discipline necessary for development". 
What good government was depended on the values of a 
people. As an Asian of Chinese cultural background, Lee 
Kuan Yew's were for an honest government effective and 
efficient in protecting its people and allowing 
opportunities for all to advance themselves. And the people 
would indeed advance themselves in a stable and orderly 
society where they could live a good life and raise their 
children to do better than they. Lee said that while 
democracy and human rights were worthwhile ideas, people 
should be clear that the real objective was good 
government. On how a developing country could get a good 
government, Lee said there was a valuable lesson to learn 
from the British and American examples of giving votes, in 
the early stages of their democracy, only to those who were 
educated or who had properties. "Such an approach can be 
criticised as elitist but the chances of getting a good 
government will be better", he said. Next, for good 
government, the leaders, whether elected or otherwise, must 
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have a sense of being trustees for the people. 
In his concluding remarks, Lee said the underlying 
assumption of democracy that all men and women were equal 
or should be equal was flawed. It was not realistic, and to 
insist on it must lead to regression. "This is a dilemma. 
Do we insist on ideals when they do not fit into practical 
realities of the world as we know it? Or do we compromise 
and adjust to realities? On balance, if I were a Japanese, 
I would like my government to assess countries on the 
substance of good government rather than the forms of 
democracy. Of course good government includes humane and 
civilised standards of behaviour".5 
Some key words or phrases can be picked out from what 
Lee Kuan Yew is reported to have said, and can help 
elaborate what may be identified as major sources or 
components of the PAP ideology: "good government, economic 
development, stability and discipline necessary for 
development, values of a people, effective and efficient, 
opportuni ties for all to advance themselves, stable and 
orderly society, a good life, those who were educated ... who 
had properties, elitist, compromise and adjust to 
realities". These words and phrases become understandable 
if one accepts three compatible and overlapping concepts as 
sources of the PAP ideology and system of values: elitism, 
Confucianism, and pragmatism. 
5The Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), November 21, 
1992. 
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EI it i sm as a pol it ica I concept for singapore means 
that the "best" should be the leaders of the nation; those 
few who are the brightest, wisest, most able, and virtuous 
in that society. And with such qualities present, it would 
then only be natural and rational that decisionmaking 
should be from the top down, while acknowledging that the 
leaders should be moral examples "without reproach". Key 
characteristics required by the PAP of new leaders include 
the following: integrity, good character, incorruptibility, 
ability to think and innovate, capacity to administer and 
govern, abi 1 i ty to work as a team, and abi I i ty to take 
tough decisions and stand pressure. 6 The process of 
selection is elaborate, and the prospective "leaders" are 
checked out thoroughly. Lee Kuan Yew and the other PAP 
leaders are thus elitist in the sense of strongly 
believing that those who govern Singapore should be the 
most talented and intelligent available, and that 
identifying, training, and recruiting them into government 
service should not be left to chance or even "to depend on 
the democratic processes". 7 At a Young PAP (the Youth wing 
of the Party) dinner on September 10, 1993, the present 
Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong remarked that democracy was 
more likely to produce an efficacious government if 
parliamentary election candidates had to be as qualified as 
presidential candidates (who must satisfy a Presidential 
~asil, op.cit., p.158. 
7Ibid., p.157. 
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Elections Committee that they are men of integrity and good 
character and have a proven record in administrative and 
financial matters). This, he said, would weed out 
incompetent, weak and flawed candidates. The prospect of 
imposing eligibility criteria for those aspiring to be 
Members of Parliament, or of having to meet pre-selection 
tests, was thus raised. There have been, of course, 
reactions to Premier Goh's remarks. University law lecturer 
Valentine Winslow said that the premise of having 
eligibility criteria seemed to be that the electorate was 
to be distrusted. "A democracy allows the widest number of 
people to stand. But if you have a committee limiting that 
number, you are limiting the freedom of choice. It should 
be for the people to decide, not the Government, on what 
kind of Parliament they want ... Who would be on (any 
eligibility criteria committee) and how would they decide 
what was good character and integrity, qualities listed by 
Mr. Goh? .. When you start talking about integrity and good 
character, you apply subjective criteria which must 
necessarily be decided by the people if you believe in 
democracy".8 One suspects that Mr. Winslow may, by various 
government spokespersons and in future issues of The 
Straits Times, be accused of holding "unrealistic Western-
liberal" understandings of what "democracy" should be and 
is in "Asian" Singapore. There is the constant anxiety (in 
the minds of the PAP leadership) that unrestrained 
8The straits Times, September 13, 1993. 
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"democracy" can easily degenerate into mob rule. Or as Mr. 
Lee Kuan Yew has said, democracy does not guarantee good 
government, so one can postulate the PAP answering remarks 
such as Winslow's by reaffirming that there is democracy, 
in that the citizens of Singapore can choose, but it may 
not be wise for the ordinary person to have too much 
choice in that it will became too "subjective", and the 
people of Singapore may not know what indeed is "wise" and 
"good" for them. Participation must necessarily be 
curtailed. The "(Confucian) Father Knows Best", so after 
explaining what the problem is, and what the government may 
decide to do about it, the citizen is expected to do his or 
her part, which is to obey (after all, the people did elect 
their government, which has always delivered the goods). As 
for what "integrity" and "good character" is - why, just 
look at your own PAP government leaders, for they are 
indeed examples of such qualities, 
they are now, precisely beacuse 
criteria set by the PAP itself. 
and they got to where 
of strict eligibility 
So what is wrong with 
proposing such criteria for Parliament; for "the brightest 
and the best" Members of Parliament for the sake and good 
of the country? "Rational" elitism PAP style (sooner or 
later) wins the day. 
Al though el i tism tends to be a negative concept ln 
"Western" eyes, where it seems to dismiss the "common man", 
and is therefore "undemocratic", there is a grounding of 
the concept in the basically Chinese political culture that 
6] 
is Singapore political culture - which means also, to note 
the government's Confucian Vlew of itself. 9 Elitism is 
essential to Confucian political philosophy, which asserts 
that people are not born equal (again, cf. Lee Kuan Yew's 
remarks in Tokyo about democratic ideas of men and women 
being equal as "flawed" and "unrealistic"), but are born 
having different capabilities, thus leading to a few being 
born to rule and the rest to follow and be ruled. 
The PAP leadership thus shows its elitist values in 
its (commonly called) "paternalistic" style of governing 
("stability and discipline necessary for development"), in 
its commitment to meritocracy ("opportunities for all to 
advance themselves" but no "welfarism"), and in policies 
such as the graduate mother scheme. As elites, the PAP 
leaders are confident that they alone understand what the 
problems are, they alone have the dedication and ability to 
solve them, their policies and programmes have been 
rationally decided by the best technocratic minds ln 
Singapore, so all that is left is for the people to listen, 
understand, and comply. In the best Confucianist tradition, 
the PAP ministers and leaders take their role as educators 
seriously: they are constantly explaining government 
policies rather than listening too much to public views; to 
get them to listen, the right approach is needed: " ... a 
conflict and bargaining ethos is discouraged; rather, a 
9John Clammer, Singapore: Ideology, Society, 
(Singapore: Chopmen Publishers, 1985), p.161. 
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Culture 
peti tionary one 1S nurtured as the way to approach a 
paternalistic political authority". 10 Elitism in government 
thus implies that it 1S government performance ("good 
government") that is self-justifying and all-important; 
paternalism is for a purpose . 
... through state authoritarian rule and 
intervention the appropriate responses could be 
found for national cohesion and for the reform of 
a society originally created to serve the 
interests of the colonial power. The authority of 
the virtuous government depends on the 
willingness of its citizens ... to give their 
collective support to those who provide them with 
stability, employment, housing and social 
services, and these ci tizens might feel less 
attracted to individual freedoms as these are 
understood in parliamentary democracies. II 
Confucianism: As has been stated, the Confucianist 
political tradition is elitist. It also contains key 
political concepts which continue to be relevant to the 
mainly Chinese political culture and system that is 
Singapore. 12 There is a hierarchical order which enables a 
harmonious universe, namely paternal benevolent rule by the 
most virtuous and able, and deference and obedience to this 
authority. There is thus an ordered or structured hierarchy 
of unequals in such a society, and all within it have their 
own roles or functions to play for the cooperative harmony 
and good of all. Duties and obligations are the key ideas 
in understanding action, rather than any Western concept of 
IOChan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1976), p.232. 
IIRegnier, op.cit., p.240. 
12See Chan, op.cit., pp.228-233. 
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"rights". The Confucianist tradition also stresses respect 
for study, learning and education, the merit principle, 
filial piety, and an understanding of the state as an 
extension of the family (regarded as the basic unit of 
society), rather than it being a collection of individuals. 
The state is a moral order guided by laws, implemented in 
seemingly paternalistic and authoritarian ways by the new 
"mandarins" - the bureaucrats, and backed by the strong but 
subtle threat of force. Rule is by the "Mandate of Heaven", 
and to maintain this legitimacy, such rule must meet 
accepted concepts of "good government" and operate for the 
benefit and welfare of the people, enabling "a good life" 
for them. Peace, stability, security, and prosperity are 
thus basic requirements which should be provided by morally 
upr ight and trustworthy leaders. 13 "The sty Ie and pol icies 
of the PAP political leadership at the top appear to be 
aligned closely with the central tenets of the Confucian 
political and moral tradition. Yet the leaders still manage 
to function as rational, technologically oriented, secular 
modernizers".I-t 
As will be pointed out in section (8) of this chapter, 
Singapore's leaders have been worried about the influence 
of "negative" Western values in singapore society and 
culture, and have tried to just adapt and appropriate the 
USee for example, D.Howard Smith, Confucius (Herts: Paladin, 
1973), pp . 29 - 3 0, 68 - 79 . 
14Milne & Mauzy, op.cit., pp.111-112. 
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best of Western science and technology, but reject values 
they consider as obstacles to progress and nodernisation. 
They hope, in so doing, to be able to retain "good, 
traditional, Asian" values and cultural identities as a 
barrier against any negative Western influences. That this 
is a difficult balance to achieve and maintain is revealed 
by the constant calls by the government not to forsake 
one's cultural roots and "Asian values" .15 The government 
has thus sponsored and promoted, in recent years, a revival 
of confucianism. Measures taken included having 
Confucianism as one of the subjects for moral studies in 
school, establishing the Institute of East Asian 
Philosophies, organising (as the Government did in 1991) 
and participating international conferences on 
Confucianism, and promoting awareness and discussion of, 
Confucian or "Asian" values in the media. We shall later 
see whether creating a national ideology may also be part 
of this sponsored revival of Confucianism. 
Be that as it may, the efforts by the Government to 
construct a Singaporean state "produces technocrats who 
identify with the ideal of Confucianist ethics; in other 
words an administration which cares above all that the 
population should conform to the rules of good social 
conduct defined by the elders (Lee Kuan Yew and the first 
ISThe latest "call" is for "family values", to be based 
broadly on "Asian Values", and \·.'hich should be spE:lt out to help 
reinforce and promote them among Singaporeans, as suggested by 
Community Development Minister Yeo Cheovl Tong, and reported in 
The Sunday Times, September 12, 1993. 
67 
generation of PAP leaders) . A Chinese cultural tradition of 
the mandarin type contributes to this regulation of daily 
life and of morality, which the great majority of 
Singaporeans seemed to accept so far". 16 
A sociologist has postulated "three legs" in 
Singapore's "central ideology": the necessity for economic 
growth, the corollary of political stability and authority, 
and the monopoly of the definition of culture, and argues 
that the "something" which makes all this possible is "the 
basic Chineseness of Singapore". 
Expressed politically this involves such notions 
as the acceptance of a strong government so long 
as it del i ver the goods, lack of interest in 
personal political involvement, acceptance of a 
very paternalistic style of government, 
acceptance of bureaucratic rule, unwillingness to 
join the opposi tion unless the government is 
clearly in serious disorder and high tolerance of 
change and personal discomfort. In many respects 
the Chinese voluntary associations and the 
Chinese family are microcosms of the state. To a 
great extent Singapore already is a Confucian 
state. 17 
Pragmatism: The PAP leaders may be elitist in their 
particular values and visions, but they also stress what 
they call pragmatism and flexibility in reaching for their 
objectives, and perhaps even to "compromise and adjust to 
realities". The underlying notion 1S that external 
challenges of various kinds justify such a permanent 
attitude of pragmatism, flexibility and adaptability. Such 
16Regnier, op.cit., p.241. 
17John Clammer,The Sociology of Singapore 
(Singapore: Chopmen Publishers, 1991), pp.18-19. 
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Religion 
pragmatism thus means that the PAP government does not 
allow itself to be trapped in political dogma, because that 
can result in paralysis when there is a need for action, 
and the leaders should be able to revise their decisions if 
circumstances change. Hence the constant attention to 
"effectiveness", "efficiency"; the commitment to results 
and the acid test of performance - "the test has never been 
ideological consistency at the expense of efficiency".18 An 
example of this was in 1985 when Singapore was in a 
recession. The government at first was not willing to 
reduce the Central Provident Fund (a compulsory social 
security savings scheme) contribution rate, but after 
studying the recessionary economic trends, it reduced the 
employers' contributions to cut production costs and make 
them "competitive". This was done after the National Trade 
Union Congress helped to persuade its unions and their 
worker-members to accept the (in effect) reduced income-
savings as a "sacrifice" for the sake of the nation's 
economic health, with a promise that the government would 
restore the full rate of contributions to the CPF once the 
receSSlon was over. Singapore did come out of its recession 
by 1987, and that was seen as another success in its 
"pragmatic" approach to problems. Confucian political 
thought has this strong pragmatic strain, of course - a 
pol icy has va 1 ue if it works or succeeds, in accordance 
with the natural order and moral ends. 
IIiMilne & Mauzy, op.cit., p.llJ. 
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A perhaps more cynical note can be expressed by say1ng 
that "the lack of any apparent long term plan, the frequent 
changes in policy, are often explained not as negative 
features, but as positive ones: as pragmatism rather than 
as short-sightedness". Pragmatism can become a strange form 
of justification, "since its existence suggests that the 
techniques of social engineering and managerial ism are not 
so effective after all, although its being put forward as 
a "philosophy" of course disguises this, although analysis 
shows it to be very functionally linked with and a 
reflection of general policy with an ill-defined goal".19 
The PAP government will certainly deny this: it may indeed 
"zig-zag" towards what it has deemed as objectives or 
goals, but it will not easily give up on ideas or policies 
regarded as essential for the nation. 
And the necessity for order and control, expressed in 
"the hegemony of the state: its Ubiquitousness and 
intervention at every level of life from the most private 
to the most public" 20 can, of course, be justified as part 
of the "pragmatic" running of the state. One (by now 
familiar) reason given for the need of such societal 
control is that political stability and the demands of 
econom1C growth, which go together and justify one another, 
require great central planning and control. Another 
implicit assumption is that the people cannot be trusted to 
19C1ammer, Singapore: Ideology ... , pp.167-168. 
2OIbid., p.160. 
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make their own decisions and need therefore to be told what 
is good for them - the overlapping concept of elitism and 
paternalism seen here aga1n. An obvious example of this 
latter point 1S seen in the continuous organisation of 
public campaigns to impress on the whole population 
awareness of certain . 1ssues and themes, and as such, 
emphasising certain weaknesses in the social order and 
behaviour. Past themes have included productivity, 
cleanliness, family planning, work, and the limitations of 
Western values. In September 1993 three campaigns were more 
or less going on at the same time 1n Singapore: (1) 
courtesy "If we could only see ourselves sometimes!" 
(i.e. don't pile up your plate at buffet meals, and do give 
up your seat on the bus or train to the old or pregnant), 
(2) Learn and Speak Mandarin in Business (the television 
commercial assures us that we will have the winning edge 
over our competi tors if we do), and (3) Keep Fit and 
Healthy - "The Great Singapore Workout!" ( a set of aerobic 
exercises designed for everyone, published in the press, 
broadcast on TV, and available at a low cost on video and 
audiocassette, lasting 15 minutes and guaranteed to burn 
off 100 calories if you know what's good for you, and do 
it). Flippant remarks aside, all these campaigns are 
certainly meant by the PAP to be edifying, seeking to 
change collective behaviour for the better, thus hopefully 
and progressively bringing about a singaporean identity, 
and using language and symbols aimed at suppressing what to 
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the government are undesirable attitudes and therefore 
promoting a more disciplined, rational, "stable and orderly 
society where they could live a good life and raise their 
children to do better than they" (Lee Kuan Yew in Tokyo). 
One can indeed ask whether there is an immediate 
correlation between such government exhortations and 
campaigns and the true feelings of the citizens at the 
"grassroots" (a term much used by the PAP). The government 
in such campaigns is merely being true to its Confucian and 
Chinese cultural assumptions: that if leaders or those in 
authority give what they believe to be good social advice 
or directives, then their followers should accept without 
question such advice for their own self-improvement and 
benefit. The response of ordinary Singaporeans may well be 
more dismissive or sceptical in the face of a seemingly 
endless ser ies of such campaigns. Often it appears that 
support of and compliance with such campaigns is given only 
because of the presence of punitive measures to enforce the 
exhortations and campaigns. An example is that of littering 
which, according to PAP Members of Parliament, is still 
"rampant" in Singapore despite campaigns and tough laws 
(which included the introduction of "Corrective Work 
Orders" in November 1992, requiring offenders to clean up 
public areas) and the government was called to take even 
more measures against this "anti-social act". As reported 
in The straits Times of March 22, 1995, one MP even 
"wondered why there was still 'a sizeable number of 
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incorrigible, recalcitrant litterbugs' after 30 years of 
relentless public education and campaigns". The answer may 
well be that many Singaporeans just stopped listening to 
the constant hectoring by their government, irrespective of 
the relative merits of such campaigns. still, this has not 
stopped the PAP government from planning further campaigns, 
even if it is aware of this general attitude of 
indifference at the "grassroots". 
To sum up: Elitism, Confucianism and Pragmatism are 
compatible sources of a PAP ideology at work today. It is 
still interesting though to look at what a prominent local 
political scientist tried to identify as the elements of 
the PAP ideology back in 1969, four years after Singapore 
became independent. 21 According to the writer, the PAP 
firmly believed then that the survival of Singapore would 
depend on the willingness and ability of the Singapore 
citizen to adopt a new set of attitudes and values, in 
short, to become "a new man". For this to be possible, the 
people would have to be aware of several themes. Firstly, 
there would have to be the creation of a multi-racial, 
multi-lingual and multi-cultural society. Secondly, there 
is to be the creation of a "tightly organized society", 
consisting of Singapore's ability to have maximum 
mobilization of all the nation's capabilities, as well as 
having "a system of organisation that would permit 
21Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore: The Ideology of Survival", 
Commentary. (University of Singapore Society), Vol.2 No.1, May 
1969, pp.1-3. 
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penetration into the society to exerC1se control over 
population". Allied with this 1S the building of a 
Singapore "rugged society" - "a new generation imbued with 
resolution, determination and dedication to training and 
skill and discipline". And finally the PAP "urges the 
Singapore population to come to terms with change as a 
value in life". Chan here is explicit in her comments: "In 
so doing, the PAP whether consciously or unconsciously is 
preparing a justification for any policy changes in the 
future. Using change as the rationale the government can 
justify otherwise politically motivated actions under the 
pretext of public interest". We have seen that this remains 
relevant and valid today, under the principle of 
"pragmatism". 
What about the other "themes"? That of a multi-racial, 
multi-cultural society 
. rema1ns essential; it is 
inextricably linked to questions of social cohesion, 
internal security, and stability. As has been shown in the 
previous chapter, Singapore cannot be understood or 
isolated from her geographical and cultural context. Thus 
the creation and maintenance of a multi-racial society 
echoes the concern to prevent Singapore falling prey to any 
new wave of communalist agitation in, or from, its Malay 
neighbours. Singapore has a sizeable Malay minority - 15% 
of the population - and the government is well aware that 
any attempt at domination of the Singapore Malays by the 
Chinese majority would not be looked on favourably by 
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Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore 1.S also aware of the 
anti-Chinese sensitivities in these two countries and their 
desire to protect the Malay population and culture. 
Multiracialism and racial harmony thus continue to be major 
components of Singapore's efforts at national integration, 
and indeed, as will be spelt out in the next section, have 
been identified as one of the core "shared values". 
Singapore continues to be a "tightly organized 
societyll today, and "order" and "control" as key concepts 
remain in vogue. This remains true today for the call in 
1969 for "dedication to training and skill and discipline", 
and was brought out succintly by Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong in his 1993 National Day Rally sppech. He stated that 
there was a problem of low-skilled workers losing their 
jobs, there was a need for retraining, and if Singaporeans 
did not upgrade their skills, they would be left behind in 
the global scramble for investments and jobs. In the best 
Confucian leadership manner, he used himself as an example 
( and as Prime Minister, has himself set the example for 
Singaporeans to follow): II It 1.S hard to think of re-
training, I know. At 52 years old, I am spending more than 
eight hours a week learning Mandarin and Malay. And I can 
tell you it is tough ". But he hoped that others his age 
would make the effort to acquire the skills they needed to 
take on new jobs. "Don't be caught like many workers in the 
West who have not been retrained and whose jobs are gone 
forever", adding that skills upgrading would fight the 
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problem of income disparity In Singapore. n In 1965 or 1969 
and today, the concern with all these values, and the PAP 
ideology, continue to be tied up with the continuing goal 
of building a modern, constantly economically viable state, 
and with creating a truly "Singaporean" nation state. 
The PAP has been governing Singapore since 1959, and 
from 1965 (independence) till 1981 it was the only 
political party in Parliament "one party dominance" 
indeed, using Chan Heng Chee's book title. The histories of 
the Singapore "nation" and of the PAP have become very 
closely associated with each other. Hence any "national" or 
"state" ideology - official or unofficial - and the PAP 
ideology is also inextricably mixed. It was in late 1988 
that the PAP government proposed moves to formulate an 
official national ideology, and to adopt it to reinforce 
what to it were important Asian values not fully emphasised 
in present national symbols. The next section deals with 
these "shared values", which were to make up this national 
ideology. 
B. What Do The "Shared Values" Promote? 
The attempt to concretize and formulate a National 
Ideology was first brought into prominence in a speech 
given by Mr. Goh Chok Tong, then first Deputy Prime 
Minister, at the PAP Youth Wing Charity Night on October 
28, 1988. It was made clear that if there was to be a 
nThe Straits Times, August 16, 1993. 
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National ideology, its purpose was to preserve what was 
called "core values". Goh's speech was entitled "Our 
National Ethic" ,23 and the basic question he raised in it 
was, how do we preserve our Asian values when we are daily 
exposed to alien influences? The answer, in his view, was 
to formalise our values in a national ideology, to be 
taught in schools, workplaces and homes as our way of life. 
"Then we will have a set of principles to bind our people 
together and guide them forward". One can ask, "for what?". 
Noting that the Indonesians and the Malaysians had 
their national ideologies, Goh said those were formal 
statements of the key axioms and premises on which their 
society was based. He said: "We should have a clear 
statement of our national ethic to prevent our society from 
drifting aimlessly into the 21st century ... This is the next 
challenge of the Government and the Party - formalising our 
national ethic and inculcating it in all citizens. Then we 
can determine what Singapore will be in the 21st century. 
We are part of a long Asian civilisation and we should be 
proud of it. We should not be assimilated by the west, and 
become a pseudo-western society. We should be a nation that 
is uniquely multiracial and Asian, with each community 
proud of its traditional culture and heritage".u 
He commented that the Youth Wing of the PAP could play 
23Goh Chok Tong, "Our National Ethic", Speeches Vol.12 No.5, 
September - October 1988, pp.12-15. 
24 I bid., P . 1 5 . 
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an active part in organising activities and projects that 
could contribute to a better understanding of the 
importance of retaining "our" traditional culture and 
heritage. "You will be around in the 21st Century", he 
said, "You want to retain your Chineseness, Malayness and 
Indianess within the framework of a tolerant, multiracial 
Singaporean society". 
Like then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Goh was 
concerned about Singaporeans' changing values, as they 
became more affluent, more English-educated, traveled more 
widely, read foreign newspapers and journals, and listened 
to the BBC and watched American television programmes. "In 
short, we are assimilating outside influences daily. What 
kind of values will our children have? Malay, Indian, 
Chinese or Western values? What if our values are Western? 
will they strengthen or weaken us?" He noted, "Over the 
last decade, there has been a clear shift in our values", 
as detected by two Members-of-Parliament, Dr. Aline Wong 
and Dr. Ow Chin Hock, both on the staff of the National 
University of Singapore. "There is a clear shift towards 
emphasis on self, or individualism. If individualism 
results in creativity, that is good, but if it translates 
into a 'me first' attitude, that is bad for social cohesion 
and the country". 25 
Mr. Goh said there was concern about the shift away 
from group interests because it will determine the national 
25 I bid., pp . 13 - 14 . 
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competitiveness, and hence the prosperity and survival of 
Singapore as a nation. He mentioned he had started reading 
a book entitled "Ideology and National Competi ti veness" 
written by two Harvard professors, George Lodge and Ezra 
Vogel, which argued that the national competitiveness of a 
country was affected by whether its people were more 
"communitarian" or "individualistic". "Every society has 
both these elements, but each differs in the dominance of 
one over the other. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, 
communitarianism dominates individualism. This has allowed 
them to catch up economically with the industrial West in 
the last 20 years. Japan, because of its communi tar ian 
value, is unbeatable, according to Ezra Vogel". 
Singaporeans therefore have to determine the sort of 
society they want to be ln the 21st century more 
communitarian or more individualistic. "The answer, of 
course, depends on which is better for our national 
competitiveness or survival". Goh commented that Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew provided the answer when he addressed 
the Global strategies Conference on October 24, 1988. 
Referring to the key factors that made the Japanese the 
first of the East Asian peoples to catch up with the 
industrialised West, Mr. Lee spoke of their attributes for 
high group performance and their emphasis on hard work as 
well as being business oriented, highly competitive and 
pragmatic. The other East Asians - the Koreans, Chinese and 
Vietnamese - are not inferior in these qualities. All those 
79 
countries have strong social cohesion. "They have learnt 
the valuable lesson that to make the greatest progress 1n 
the shortest possible time, it is necessary for a people to 
move in unison. And this implies the need for individuals 
to make sacrifices for the good of the country and its 
progress" . 
Mr. Goh said that like Japan and Korea, Singapore was 
a high performance country because "We share the same 
cultural base as the other successful East Asians, that is, 
Confucian ethic. We have the same core values which made 
the Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese succeed. If we want to 
continue to prosper we must not lose our core values such 
as hard work, thr ift, and sacr if ice" .26 Prosper i ty, in 
short, is due to the presence of Confucian values. 
It was next up to Trade and Industry Minister, 
Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong (and present Deputy Prime 
Minister) to take the discussion on a National Ideology to 
a new phase by spelling out and seeking to examine 
comprehensively what he believed were the central issues 
involved - what the National Ideology 1S and what it 1S 
not, why the need for it and how it can be transmitted to 
Singaporeans. He did this when delivering the third Alumni 
International Singapore Lecture. v 
He defined the National Ideology as "the 
26Ibid., p. 15. 
27Lee Hsien Loong, "The National Identity - a direction and 
identity for Singapore", Speeches, Vol.13 No.1, January 
February 1989, pp.26-38. 
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characteristic ethos and spirit of a people. It is the core 
values which the community shares, and which distinguish 
them from other peoples and countries. It is the beliefs 
which underpin their social and political institutions".28 
He stressed that the National Ideology was not Confucianism 
by another name, nor was it a ruse for imposing Chinese 
Confucian values on the minority communities.29 And (a 
necessary disclaimer, one supposes) the National Ideology 
could not, what he called "one sceptical doubt" had 
expressed, be a scheme to perpetuate, or perpetrate, rule 
by the PAP. 30 
He began by defining the problem which the formulation 
of a National Ideology was intended to solve. "In one word, 
Westernisation", he said. with universal English education, 
Singapore had become a totally open society and the next 
generation was growing up with values and outlook different 
from their parents I. He sa id, "As a society, we are 
absorbing ideas from outside faster than we can digest 
them, and in danger of losing our sense of direction". 
While noting that Westernisation had, in the short run, 
contributed to economic growth, he saw many dangers ahead 
as Singapore was not the United states or Europe. "Although 
we are in close contact with the Western world, our values 
and expectations, and our responses to challenges as a 
28 I bid., P . 3 0 . 
29Ibid., p.34. 
30 I bid., p . 3 6 . 
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people, have so far been different from Westerners". The 
problem was not unique to Singapore, BG Lee said, pointing 
out that every non--Western developing country had to 
ponder "how to modernise without losing its soul, how to 
transform itself without undermining the basis of the whole 
society". Noting that not all societies had risen to the 
challenge, he said: "Singapore's problem is: how to be 
cosmopolitan, but yet not be rootless; how to have an open 
mind and be forward and outward-looking, but still keep a 
clear sense of identi ty and self-conf idence? ,,31 
The answer or solution was in building a strong sense 
of Singapore identity. There was a need for a "clear set of 
values, strongly held and shared by Singaporeans" to help 
develop an identity to bond Singaporeans together and to 
determine their future. "with a common understanding of 
what we as Singaporeans believe in, we can absorb what we 
want from the practices of other countries, without blindly 
following irrelevant American or European standards".n 
Since Singapore was multi-racial and multi-religious, 
no single religion could be chosen as a basis for a common 
identity. The approach thus, must be to respect and 
recognise Singapore's diversity of cultures and religions 
and to create unity out of it. This involves a three-fold 
task: "to find common values which all can share, to 




ensure that each cODnunity also appreciates and is 
sensitive to the traditions of the others". A "faster way" 
in setting out the core values would be for all to become 
"equally decul tured and Westernised", and therefore to grow 
more similar to one another. Although he thought this would 
be welcomed by a minority of "highly-Westernised" 
singaporeans, BG Lee doubted if it would be accepted by the 
majority of the population, or the minority communities. It 
has to be a "slow and difficult process" - drawing on the 
essence of Singapore's heritages, identifying certain 
abstract values common to and capable of being shared by 
all Singaporeans, and then to interpret and convey these 
ideas to each community ln terms of its own cultural and 
religious traditions. "In time, very gradually, all 
communities can develop more common, distinctively 
Singaporean character istics" . 33 
Stressing that these core values should be non-
political and non-religious, he said the four items 
identif ied in the President's Address at the opening of 
Parliament on Monday, January 9, 1989 were an "adequate 
starting point for a National Ideology". The values - (1) 
"community over self"; (2) "upholding the family as the 
basic building block of society"; (3) "resolving major 
issues through consensus instead of contention"; and (4) 
"stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony" -
were compatible with the major cultures ln Singapore. 
JJlbid., pp.30-31. 
83 
Responding to the Vlew that Singapore's ideals had already 
been incorporated into the state flag and the National 
Pledge, BG Lee said neither the five stars on the flag, nor 
the Pledge identif ied what personal values Singaporeans 
must have to bring about the ideals. "The National Ideology 
will do so, and complement both".J4 
To suggestions that Singaporeans should be "citizens 
of the world, comfortable everywhere but belonging nowhere 
in particular, upholding universal values and feeling a 
brotherhood with all mankind", BG Lee answered: "We belong 
to a time and a place, with a past which we should be proud 
of, and a future which is ours to make. If we are not aware 
of this, within one generation, or at most two, the spirit 
of Singapore will disappear, the society will dissolve, and 
the nation will be no more ... No group of people can 
jettison their past, embrace another culture, and survive 
intact ... It is one way for individuals to survive, but not 
for a whole society". 35 Singapore must therefore "take a 
conservative but not unquestioning approach: Retain our own 
heri tages, but examine them for values which need to be 
modified, and scrutinise foreign traditions for ideas which 
can be incorporated, but do so cautiously. Our roots are 
important. We should not be root-bound, but neither should 
we abandon our roots. They anchor us, and will help us 
34Ibid., p.3l. 
35 I bid., p. 3 2 . 
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grow" .36 
Corning to the sensitive lssue of the role of 
Confucianism, Lee admitted that some Singaporeans from the 
minority communities had reacted rather hesitantly to the 
idea of a National Ideology, fearing that it would be a 
disguise for imposing Chinese Confucian values on them. He 
revealed how when Mr. Goh Chok Tong first raised the 
subject ( in his speech "Our National Ethic", as reported 
earlier), some Chinese newspapers had seen it as the 
elevation of Confucian ethics to a national status. This 
misunderstanding had to be dispelled, and the relationship 
between the National Ideology and Confucian ethics 
clarified. 
Thus: "The National Ideology is for all the 
communities, while Confucian ethics is not. But the Chinese 
community, in order to elaborate the abstract values of the 
National Ideology into concrete examples and vivid stories, 
must draw upon Confucian concepts, for several reasons: It 
is the heritage of the Chinese part of our population. It 
stresses the importance of placing society above self, a 
key value we want to preserve. And many Confucian ideals 
are still relevant to us".J7 "However, the National 
Ideology cannot just be Confucianism by another name". And 
the Government could not force Confucianism on the other 
communities, or allow it to lead to Chinese chauvinism, 
36Ibid., p.]] 
37 I bid., P . ] 4 
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narrowing the outlook of Chinese Singaporeans and making 
them intolerant of others. "The Government has never let 
the majority race impose itself on the minority communities 
in Singapore. It does not intend to do so now". It also 
recognised that Confucianism did not have a monopoly of 
virtues and must be brought up to date and reconciled with 
other ideas such as democracy and the rule of law, "which 
have already become part of our ethos". 
BG Lee also said that although the National Ideology 
embodied non-political, personal values, it could not be 
completely separated from the politics of Singapore. "It 
must complement, not replace, our system of democracy. 
Singapore cannot be governed effectively except by a 
democratically elected government. without the consent of 
the people, no government can achieve anything ... However, 
democracy is not an automatic formula for political 
success. To make it work, the people need to have the right 
values, understanding and sense of responsibility. Our core 
values should contribute to this". 38 For the Chinese 
community, Confucian values must be reconciled with the 
concepts of democracy. Confucian values could not 
SUbstitute for participatory and consensual democracy, or 
be used as a tool to keep the population cowed and 
submissive. "In a democracy if the population do not 
understand and support the goals of the government, they 
will not work to achieve these objectives". 
38 I bid., P . J 6 . 
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Now that there had been some discussion on the 
National Ideology, BG Lee stated the next step was to 
debate it in Parliament, invite public views and reach 
consensus on the key values it should contain. "We should 
then formulate a credo, a short formal statement of faith 
similar to the National Pledge, restating the key 
principles. This is relatively straightforward". Then the 
values would be systematically worked into the Singapore 
way of life through the schools and the homes. "We need to 
inculcate them through our various cultural heritages, in 
the different communities, and especially ln the next 
generation. This will take many years, and be much 
harder" .39 
He ended his speech by asserting: 
In discussing the National Ideology, we are 
really pondering over the future of Singapore. 
What does the future hold for us? As we develop 
economically, will we also naturally evolve into 
a successful copy of a Western society? If so, we 
have nothing to worry about. We can just let 
everything happen by itself, and all will be 
well. Or is our fate inevitable and tragic in 
that as we develop, we become superficially 
Westernised, cast off our traditional moorings, 
drift into banks and shoals, and come to grief? 
Or will we, through deliberate effort, retain and 
strengthen our identity, one which is distinct 
from other societies, and continue to prosper, 
achieving political stability, freedom from want, 
human dignity and fulfilment for ourselves? The 
answer must be decided by Singaporeans ourselves. 
We have the right, and the responsibility, to 
determine our own future. 40 
A stirring finish indeed, to BG Lee's attempt to 
391 bid., P . 37 . 
~Ibid., pp.37-38. 
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advance the cause of a national Ideology, with some fine 
rhetorical questions and some well-turned phrases and 
images to summarise the fears and problems the Government 
had over Singapore's future. As should be expected, both 
Lee Hsien Loong's and Goh Chok Tong's speeches bear on the 
same concerns: "Westernisation" as identified and defined 
by the Government as being a "problem" and having negative 
effects; that if we become "superficially Westernised", we 
will "drift" and "come to grief" (Lee), so we should not 
become a "pseudo-Western society" and "dr ift aimlessly" 
into the next century (Goh). Therefore the Government, 
being the Government, has zeroed in on what needs to be 
done: "a set of principles" (Goh) , "a clear set of values" 
(Lee) is needed to "bind our people together and guide them 
forward" (Goh); to "retain and stregthen our identity" to 
bind Singaporeans together and to determine their future 
(Lee). There is a future for Singaporeans, if we are proud 
of our "Asian civilisation" and that it is "distinct from 
other societies", and if we "through deliberate effort" 
(Lee) "preserve our Asian values" (Goh) especially when we 
are daily exposed to "alien influences". If we do not 
"abandon our roots" and "cast off our traditional moorings" 
(Lee) and thus rej ect Western " individualism" for Asian 
"communi tar ianism" and other Asian/ "Confucian ethic" values 
like "hard work, thrift and sacrifice" (Goh) , Singapore's 
"national competitiveness, 
will be assured. The 
prosperity and survival" (Goh) 
Government therefore wants 
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Singaporeans to "decide ll or "deternine" their future and 
their society, but has decided that "formalised values in 
a National Ideology" (Goh) is indeed necessary if Singapore 
is to continue "achieving political stability, freedom from 
want, human dignity and fulfilment for ourselves" (Lee), as 
contrasted to the usual disparaging remarks about Western 
"welfare-states" which are now in an economic mess, and are 
unable to provide employment, a decent standard of living, 
or even dignity to their citizens without (or unwilling to) 
work. This 1S thus a PAP attempt through a National 
Ideology to preserve or reinforce "important Asian values" 
to redress the balance, and check the advance, of what are 
considered the negative effects of growing Westernisation, 
such as excessive individualism, increasing demand for 
"rights", permissiveness and moral laxity, etc. Just as 
clearly, the four core values suggested - community over 
self; upholding of the family as the basic building block 
of society; major issues to be resolved through consensus 
instead of contention . , and stressing of racial and 
religious tolerance and harmony reflects much of PAP 
ideology and beliefs, as expressed in all the years of 
nation-building since 1959, and especially from 1965. 
Unlike the National Ideologies of Malaysia 
("Rukunegara") and Indonesia ("Pancasila"), the core values 
proposed as the starting point of a Singapore National 
Ideology did not include any reference to belief in a 
deity. Where then is the place (if any) of God in the 
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National Ideology? This question was raised in a question-
and-answer session at the end of BG Lee's speech. His reply 
was: "It is a part of life that is very hard to capture in 
the National Ideology. We are a secular state. Keep 
religion aside. Keep it out of politics altogether"."1 
Such an answer would not be unexpected to Singaporeans and 
Singapore-watchers, as it was a reiteration of constant 
government statements on the need to retain the secular 
nature of Singapore as a state. Lee went on to say that 
putting belief in one God in the National Ideology would 
lead inevitably to further difficult questions such as; 
which god should it be, and how about those people who do 
not believe in any god? He did add, however, that although 
it was not possible for belief in God to be included in the 
National Ideology immediately, there could possibly be a 
review of this stand . ln 10 years, when there might be 
greater consensus (he did not elaborate "consensus" on 
what) . 
According to him, the Government was not against any 
religion but, in fact, recognised its importance. It wanted 
to see "mosques, churches and temples blossom" because 
citizens without faith would be deprived of an "anchor" in 
their lives. For BG Lee to use the word "anchor" as a 
function of religions merely reminds one of the Singapore 
government v lew that reI ig ions are for the purpose of 
instiling morality or moral values in their followers to 
41The Stra its Times, January 12, 1989. 
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teach them to be good citizens. Lee also described, 1n his 
speech, Asian values as "roots" which "anchor" us and "help 
us to grow". Are these Asian/core values as the foundation 
of a National ideology, to be set 1n the context of a 
religion? 
The Institute of Policy studies was also asked by the 
singapore government to conduct a study and prepare 
background studies with the goal (in the words of the book 
which was ultimately published) of identifying "those 
national values which can counteract the adverse effects of 
excessive individualism as well as unify the citizens of 
Singapore into a coherent nation". 42 The writers of the 
articles in the book included political scientists, a 
sociologist and a journalist, so perhaps one can infer that 
they are supposed to represent the social . SC1ences 
intelligentsia, here interpreting and recommending, for and 
on behalf of the government, some "expert" views on this 
area of national ideology and values. The articles included 
a historical perspective on nation-building in Singapore, 
case-studies of how their national ideologies have affected 
nation-building in Malaysia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, 
government policies used to promote nation-building, and 
the relevance of national values for young Singaporeans. In 
his introduction the editor, Jon S.T. Quah, Associate 
Professor in the Department of Political Science and Vice-
42Jon S.T. Quah (ed.), In Search of Singapore's National 
Values (Singapore: Times Academic Press/ The Institute of Policy 
Studies, 1990). 
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Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in the National 
University of Singapore, becomes strangely squeamish though 
over the use of the phrase "national ideology", preferring 
instead "national values", Slnce this latter term does not 
have a "pejorative connotation", nor a "Marxist" overtone, 
like the former does. Strange indeed, since Mr. Goh Chok 
Tong and BG Lee Hsien Loong, (top second-generation leaders 
in the PAP hierarchy), obviously had no problems 
understanding and using the word "ideology" to express what 
they meant in their respective speeches. Such a display of 
acute (and appropriate) political consciousness and 
sensitivities aside, Jon Quah in his conc] uding chapter 
seeks to evaluate the four core values and ends up 
recommending two more. 
Quah agrees that "Community over Self" as one of the 
values 1S understandable taking in account the "excessive 
focus" on individualism in Singapore. He gives as an 
example the emphasis on doing well in examinations, and 
hence on paper qualifications, and notes the special 
treatment given to the "scholar" civil servants (surely 
Confucian) all of which have reinforced the appeal of 
individualism among Singaporeans. He proposes the solution 
of an "attainment of an equilibrium between individual and 
community interests", and that "community over self" be 
modified to "harmony or balance between individual and 
community interests", as this would be "more feasible in 
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the short run". 43 
Concerning the family as the basic institution, Quah 
notes that the varIOUS communities In Singapore the 
Muslims, Tamils, Eurasians in their discussions and 
submissions on the core values and the National Ideology, 
consider the family as indeed an important institution. "In 
the Singapore context, the family's important role in 
nation-building will be enhanced by promoting the core 
value of the family as the basic institution in society". 
However, a warning IS also issued; that, given the 
importance of the family, care must be taken when 
highlighting this value to ensure that the Government is 
not perceived by the minority groups to be only promoting 
the Confucian model of the family as this will not be 
acceptable to Singaporeans of other races. "It is quite 
easy to make the mistake of stressing Confucian family 
values only especially when three-quarters of the 
population is of Chinese descent. The temptation to do so 
must be strenuously resisted otherwise this core value 
would cause a wedge not only between the Chinese and non-
Chinese Singaporeans, but also among Chinese Singaporeans 
themsel ves" . 44 
For the core value of "solving problems by consensus, 
not contention", Quah seemed to have stronger and sharper 
43Jon S. T. Quah, "Searching For Singapore's National Values" 
in "In Search Of ... ", p.93. 
44Ibid., p.94. 
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comments than usual for the Government. After def ining 
"consensus" as "shared public agreement among 
Singaporeans", he states that to govern by consensus 
assumes the government 1S willing to listen to the 
population and to consult them when formulating major 
public policies. He notes the change in PAP leadership 
style from a paternalistic one (1959-84) to a consultative 
style (after 1984) as conducive for the promotion of this 
particular core value. He warns the leaders however, that 
they "should realise that one consequence of governing by 
consensus IS that it requires time and that they would not 
be able to formulate and implement public policies as 
swiftly as they had done so before". 45 
He stresses also that this core value should not 
undermine the role and place of opposition parties in 
Singapore. 
Indeed, in a democratic political system, 
opposition parties playa valuable role when they 
are constructive in their criticism of government 
policies and when they provide a credible 
alternative to the incumbent government. At the 
same time, however, the government must not 
ignore or neglect the demands made by various 
groups and their adverse reactions to public 
policies. Rather, the government should assess 
objectively whether such demands are legitimate 
or not, and also ascertain the reasons for the 
negative responses to its policies.~ 
Remarks like those above would have been regarded as 
heretical not too long ago, with the implication that the 
45 I bid., P . 9 5 . 
~Ibid., pp.95-96. 
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government I S "pragmatism" r:1ay not have been "practical" 
after all, or that the regard for strict control or order 
over society may not be that good for the public order too. 
Quah goes on to say that the government should take care to 
ensure that it does not silence constructive dissent when 
it governs by consensus, for if that happens, singaporeans 
will perceive the promotion of this core value as an 
attempt to perpetuate PAP rule. 
Quah makes two final recommendations to the 
Government: firstly, to govern by consensus and not 
contention, it has to consult singaporeans when it wishes 
to formulate important policies. Singaporeans, on the other 
hand, should corne forward and provide honest feedback on 
government policies as well as suggestions for improving 
such policies; they should make full use of such 
opportunities given to them ln this consultative process. 
Secondly, the government must take the exercise of 
consulting the people seriously. lilt must not be perceived 
by Singaporeans merely to be paylng lip serVlce to 
consultation and dismissing feedback provided especially if 
such feedback is negative ll • Survey findings do indicate 
that the majority of the respondents want to be consulted 
by the government before policies are made but their 
perception is that the government has not done so. "If 
there is overwhelming public opposition or resistance to a 
new policy, the PAP leaders should attempt to ascertain the 
reasons for such dissatisfaction, and either modify its 
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contents or re-examine the need for such a policy in the 
first place". 47 A radical suggestion indeed, considering 
the PAP's long-standing aversion to adjusting or changing 
any pol icy it has deemed right in the running of the 
nation. 
As for "Racial and Religious Tolerance and Harmony", 
Quah's conclusion is that understanding, tolerance and 
harmony between the different races and religions in 
singapore is a sine qua non for its survival as a nation. 
Indeed, according to Quah, Singapore's rapid economic 
growth after her independence has been the result of its 
political stability, which in turn can be attributed to the 
absence of racial or religious conflict during the last 20 
years. The White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
(which was passed by Parliament as a Bill on November 9, 
1990) 1S quoted as giving two vital conditions to be 
observed to maintain harmony: "firstly, followers of the 
different religions must exercise moderation and tolerance, 
and do nothing to cause religious enmity or hatred. 
Secondly, religion and politics must be kept rigorously 
separated". To Quah then, the inclusion of this core value 
recognises the fragility of the racial and religious 
harmony in singapore and seeks to increase further 
tolerance and understanding. It should be noted that if 
indeed there had been an "absence of racial or religious 
conf I ict" , it was because the PAP government was not 
47 b' d Il ., p.96. 
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hesitant in acting against religious groups which 
threatened (in the government's eyes) to cause such 
conflict. Examples and details will be given in section B 
of Chapter IV. 
Quah, on behalf of his Study Group, then proposes two 
additional national values to supplement the afore-
mentioned four core values: honest government and 
compassion for the less fortunate. 
For "honest government", Quah gives a short summary of 
the steps and incentives taken by the PAP over the years to 
ensure a corruption-free government. His reason then for 
suggesting this new value is to maintain the tradition of 
clean and honest government by highlighting it as one of 
Singapore's national values, and to preserve this tradtion 
as far as possible. Singaporeans should realise that it is 
in their best interests to maintain this tradition, because 
they cannot afford to lower their standards and accept a 
dishonest or corrupt government. This does not necessarily 
mean that the PAP government is the only government that is 
fit to rule in Singapore - only that Singaporeans deserve 
an honest government. 48 
In speaking of "Compassion for the Less Fortunate", 
two groups of Singaporeans are referred to: those who are 
disabled, and destitute families. This sixth "national 
value of compassion" for the less fortunate is important, 
Quah feels, because it encourages the more fortunate 
48 b' d 11., p.lOl. 
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Singaporeans to be more considerate and to think of their 
counterparts who are less well off. At the same time, the 
disabled and destitute Singaporeans will thus not feel 
neglected or alienated since their feelings and needs are 
also being taken into account by their more fortunate 
fellow citizens. Quah hastens to add though, that in 
suggesting this new core value, his Study Group is not 
recommending that Singapore should become a "welfare state" 
(anathema to the PAP), and also that any assistance 
extended to the "less fortunate II should be done in such a 
manner that they can help themselves, and without eroding 
their will to work or undermining their self-respect. 49 
So from the original four core values first mentioned 
by the President at the opening of Parliament in January 
1989, the Insti tute of Pol icy Studies after having been 
asked by the government to do so, now concluded their study 
with a recommendation of six core values to be adopted by 
the government as national values for all Singaporeans. In 
descending order of importance, they were: 
1. Enhancing racial and religious understanding, tolerance 
and harmony. 
2. Preserving and maintaining the tradition of honest 
government. 
3. Harmonizing individual interests with the interests of 
the community at large. 
4. Upholding the family as a basic institution of society. 
49 I bid., P . 1 0 2 . 
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5. Showing compassion for the less fortunate in society. 
6 . Resolving maj or lssues through consensus as far as 
possible. 
The Committee on Shared Values, of which Deputy Prime 
Minister Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong was the 
Chairman, advanced the discussion on these core values 
further when it released a white Paper on January 6, 1991. 
Again, there were changes in the number and form of the 
Shared Values: "regard and community support for the 
individual" was an addition to the four core values first 
suggested, and another change was the extension of "society 
above self" to include "nation before community". Reactions 
from 22 academics, politicians, religious leaders and 
parents were garnered, and the summing up was that there 
was general support for the core values, but with some 
reservations on individual values.~ (We can however also 
ask whether these 22 respondents do actually represent the 
attitudes of the citizenry at large). While there was 
welcome for the new value of regard and community support 
for the individual, a few from the 22 feared that this 
might lead to the Government passing the responsibility of 
looking after the poor and aged to the citizens. The 
Government has a role too, and should not "pass the buck to 
the community". The value of consensus instead of 
contention raised the most controversy among the 
respondents. There were fears that an irresponsible 
~he straits Times, January 9, 1991. 
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Government night use this to muzzle the opposition in the 
future. An opposition MP, Chiam See Tong, called for this 
value to be dropped, as he felt it would nake Singaporeans 
"stop thinking". The Government, he said, was trying to 
"contain the emerging trend among Singaporeans to speak 
out". Chiam also felt that the value of family as the basic 
unit of society was a way to "sneak in Confucianism". 
others wanted religious and political values to be 
included. All interviewed, however, were against 
legislating values, feeling it would be better for the 
values to be imparted through schools, homes, religious 
centres and the media. 
On January 14 and 15, 1991 Members of Parliament 
debated the Whi te Paper. A record 31 MPs spoke on the 
issue, but most of them just took at face value the reasons 
for having the values as stated in the White Paper, surging 
forward instead to focus on the pros and cons of each value 
and how they could be reworded or modified. It was left to 
the two Opposition MPs to argue that the Government had no 
moral right to propose the five Shared Values as many of 
its policies were not consistent with those values. Mr. 
Chiam See Tong stated that unless the Government practised 
what it preached in its policies on the family, race and 
support for the individual, its "sanctimonious, pious talk 
would sound hollow". Both he and Lee Siew Choh cited a 
string of policies which they argued showed the 
Government's "hypocrisy" when it advocated the Shared 
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Values. For "nation above community, society above self", 
Chiam said that many felt the GovernDent was mercenary and 
ran the country on commercial lines. Thus, privatisation of 
government monopolies like Telecom and the Public utilities 
Board would only benefit wealthy individuals at the expense 
of the community. As for "the family as the basic unit in 
society", both Chiam and Lee argued that the Government's 
immigration policy on Singaporeans who marry foreigners had 
broken up many families in Singapore. In terms of "regard 
and community support for the individual", Chiam said the 
GOvernment was abrogating its duty to provide a measure of 
welfare for those in need. He was not advocating widespread 
welfarism, but rather welfare programmes for the most needy 
like the destitute, the aged sick and those unable to work. 
What, he asked, had become of the old PAP idealism? Both 
the Opposition MPs felt that"racial and religious harmony" 
was a way of life in Singapore, but Chiam argued that 
Government policies such as having separate racial months, 
the Speak Mandarin Campaign and calls for each racial group 
to solve its own community's problems had actually 
heightened racial awareness. 
Further changes were made to the Shared Values in 
response to the comments and criticisms made during the 
debate. The final list of the Shared Values is as follows, 
with appropriate comments (and reasons for inclusion) from 
the White Paper: 
1. Nation before communi ty and society above selt: The 
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Whi te Paper says that putting the interests of society 
ahead of the individual's has been a major factor in 
Singapore's success. The principle also applies when 
weighing the interests of sub-groups against that of the 
nation as a whole. 
2. Family as the basic uni t of society: The family is 
regarded as the best environment for children to grow and 
for the elderly to be looked after. The White Paper 
reiterates that Singaporeans must not "uncritically" adopt 
the "alternative lifestyles" seen 1n western developed 
countries, such as casual sexual relationships and single 
parenthood. 
3. Community support and respect for the individual 
(revised from "regard and community support for the 
individual"): While stressing the value of community above 
self, the Government apparently now recognises that the 
individual has rights which should be respected and not to 
be lightly encroached upon. The White Paper had said that 
the Shared values seek to balance the community with the 
individual, not promote one to the exclusion of the other. 
4. Consensus not conflict (revised from "consensus instead 
ot contention"): This means accomodating different views of 
the way society should develop, and forming a consensus on 
particular courses of action which have majority but not 
unanimous support, 1n order to br ing as many people on 
board as possible. The White Paper notes that this value 
complements the idea of putting society above self. 
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5. Racial and religious harmony: stressed by the Government 
as fundamental to the wellbeing of Singapore. Unless the 
different communities can live in harmony together, neither 
the majority Chinese community nor any of the other groups 
will be able to prosper as they have done, so states the 
White Paper. 
All fine and good, but just how these Shared Values 
are to be promoted or implemented as a National Ideology 
remains uncertain, other than the oft-mentioned avenues of 
school and family. Another pertinent question would be how 
the implementation of these values actually affects the 
lives of Singaporeans. What kind of sacrifices does the 
Government expect Singaporeans to have to make to their 
personal choices in abiding by these Shared Values? What 
real-life examples could be given to explain to the people 
how the Values would affect them? In other words, unless 
the Values were legislated - which would mean imposing the 
values on the people instead of gaining their voluntary 
acceptance and support - some way still had to be found to 
enshrine these values so that they do become basic tenets 
in the value system of Singaporeans. Member of Parliament 
Dr. Arthur Beng had the opinion that having Shared Values 
meant putting them in practice, and the Government had an 
important role in this (the implication being that the 
Government must be serious about making the Shared values 
or National Ideology work). He said: "We must now begin to 
question Government policies not only in economic terms, 
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but examine whether they conform with the Shared Values". 
Furthermore, all present and future major policies must 
"pass the test of not contradicting our Shared Values", for 
only then would the Values be meaningful. Sl This indeed 
sounds like a positive version of what opposition MP Chiam 
See Tong had said to the Government an the same subject: 
practice what you preach! 
For all the effort, energy and expense incurred by the 
Government in spelling out and promoting these core 
values/shared values/ national ideology (a process which 
began systematically in october 1988), with the stated 
intention of countering "negative" Western values and to 
"evolve and anchor a Singaporean identity" (Introduction of 
the White Paper on Shared Values), the general perception 
was that the proposed Shared Values were not something 
which got one all excited. This was the view expressed by 
another PAP Member of Parliament, Chng Hee Kok, who added 
that he and other Singaporeans were "not turned on by 
them"! As he saw it, there was nothing wrong in the 
sUbstance or essence of the Values. Rather, there appeared 
to be a lack of a sense of urgency, both inside and outside 
Parliament, about the need for a set of Shared Values now. 
He noted that the White Paper "has little or no immediate 
impact on Singaporeans". 52 One could also add that 
Singaporeans may well be sceptical of the whole idea of 
~IThe straits Times, January 16, 1991. 
S2r bid. 
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Shared Values in the first place. 
If that is so, the Government must be wondering why. 
Is it because Singaporeans at large (other than the 22 who 
were interviewed) do not take seriously, or are as alarmed 
as the PAP seemed to be about growing Western influence? Do 
they still need to be convinced of the importance of such 
values, the existence of which, according to their leaders, 
is an extremely important prerequisite for (continued) 
nation-building? Or is the feeling that of the Government 
having its own agenda for pushing this National Ideology-
Shared Values concept other than that stated in the White 
Paper, with the additional apprehension that the Government 
may also drop all of this in the name of "pragmatic 
change", or to push another perceived "important" issue? 
The fact remains that after the Shared Values were 
adopted in Parliament, the agenda seemed to have been to 
quietly leave them to one side, or let them be. No overt 
consistent efforts in bringing them to the forefront of the 
Singaporean consciousness seemed to have been done, 
although the White Paper, in section 54, affirmed that 
"practical steps" need to be taken "to weave them into our 
way of life, and inculcate them in Singaporeans, especially 
the younger citizens, through our various cultural 
heritages. This will take many years". The years since have 
seen an emphasis on "Asian values", depending on how they 
are defined, and with countries like South Korea, Taiwan 
or Japan being cited as examples where the strong presence 
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of "Asian values" have helped ln their economlC success. 
And for Singapore, that is always the bottom line - the 
survival of Singapore depends on its economic success. 
Hence the move to inculcate the Shared Values into 
Singapore society may indeed be gOlng on, albeit in a 
quieter, less obvious manner. An example of this may be the 
Minister for Information and the Arts, Brigadier-General 
George Yeo, commenting on the Duchess of York, and the 
Woody Allen "scandals", and stating that Singapore must not 
go the way of Western societies where such public figures 
as the two already mentioned could "f lout standards of 
morality openly". He said that these were examples of what 
happened when society no longer held "certain standards" . .53 
He added that Singaporeans should be reassured by the 
findings of the survey on moral values recently published 
which showed that Singaporeans still upheld family values. 
"It means that the basic building block of our society is 
still intact". That survey reported that Singaporeans still 
held conservative views on sex and marriage, and that they 
"voice a firm 'no' to liberal values".54 So, as expected, 
BG Yeo called for discrimination in what Singaporeans 
picked up from East and West, and also stressed the need 
for inter-racial harmony and unity between people and 
government. One could say then that most of the Shared 
Values were touched on and reaffirmed in his speech. 
~.lThe straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, August 29, 1992. 
~The straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, August 8, 1992. 
106 
A recent reminder that the Shared Values have not gone 
away but are being quietly stressed and i~plemented came in 
an article which was entitled "Greed threatens shared 
values like society above self". 55 The writer was reacting 
against a prominent businessman Robert Ng for eulogising 
greed when he spoke to some students in a pre-university 
seminar. 
The government 1S thus being patient 1n waiting for 
these Values to be accepted (with periodic examples) by the 
people, and thus to become part and parcel of the Singapore 
Way of Life, whether this be understood (as we will 
propose) as a civil religion, and also as an ideology 
helping Singapore continue its economic progress, so much 
a part of, and justification for its "nation-building". 
55Ng Wei Joo, The Sunday Times, July 11, 1993. 
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CHAPTER III 
A SINGAPOREAN CIVIL RELIGION? 
The last chapter, 1n dealing with Singapore as a 
society and in terms of 'nation-building', was also in a 
sense dealing with fundamental questions about what 
'society' 1S. How . 1S society possible? What makes it 
possible? What enables separate members or citizens or 
persons to come together into a larger whole, the 
identifiable entity called 'society'? Society is more than 
the sum of persons who just happen to be together at a 
certain time 1n a certain place or even in a certain 
culture. There are also such concepts as "national values" 
or social norms and traditions which do operate on, and do 
have a force felt by the individual in a society. Singapore 
has a norm against littering- which includes tapping ash 
from a cigarette onto the pavement- and so if you are a 
careless smoker with an excitable finger, you will be 
punished whether or not you agree with the norm of non-
littering. The Michael Fay case reveals clearly the 
Singaporean norm of corporal punishment for vandalism, 
whether you agree or not on the relative seriousness of the 
act of spray-painting cars, or stealing road signs as 
souvenirs. The question of society is therefore also 
concerned with the relationship between what are held to be 
common or national values and the production and 
maintenance of social order. 
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What, then, 1S the kind of unity existing in society 
which gives it this powerful quality? How is the individual 
connected to this larger society? And how does the society 
gain the commitment and cooperation of its members? Is it 
indeed so, as Emile Durkheim believed, that ~ set of common 
values is mandatory for a society's survival? What is the 
role of religion? In many societies, a traditional religion 
serves the purpose of providing a sense of unity and common 
meaning, and may even serve as a source of national unity 
if it is held by the majority of the population. However, 
in a "pluralistic" or religiously heterogeneous society, it 
would be difficult indeed for one particular religious 
group to serve such a function. The possibility is real 
that religious groups may instead become sources of civil 
conflict rather than unity or harmony. In such a situation, 
something else must serve as a basis for social cohesion or 
consensus and for evaluating and defining the value and 
meaningfulness of national activity. A new meaning system 
may now be needed, which may then become sacralized and 
serve as a form of religiosity. The needs of society being 
a basis of religion? Religion representing a sanctification 
of society? In beginning to talk of integration theories, 
and concepts of social cohesion and stability, and of a 
religious dimension in all cultures, we must now turn to 




Durkheim argued ln The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life that the origin of all religion lies in the 
ascription of 'sacredness' to the human community: family, 
clan, tribe, city, and state, in that order. It is the 
social bond itself that is celebrated in the most primitive 
religions external, supernatural gods are not to be 
found. Durkheim had observed that a sense of 'force' was 
central to primitive religions, and he stressed that this 
religious force was not an illusion. The symbols being used 
to represent this force may be imperfect, but the force 
being experienced by the people is real - and Durkheim 
calls it society. He goes on to say that it is the social 
bond, ln the form of the cult and the church, that remains 
the real basis of faith and observance even ln the 
'higher' , 'revealed' religions such as Christianity, 
Judaism, and Buddhism. 
Religion is thus the expresslon of social forces and 
social ideals, and wherever there is social cohesion, it is 
expressed religiously. It is a system of shared meanings by 
which individuals represent to themselves their society and 
their relations to that society. To take part in religious 
ritual is therefore to experience the transcendent force of 
society itself. Religions would tend to weaken when their 
religious rituals or visible communal rites begin to weaken 
or fade too, and when religion itself is declared to be 
just a matter of individual faith. Durkheim also wrote that 
there is virtually no limit to what may be regarded by a 
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given cult as sacred, l.e. as belonging to a different 
sphere from what is utilitarian or secular. Good and evil 
are alike expressions of the sacred. Hence his well-known 
definition of religion: "A religion is a unified system of 
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to 
say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices 
which unite into one single moral community called a 
Church, all those who adhere to them. III Moving from 
primitive religions to world and civil religions, Durkheim 
asserted that all societies neeed regular events to 
reaffirm their shared meanings and central ideas. Since 
these shared beliefs and symbols express the highest values 
of that society (and are thus considered sacred), the 
collective sharing of these values will remind members in 
that society of what they hold in common, as such providing 
for the stability, order, and integration of the society as 
a whole. Periodic collective rites ("reunions, assemblies 
and meetings"), during which the shared values are 
celebrated and reaffirmed, constitute the specific 
structures through which these states of cohesion and 
integration are affirmed and sustained. However, Durkheim 
also states: 
... hence come ceremonies which do not differ from 
regular religious ceremonies, either in their 
object, the results which they produce, or the 
processes employed to attain these results. What 
essential difference is there bet~een an assembly 
of Christians celebrating the principal dates of 
IEmile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976), p.47. 
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the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the 
exodus from Egypt or the prouulgation of the 
decalogue, and a reunion of citizens 
commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or 
legal system or some great event in the national 
life?2 
Durkheim may thus be implying that in modern nations (like 
France, his own country), religious representations and 
rituals may comprise the civic religion of the national 
collectivity. such national religions are called or named 
"civil religions". 
B. The civil Religion Hypothesis 
Before we go on to definitions offered for this 
concept, perhaps a brief 'history' (if such a word can be 
used) should be offered. The term "civil religion" was 
actually coined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Social 
contract (1762). However the traits or characteristics 
commonly associated with it appear far back in history. The 
ancient Greek and Roman city-states had civil religions. 
(In fact, "civil religion" is quite clearly an outgrowth of 
what Augustine called "civil theology" to characterize the 
religion of pre-Christian Rome). The family and its 
functions, the giving of devotion to ancestors - such may 
have formed the core of the Greeks' and Romans' private 
religion, but the city-state was the heart of the public 
religion, and as such, there were appointed seasonal and 
other festivals, rites and creeds, all honouring the great 
events of the city's past. So each Greek polis had its own 
lIbid., p.427. 
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gods, dogmas, and worship. The Roman emperor had dual 
roles: he was the chief priest in the state cult as well as 
an object of worship. The public religious cult alone was 
an obligatory civic duty. As Jurgen Moltmann puts it, "It 
was therefore, completely irrelevant whether one refused to 
worship the gods of the state because one was atheist or 
whether one refused to worship them because one worshipped 
other gods. Atheism meant only one thing: public refusal to 
participate in the civic cult, cultic impiety against the 
gods of the state. ,,3 civil religions also flourished in the 
Middle ages and during the Renaissance in western Europe. 
Major cities held festivals and yearly ceremonies in what 
was basically a worshipful attitude for the city itself. 
It has been suggested that the destructive conflicts 
between European Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, followed by the attack on 
revealed religion of any kind in the Enlightenment, led to 
the creation of a vacuum of belief among many in western 
Europe. Indeed, part of the reason for Rousseau to advocate 
civil religion was to provide a sUbstitute belief system 
for those whose faiths had been destroyed by the forces of 
the Enlightenment. The traditional Christian conception of 
God was not adequate then. Also unsuccessful were attempts 
to make a deistic God, or a God of nature or progress take 
the Christian God's place. What did prove effective though 
'Jurgen Moltmann, "The Cross and civil Religion" in Religion 
ond Political Society, Moltmann, et ale (New York: Harper & ROw, 
Publishers, 1974), p.23. 
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was the concept of patrie from French philosophy, which 
referred to the political state as one that was paternal 
towards its citizens, and was more than an instrument of 
warfare and taxation the state had seemed to be for so many 
centuries. 
Rousseau had patrie in mind when he wrote his Social 
Contract. Book IV, Chapter VIII was titled "The civil 
Religion" • In it Rousseau expressed the belief that a 
religious need lies in everyone, and believing also that 
all existing religions, especially Christianity, were 
inadequate in the ideal state, he proposed a systematic 
civil religion "of which the Sovereign would fix the 
articles." Such articles would not exactly be "religious 
dogmas but as social sentiments without which a person 
cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject." His 
proposed civil religion had serious sanctions included -
banishment and even death for those who accepted and then 
flouted these articles of belief. Such a person would be 
"an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws 
and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his 
duty.,,4 One could say then that authority is the crux of 
the matter - authority to set legal boundaries and invoke 
transcendental sanctions. Rousseau's solution to these twin 
problems is civil religion: it is religious because it is 
necessary that citizens be willing to love their duties, 
4Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses 
(London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1973), p.307. 
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and it is civil because its sentiments are those of 
sociability, lacking which a person cannot be a good and 
faithful citizen. Rousseau's civil religion is also 
something that could deal with religious pluralism and at 
the same time cement people's loyalty to civil society, 
thus ensuring social peace. Therefore, 
The dogmas of civil religion ought to be few, 
simple, and exactly worded, without explanation 
or commentary. The existence of a mighty, 
intelligent, and beneficent Divinity, possessed 
of foresight and providence, the life to come, 
the happiness of the just, the punishment of the 
wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and 
the laws: these are its pos it i ve dogmas. Its 
negative dogmas I confine to one, intolerance ... 5 
Some of Rousseau's other points can be summarised 
thus: civil religion (1) is codified in a single country, 
(2) glves it its gods, (3) glves it its own tutelary 
patrons, ( 4 ) has its dogmas, rites, external cult 
prescribed by law, (5) outside the nation, all the world is 
foreign and barbarous. 
The advantages of civil religion are that it (1) 
unites the divine cult with love of the laws, (2) makes the 
country the object of the citizens'adoration - it teaches 
them that service done to the state is service done to its 
"tutelary God", (3) 1S a form of theocracy "no pontiff 
save the prince",and (4) stresses that to die for one's 
country is martyrdom; to violate its laws is impiety. 
The disadvantages of civil religion are that it (1) lS 
~Ibid., pp.307-308. 
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founded on lies and error, deceives men, makes them 
credulous and superstitious, and drowns true religion in 
empty ceremonial, (2) becomes tyrannous and exclusive -
makes a people intolerant. It regards as a sacred act the 
killing of anyone who does not believe in its gods, (3) 
places such a people in a natural state of war with all 
others so that its security is deeply endangered. 
One is left after all this with the impression that 
civil religions, in Rousseau's meaning of the term, are 
probably quite rare in the world today, not types that are 
routinely developed! According to Phillip Hammond, 
Rousseau's "civil religion was not to be just another 
religion; its purpose was precisely to harmonize religion 
and politics. ,,6 civil religion was to be an ideology at 
once transcendent but focused on the nation-state. 
Nationalisms are plentiful indeed today, but how many truly 
reflect a transcendent or "ultimate" quality? 
(1) Some Definitions 
It will be proposed later that there was an attempt by 
the government in Singapore to construct a civil religion 
(including in part, nationalism) for a specific purpose. 
For now, however, we need to clarify the term "Civil 
Religion". There is no denying that "Civil Religion" is 
indeed a vague and imprecise, even controversial concept, 
happily used by sociologists and theologians to cover 
6Phillip E. Hammond, "The Conditions for civil Religion: A 
Comparison of the united States and Mexico" in varieties of civil 
Religion, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980), p.42. 
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several different understandings. Be that as it may, some 
general definitions may be attempted, apart from what has 
already been said concerning Rousseau's use of the term. 
Civil religion has also been called civic, public, or 
even political religion. It refers to the general and 
widespread acceptance by a people of a structure of 
religious-political characteristics linked with their 
nation's history and perceived destiny. There is also a 
religious or quasi-religious regard for certain values and 
traditions found constantly in the history of the nation. 
Such regard is usually shown by special festivals, rituals, 
creeds or dogmas that honour the great persons and events 
of the nation's past. "civil religion is the expression of 
the cohesion of the nation. It transcends denominational, 
ethnic, and religious boundaries. The civil religion has 
its own collective representations, by which the nation 
represents an ideal of itself to its members. It has its 
own rituals, by which members commemorate significant 
national events and renew their commitment to their 
society. ,,7 By such a "renewa I" of "commitment", there is 
thus a looking forward too. Civil religion also serves to 
relate a people's society to the realm of ultimate meaning 
("destiny"). It thus also enables the self-interpretation 
of the society, and functions as a "social cement", as the 
integrating symbolism of a nation. To use will Herberg's 
7Meredith B. McGuire, Religion: The social Context, second 
edition, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1987), p.159. 
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term, it is the "operative religion" of a society, and is 
the system of rituals, symbols, values, norms, and 
allegiances that function in the ongolng life of the 
communi ty and prov ide it with "an overarching sense of 
unity" that rises above all internal conflicts and 
differences. 
One apparent distinctive mark about civil religion 
then is that it has reference to power within the state yet 
transcends that power by focusing on ultimate conditions. 
As Herbert Richardson puts it, " one of the functions of 
civil religion is to legitimate and control the use of 
political power ln a society. ,,8 Theoretically then, civil 
religion gives both the justification for power and a basis 
for criticizing those who exerclse power (cf. 
"priestly/prophetic" forms). Also, "civil" religion must in 
some sense be independent of the church as such or it will 
merely be an ecclesiastical legitimization of the state, 
and it must be genuinely a "religion" - be independent of 
the ruling regime - or it will be just secular nationalism. 
To sum up then, "civil religion is the set of beliefs, 
rites, and symbols that sacralize the values of the society 
and place the nation in the context of an ultimate system 
of meaning ... Socially, civil religion serves to define the 
national purposes ln transcendent terms and acts as an 
8Herbert Richardson, "Civil Religion ln Theological 
Perspective" in American Civil Religion, eds. Russell E. Richey 
and Donald G. Jones, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974), 
p.163. 
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expression of national cohesion. In short, it offers a 
nondenominational theodicy for the nation. 11 9 
(ii) American civil Religion 
If we are looking for examples of civil religion in 
the world today, we have to consider the case of American 
civil Religion. After all, it was Robert Bellah's paper 
"civil Religion in America" vlhich vIas the catalyst that 
propelled civil religion as a topic into the centre of 
scholarly attention. Heated debates went on in America as 
to the nature of this "public faith", and whether in fact 
it even was a valid concept. 
In his paper, Bellah asserted, " ... few have realised 
that there actually exists alongside of and rather clearly 
differentiated from the churches an elaborate and well-
institutionalized civil religion in America ... this religion 
- or perhaps better, this religious dimension - has its own 
seriousness and integri ty and requires the same care in 
understanding that any other religion does." 10 Bellah 
points out that the principle of separation of church and 
state guarantees the freedom of religious belief and 
association, but it has also the effect at the same time of 
clearly separating the religious sphere (considered to be 
essentially private) from the political one. But if there 
9Ke ith A. Roberts, Religion in Sociological Perspective, 
Second edition, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1990), 
p.342. 
J(~obert N. Bellah, "civil Religion in America" 1n Daedalus, 
Winter 1967, (Boston, Massachusetts), p.1. 
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is such a separation, how is a President justified in using 
the word "God" at all ln his inaugural address? Bellah 
says, "The answer is that the separation of church and 
state has not denied the political realm a religious 
dimension. "Matters dealing with one I s personal religious 
belief or worship may indeed be considered strictly 
private, but there are still "certain common elements of 
religious orientation that the great majority of Americans 
share." These have had a crucial role ln developing 
American institutions, "and still provide a religious 
dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including 
the political sphere. This public religious dimension is 
expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that I 
am calling the American civil religion. "II This religious 
dimension is not to be equated with Christianity, however, 
although much may be selectively derived from it.12 Bellah 
notes that American Presidents such as Washington, Adams, 
Jefferson, and others mention "God" but not "Christ".So the 
collection of "beliefs, symbols, and rituals" shared much 
in connection with Christianity, but was neither sectarian 
nor in any specif ic sense Chr istian. Also, according to 
Bellah, there was an implicit yet clear division of 
function between the civil religion and Christianity. 
"Under the doctrine of religious liberty, an exceptionally 
wide sphere of personal piety and voluntary social action 
IIIbl' d. , 3 4 pp. - . 
12Ibid., p. 7 . 
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was left to the churches. But the churches were neither to 
control the state nor to be controlled by it. ,,13 
Furthermore, the religious dimension in political life "not 
only provides a grounding for the rights of man which makes 
any form of political absolutism illegitimate, it also 
provides a transcendent goal for the political process. ,,14 
Here, Bellah was apparently inspired by John F. Kennedy's 
final words in his inaugural address on January 20, 1961: 
"here on earth God's work must truly be our own." In 
another article, in pointing to the Declaration of 
Independence I S reference to the sovereignty of God over 
political society, he aff irms, "The existence of this 
highest level religious symbolism in the political life of 
the republic justifies the assertion that there is a civil 
religion in America. "IS 
Bellah has consistently affirmed that there is a 
constant and persistent thrust within American civil 
religion which proposes that civil power stands under the 
sovereignty of God and that the nation must judge its own 
acts in the light of divine righteousness. American civil 
religion is America's attempt to bring its own life under 
a higher ideal, and it functions to make "any form of 
political absolutism illegitimate." 
13Ibid., p. 8. 
14 I bid., P . 4 • 
Bellah therefore 
iSRobert N. Bellah, "Religion and the Legitimation of the 
American Republic" in varieties of civil Religion. op.cit., p.11. 
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realises too that J..merican ci'lil religion can be 
idolatrous. This occurs ~hen the gap between the nation and 
its ideals are closed, so that the all-iDportant dimension 
of transcendence lS lost, and America falls into self-
congratulation or smugness. One might say then that the 
sense of covenant has collapsed. "Precisely from the point 
of view of republicanism civil religion is indispensable. 
A republic as an active political community of 
participating citizens must have a purpose and a set of 
values ... A republic must attempt to be ethical in a 
positive sense and to elicit the ethical commitment of its 
citizens. For this reason it inevitably pushes toward the 
symbolization of an ultimate order of existence in which 
republican values and virtues make sense. ,,16 And again, 
" ... in describing the classical notion of a republic, there 
is a necessity in such a reglme not only for asserting high 
ethical and spiritual commi tments but also for molding, 
socializing, and educating the citizens into those ethical 
and spiritual beliefs so they are internalized as 
republ ican virtue." 17 
In passlng, we can note one response to Bellah's 
endorsement of "republican virtue" or core American values. 
Michael Hughey has pointed out that Bellah I s paper was 
published in 1967, against a background of social upheaval 




-- - -:=----- -- ----~;;;===_¢r 
values, and understandings, Hughey suggests, may have made 
Bellah self-consciously aware of his own affinities for 
them. "Thus conceived, Bellah's initial expression of 
American civil religion may be regarded as a defensive and 
personal reaction to attacks on traditional, Protestant, 
small town civic values ... "18"Civil Religion in America" 
thus represented an affirmation of these values at the 
exact moment of their general demise. According to Hughey 
then, Bellah detached the old middle-class Protestant 
values from their existence in a historical time and place 
and from the institutions that sustained them, and 
fashioned them into a "higher" and "transcendent" order of 
value and meaning. "These values were then projected onto 
American society as a whole and given doctrinal expression 
as American civil religion. In this sense, American civil 
religion represents an intellectually sublimated and 
extended version of the small town Protestant civic 
morality which Bellah shares. ,,19 
Besides Bellah's, there are also several 
interpretations of American civil religion. Brief mention 
will now be made of some other scholars. sydney Mead is a 
historian who calls his understanding of American civil 
religion, "religion of the Republic". America is indeed 
"The Nation with the Soul of a Church". His phrase 
I~ichael W. Hughey, Civil Religion and Moral Order, 
(Westport: Greenwood Press,1983) , p.164. 
19Ibid. 
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"religion of the republic" suggests that the civil religion 
is indebted to the American Enlighten~ent and the 
revolutionary period. It is the Enlightenment faith that 
provides the nation with its "synergistic" religious 
cosmopolitanism; the universal religion with its prophetic 
and transcendent spirituality is such a "faith". The 
republican beliefs in popular sovereignty and 
representative government, and the deist beliefs in the 
existence of God, creation, laws of nature, providence, 
immortality, and judgement are the fundamentals of the 
"religion of the Republic". 20 Such beliefs unite and 
transcend the separate sects and ethnic groups. It is the 
belief system of the religion of the republic the 
"universality inherent in its spiritual core" - that makes 
it superior to the divisive creeds of the denominations. 
Mead's civil religion can thus be called "an American 
faith". 
To will Herberg, civil religion is " ... the operative 
religion of a society, the system of norms, values, and 
allegiances actually functioning as such in the ongoing 
social life of the community. ,,21 The word "community" is 
important here, because Herberg's version of civil religion 
can be called a "folk" version - he was interested in the 
views of average Americans. He claimed that Protestants, 
lOsydney E. Mead, "The 'Nation with the Soul of a Church' " 
in American Civil Religion, op.cit., pp.59-63. 
21ill Herberg I "America I s Civil Religion: What It Is and 
Whence It Comes" in American Civil Religion, op.cit., pp.76-77. 
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catholics, and Jews in America were all worshipping the 
American way of Life. It was the central sacred system of 
beliefs, and whether or not this set of beliefs was 
accompanied by a "God" it appeared to be the operating 
centre of values and hence the central, "common religion" 
of America, providing Americans with an "overarching sense 
of unity". The American Way of Life is the civil religion 
of Americans. It is compounded of "the two great religious 
movements that molded America the Pur i tan way, 
secularized; and the Revivalist way, secularized."22 In 
other words then, secularized Protestantism. 
Martin E. Marty has pointed out that civil religion 
can be either prophetic or priestly in style. He proposes 
that there are two kinds of civil religion, one that sees 
an objective, transcendent deity as the reference point for 
the social process ("the nation under God") - in his own 
words, "Somehow a transcendent deity is seen as the pusher 
or puller of the social process", and the other which 
stresses national self-transcendence. This kind "does not 
see people, left to themselves, automatically given to 
self-worship. ,,23 wi thin these are the two approaches - the 
"priestly" which is celebrative, affirmative, and culture-
building by affirming the greatness of the nation, its 
achievements and superiority. Thus it does provide comfort 
llIbid., p.S3. 
~artin E. Marty, "Two Kinds of Two Kinds of civil Religion" 
in American civil Religion, op.cit., p.144. 
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and stability, often by legitimating and sacralizing the 
present system. The "Prophetic" is dialectical but tends 
towards the judgmental - it tends to challenge the status 
quo and call the faithful to change behaviours in accord 
with ethical concerns. It thus directs the nation's 







summary then, we can 
1S expressed through 
land"), rituals, 
rituals that occur 
Day, the Fourth of 
say that American civil 
myths (America as the 
national holidays (the 
on such "holy days" as 
July, and presidental 
inauguration days), visitations to national ;'shrines" such 
as the Washington and Lincoln Memorials in Washington,D.C., 
the Capitol building, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, war 
cemetries, and the birthplaces or burial sites of American 
presidents, and sacred treatment of national symbols, most 
particularly the American flag. All these 1n one way or 
another express central American values and inspire a 
feeling of unity and even a sense of transcendence - that 
there is indeed a greater purpose for the citizen and the 
nation. After all, the national motto does state, "In God 
We Trust!" 
Are there other examples of civil religion in the 
world, either existing or being developed? In Britain, 
Robert Bocock believes that the Royal Family is a central 
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component of the civil religion there and forms a focus for 
ritual activity and the revitalisation of loyalty to the 
nation-state (although with all that has been happening to, 
or has been revealed, about the Royal Family recently, many 
might wonder what kind of "focus" is being offered). Bocock 
also feels that Britain's civil religion can be seen as 
expressing in its teachings, in its values, in its social 
practices and in its organisations (such as the Church of 
England or of Scotland) a form of patriarchal ideology.~ 
Even today in Japan there may be a civil religion 
involving a mixture (or fusion) of divinity, society and 
the individual. 
In Malaysia, the civil religion there serves to 
overcome any divisiveness of exclusive loyalty which the 
different races give to their own particular religious 
communities. The King must be a Malay and a Muslim, 
according to the constitution. However, in order to promote 
a unified identity ("Malaysian") among all the races in the 
whole nation, which includes large minorities of Chinese, 
Indians, Europeans, etc., and are thus non-Muslim, the 
government promotes civil rituals and campaigns stressing 
goodwill among each other, solidarity among all in the 
nation, and tries to sacralize the ideals of interethnic 
cooperation ("gotong royong") and just representation of 
all groups in the plural istic society. Malaysia has a 
~Robert Bocock, "Religion in Modern Britain" in Religion and 
Ideology, eds. Robert Bocock and Kenneth Thompson, (Manchester: 
Manchester University press, 1985), pp.207-233. 
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creed; a set of national values called the Rukunegara which 
all Malaysian citizens are to ascribe to. (Indonesia, with 
a "secular" constitution despite an overwhelming Muslim 
population, has a similar creed/national values called 
Pancasila). 
The conflict in Northern Ireland could perhaps be 
understood as the result of two mutually exclusive civil 
religions: one "Protestant" ("Orangeism") and the other 
"Catho1ic" ("Republicanism") . The civil religions 
themselves seem to have become separate religions, with 
dynamics of their own. 
The rise of the "far-right" in much of Europe appears 
conducive to a resurgence of nationalisms mixed with racism 
and fascism. A recent article talked about the candle-lit 
processions against racism in Germany, and the fact that 
millions are prepared to take to the streets to demonstrate 
against the murder of "foreigners". The writer comments 
that the Germans themselves are still "the astonished 
witnesses to the birth of a new I civic I religion - one 
which derives its strength from the methods and symbols of 
traditional religion; one which turns a collective and 
unifying eye on contemporary social realities and on 
Germany I s history. ,,2S This religion may come without God, 
but it does have the power to move. The writer is gloomy 
about it though, "It appeals in the short term to our sense 
~icha Brumlik, "Darkest Light",The Guardian, section two, 
February 5, 1993, p.15. 
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of community, but without bringing people closer togther. 
It paints a new world vie~ without actually increasing our 
understanding of it. ,,26 
As stated earlier, civil religion has also been termed 
civic, public, or political religion; it acts as an 
expression of national cohesion, and serves to define the 
purpose of a nation in transcendent terms. As such, it may 
well be that writers will continue to use the concept of 
civil religion to discuss, analyse or evaluate the various 
forms of nationalism or national sentiment being expressed 
in Europe and elsewhere. For now, we return to Singapore to 
see if a civil religion is being developed there. 
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Ideology and civil Religion. 
Was there an attempt to construct a "civil religion" 
in Singapore? Any attempt to answer that question would 
necessarily have to take into account the political and 
cultural backdrop, and this brings into focus again the 
formulation of "shared values" and a national ideology, and 
the influence of Confucianism on the whole process. 
The idea of having a national ideology is, of course, 
not new in South-East Asia. Malaysia and Indonesia have 
26Ibid. 
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their own examples. v These two national examples were 
formulated at times of social and political crises: 
Malaysia's "Rukunegara" ("pillars of the state") was 
formally introduced in 1969, not long after the racial 
riots following (Chinese) opposition party gains in the 
national elections. It "reflects the essence of the 
Malaysian Constitution" and "is aimed at further 
safeguarding the sUbstance of the Malayan/Malaysian 
Constitution ,,28 which enshr ines Ma lay dominance in pol i tics 
and culture, including the position of the Malay rulers, 
language and religion (Islam). Indonesia's national 
ideology is the "Pancasila" ("five principles") formulated 
in 1945, when the country was shaking herself free from her 
Japanese occupiers and also seeking independence from the 
Dutch, which wanted to restore the colonial order. 
Singapore's attempt at a national ideology seems also to 
have emerged at a time of political and social transition 
and change. 
This was not sudden. In arguing for a national 
ideology, the ruling People's Action Party has pointed to, 
and has seen in Confucianism a necessary moral core to the 
society. The government, since the early 1980's, and 
further emphasized since 1988, has thus tried to foster 
Confucian values within the population. As Chapter II has 
27See Leo Suryadinata, "National Ideology and Nation-Building 
in Multi-Ethnic states: Lessons from Other Countries" in Quah, 
op.cit .. pp.24-44. 
ulbid .. pp.35, 30. 
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shown, Confucianisn is part of the PAP ideology, but more 
than that, it should also be remembered that the population 
of Singapore is 77% Chinese. "For the Chinese in general, 
cultural values are primarily moral in nature; Confucian 
values are what basically shape the Chinese mind ll .29 In 
other words, whether they realise it or not, Singaporeans 
already exist ln a quasi-Confucian society. And any 
"promotion of Confucianism does not aim at introducing 'new 
values' to Singaporeans. Confucian values both relevant and 
not so relevant are already exerting their influences upon 
Singaporeans II .30 As one Confucian scholar commented on 
Singapore: 
I found this state to be well-governed, orderly 
and modernized. Furthermore, three-quarters of 
the population, as well as a majority of the 
leadership, are actually putting confucianism 
into action (emphasis mine). The general public, 
from the leadership of the private sector and the 
government to the ordinary people, behave much as 
would idealized Confucians, in a spirit of hard 
work, mutual help and cosmopolitanism. I see 
here, for example, a coherent communal 
relationship and tolerance among different races. 
Now, the great project of this society is the re-
evaluation of Confucianism in the modern day. Yet 
precisely because singapore is already such an 
ideal and almost totally Confucianized state, it 
follows naturally that one would ask why there is 
any need to establish or re-establish 
Confucianism here (emphasis again mine) .31 
Prof. Hsu may be puzzled, but to others such a move makes 
2~artin Lu, Confucianism: Its Relevance to Modern Society, 
Singapore: Federal Publications (S) Pte. Ltd., 1983, p.89. 
30Ib'd 91 1 • « p. . 
3lProf. Hsu Cho-Yun, quoted in Tu Wei-Ming, Confucian Ethics 
... T...zQ...zd:..:a:....ly ...... ;L-.._T&.!.!h..:::e:.....----!:S~l~· n~g~a..t.p~o~r:....:e:::.....__=C..:....:h=a:....::l:...;:l'"_..;e=n~g_=e , ( Sin gap 0 r e : Cu r ric u 1 urn 
Development Institute of Singapore, 198~), p.136. 
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sense if seen as an ideological move - that the PAP 1S 
tapping Confucianism to strengthen the moral backbone of 
Singaporeans as a defence against problems arising from 
affluence, modernization, and economic success! For some 
time now, the PAP government, apart from being glad that 
singapore was indeed making rapid economic progress, was 
also keenly aware and worried about the kind of citizen 
that precisely such rapid economic growth has bred! The 
usual official argument goes thus: that while older 
Singaporeans who had to struggle during the traumatic days 
following independence fully appreciate the fruits of 
modernization, the newer generation younger Singaporeans 
take these for granted as their due, with the attitude of 
always wanting more but lacking any sense of obligation to 
society. Being too "individualistic" or "materialistic" are 
often seen as aspects of Western influence already 
affecting (and infecting) these younger citizens. One can 
however point out that the results of the PAP's own 
policies are exactly now being seen all too sharply in the 
consumerism and "materialism" that permeates the society 
and the general attitude of a people used to being 
generally well-off, that if they do not get more of what 
they want, they will get bored and even turn against the 
government. As has been pointed out at the end of Chapter 
II, there is a strongly emerglng "class problem"; an 
affluent property-owning middle-class with the concomitant 
high expectations of more "good things", and a working 
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class being constantly asked to retrain for new skills to 
protect their jobs and their "bread-and-butter" - yet all 
somehow conscious of a widening gap between the rich and 
poor in Singapore society, and indeed, of Singaporeans 
themselves in danger of inhabiting different worlds on the 
same island. 
Bearing in mind the PAP government's justification of 
its policies and style of ruling through i ts ability to 
constantly deliver economic progress - the "good things" 
and "bread-and-butter" - one can speculate that the 
movement to insti tute shared, tradi tional values has a 
wider agenda than just to motivate Singaporeans to be good, 
upstanding, socially cohesive, as well as prosperous, hard-
working citizens. The PAP ideology of survival constantly 
prompts the party's leaders to look ahead for ways to 
ensure Singapore's continued economic progress against any 
storms ahead, and since its rule as a government has been 
explained and legitimised in its ability to deliver the 
goods, it is obvious that the PAP government will do 
whatever it can to continue to do so - and to stay in 
power. And thus, one answer was apparently to drum good 
home-spun Confucian values into the population - or at the 
very least, into the majority Chinese. In so doing, the PAP 
could be said to be merely pragmatic in wanting to manage 
its affairs (and future) well, by such a re-affirmation of 
"the central thrust of Confucian philosophy, namely, the 
emphasis placed on the proper and adequate management of 
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the practical affairs of man as against abstruse 
theorization or spiritual contemplation", and knowing it 
could do so since such an emphasis remains "the prevalent 
characteristic of Chinese cultural life in Singapore" .32 
At this point it might be helpful to have a brief summary 
of what Confucianism is, or can be today, and to identify 
a few of its central tenets relevant to Singapore society. 
(i) Confucianism for today, and Singapore's "Shared Values" 
Confucian thought may be regarded as a set of ideals 
and guides for political life generally accepted as state 
doctrine after 140 BC, but it still persists as an 
inseparable component of Chinese thought and is integral to 
the Chinese way of life. How one actually applies 
Confucianism of course, now as in the past, has always been 
open to various interpretations. 
Confucius was born in 551 BC at a time of great 
internal conflict among feudal lords. It was also a time of 
constant external threat from hostile outside "barbarian" 
tribes. It was in this sort of context that Confucius 
developed his code of ethics and virtues for what was to 
become the ruling class - the junzi, or scholar-officials. 
Rulers of the early Zhou period and others were 
idealized and chosen to embody his teachings. It seemed 
simple enough: leaders were to rule in a humane, benevolent 
and virtuous way, and the response to such a "moral and 
32frham Seong Chee, Religion & Modernization: A Study of 
Changing Ri tua 1 s among Singapore's Ch i nese« Ma lays & Ind ians 
(Singapore: Graham Brash, 1985), p.9. 
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humane government will be the respect, loyalty, and 
confidence of the people". 33 "Confucius taught a philosophy 
of government by men serving as moral exemplars rather than 
government by laws and institutions framed and administered 
by men". 34 Such persons of virtue were essential because 
"Confucius exalted virtue [tel as the foundation of 
government. 'He who rules by moral force [tel is like the 
pole-star, which remains in its place while all the lesser 
stars do homage to it' [Analects 2:1]. Government should be 
in the hands of those who practise virtue first themselves, 
then the people will follow" .35 Such rule should even carry 
with it a disdain for material gain! 
Confucius believed that the sullenness, 
resentment and uncooperative attitude of the 
people, together with the extensive of 
lawlessness, were the direct result of the greed 
and licentiousness of the rulers. According to 
him virtue in a ruler is of practical importance 
in the government of a state. The way to gain the 
respect and obedience of the people is for the 
ruler to set an example: ... ' It is by deeds of 
righteousness that men extend the influence of 
their way' [Analects 16:11J.M 
In such manner then, order in a disorderly world would be 
preserved or re-created. 
still, "the ultimate purpose of government is the 
welfare of the common people. This is the most basic 
J3Raymond Dawson, Confucius (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 
p.64. 
34 I bid. « p.54. 
llD.Howard Smith, Confucius (Herts: Paladin, 1973), p.82. 
l6I bid. 
""'----"--------
principle in Confucianism and has remained unchanged 
throughout the ages". n Mencius, the second great Confucian 
philosopher who interpreted his master's moral principles 
for the 4th century BC also had as the basis of his 
political and social philosophy the understanding that "all 
government is established for the benefit of the people".» 
And yet he also had the view that while consultation with 
the people was possible, and necessary for the sake of 
political harmony, 
the further step of government by the people is 
incompatible with the Confucian idea that men 
have distinct roles which they must perform for 
the sake of the orderly arrangement of society 
('let the prince be a prince, the minister a 
minister, the father a father, and the son a 
son') ... In the Confucian philosophy government 
has to be the function of a specialist ruling 
group.39 
Indeed, in later years the Confucian code became a state 
ideology, and one used often to preserve the status of a 
ruling elite and the institutions on which it relied. For 
example, the history of China in the early years of this 
century has often been described or interpreted as a 
struggle between those who would embrace and maintain 
Confucianism to preserve the traditional order, and those 
who would discard much of it for the sake of progress into 
the modern world. 
nD.C.Lau, Confucius: The Analects, trans. D.C. Lau, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), p.32. 
»Smith, op.cit., p.103. 
~Dawson, op.cit., pp.65-66. 
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To some, Singapore may already be a Confucian state, 
but that did not preclude objections being voiced to the 
"Confucian campaign", both in the early 80' s with the 
announcement of plans to teach Confucianism in schools as 
part of the moral education programme, and also in the 
National Ideology-Shared Values debate in the late 80's. 
The objections were that the government was actually trying 
to bolster compliance, and to continue to justify the 
presence of strong, authoritarian rule. What appeared 
worrying was the negative political aspect of Confucianism 
usually identified as such traits as blind obedience to 
elders and to rulers. As one scholar has commented, 
It is essential ... to know what type of 
Confucianism we plan to introduce in a dynamic 
modern nation like Singapore. It certainly cannot 
be Confucianism as a political ideology; nor can 
it be Confucianism as a kind of outmoded 
scholarship. Instead, it must be Confucianism as 
a living, dynamic and developing ethic.~ 
The government may indeed be arguing that it is using 
Confucianism as a "developing ethic" in the cause of 
nation-building. In incorporating Confucianism into a 
school curricula, and indeed into a National Ideology, 
there is a strong witness to the desire to stregthen 
Confucian values. As Julia Ching summarises, in a rather 
dead-pan manner, 
This is not to say that a Confucian background or 
education is expected to accelerate 
modernization, but rather that it is being seen 
as a corrective to some of the by-products of 
modernization, such as extreme individualism or 
~u, op.cit., p.142. 
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moral permisiveness, and it is perceived as 
capable of contributing to a greater sense of 
cultural cohesiveness and Asian identity, and as 
an antidote to the continued spread of Marxism. 41 
Surely there are hints here that Confucianism may be used 
as a political ideology, if nothing else than to affirm 
Singapore as a successful Capitalist nation-state? Be that 
as it may, like the China of Confucius, Singapore political 
thinking senses threat everywhere, and nation-building, on 
a basic psychological level goes on. And as the National 
Ideology/Shared Values exercise shows, a greater sense of 
national identity is sought, as are a stronger and more 
reliable sense of social cohesion and a greater sense of 
civic duty, now seemingly diminished, as noted, by the 
rewards of self-interest or "individualism" in a growing 
successful economy. In short, the government is still 
trying to build a nation in the minds of its citizens, 
Confucianism is viewed as one way to lend it the staying 
power it will need to survive in a hostile world, and a 
National Ideology can be used as a tool to direct society 
and social change into preferred paths. 
While keeping in mind what has already been said about 
Confucianism in operation as part of the PAP government 
ideology in Chapter II, we can still point to several 
features prominent in the workings of Singapore society. 
41Julia Ching, "Some Problems of Modernization in 
Confucianism" in Confucian-Christian Encounters in Historical and 
Contemporary Perspective ed. Peter K.H.Lee (Lauriston, N.Y.: The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), p.392. 
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One of the most obvious concerns those who make up the 
"movers and shakers"; the leaders and rulers in soceity. 
The term "elitism" is bandied about, but Confucius did 
apparently rate a career in politcs and state 
administration as the highest of aspirations. His ideal of 
government was "that it is an agency for ensuring that the 
influence and example of men of superior moral qualities is 
brought to bear on the population". 42 The singapore 
government has never made a secret of wanting only the best 
(nor of its difficulties in attracting them) into the PAP, 
and in recruiting and keeping able and skilled civil 
servants and senior administrators. Being so reliant on 
overseas trade and investment, it is no surprise then that 
the government see the same need Confucius did for strong 
and orderly administration. As such, a fundamental aspect 
of Confucianism - respect for authority as manifest in both 
the family and the polity is seen as essential to 
success, present and future. 
Confucius, after all, looked on "the people" as 
largely passive, to be moulded and influenced rather than 
consul ted. He did not appear to have had too high an 
opinion of the intellectual and moral capacities of the 
common people, an attitude perceived shared by and large by 
the government leaders, leading to the inevitable charges 
of the PAP being domineering, disdainful of the simple 
wishes of the people, and fond of talking down to them. In 
~Dawson, op.cit., p.53. 
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other words, like an overbearing father. 
Perhaps, it is precisely because the people are 
incapable of securing their own welfare unaided 
that the ruler's supreme duty is to work on their 
behalf in bringing about what is good for them. 
The common people should be treated with the same 
loving care given to babies who cannot fend for 
themselves ... It is thus undeniable that Confucius 
advocated a strong paternalism in government and 
this remained unchanged as a basic principle 
throughout the whole history of Confucianism. 43 
The problem now is that the "babies" seem to be 
growing up fast and crying out for more. So it should be a 
relief for the government then that "for the Chinese in 
general, cultural values are primarily moral in 
nature" ;44Such a Confucian emphasis on moral order must 
seem attractive to any society and its rulers in which 
materialism and the pursuit of self-interest are among the 
main social motivators. Thus Confucianism is happily used 
as a counter to what are easily called the West's 
"decadent" and socially harmful values.The tide may not be 
rolled back, but maybe the "babies" can learn to cry less 
frequently or more selectively. 
This brings into focus "obedience" [xiao], a central 
virtue in Confucianism. The current government may stress 
its openness and a slightly more ready willingness to 
listen to feedback from Singapore's common people, but the 
citizens are expected to obey the dictates of the 
government when told what to do. It may lead to good social 
43L . t 36 37 aU,op.cl . , pp. - . 
~Lu, op.cit., p.89. 
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order, but does not allo~ easy stimulation of new ideas and 
creativity, nor room for analysis and critical observation 
- for those so inclined in the first place. So there is 
still the feeling that Confucian values operative now can 
be used to foster "blind obedience", leading to an almost 
unquestioning acceptance of state authority, even if it is 
in a multiracial society. 
Last but definitely not least ln terms of central 
Confucianist tenets for Singapore is the concept of the 
loyal family, with the young being obedient to and showing 
filial piety towards their elders. The family unit concept 
is extended to the state, with a ruler commanding absolute 
loyalty and compliance among his subjects as long as he is 
enlightened, just and devoted to their welfare and 
protection. If he is not, he can be removed. In fact, one 
could wonder about such Confucianist precepts about 
government, and ask if they could be applicable outside a 
small and cosy community. One could even marvel that they 
should have provided the ideology (and still can) of an 
enormous bureaucratic state. But "this could only happen 
because of the age-old dogma that the state was the family 
writ large, and the belief that the family virtues were a 
structural part of the cosmic order". ~5 
In thinking then about this Confucian precept of the 
family, we are thus reminded that it is one of the Shared 
Values, the basis for the National Ideology, and we can now 
~Dawson/op.cit. I p.68. 
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use this as the starting point to look at the Confucian 
links between this and the other four Shared Values. 
The White Paper on the Shared Values states in section 
12 that "the sanctity of the family unit is not a value 
unique to Singapore" and that "all major faiths consider 
this a cardinal virtue". This may well be all too true, but 
citing other "faiths" to endorse the importance of the 
family does not disguise the fact that (as pointed out) the 
family is one of the central tenets in Confucianism. The 
government's understanding (and ideological use?) of this 
precept may well be reflected in this observation from a 
singaporean academic: 
One Confucian value already adopted by many 
Singaporeans is family cohesiveness. To a 
Confucianist, the family unit is important 
because it is the training ground for morality. 
And filial piety is important because it is the 
root of morality ... lt is possible that in actual 
practice too much emphasis upon family has 
watered down a person's devotion to his society 
and country as a whole.~ 
Therefore, to have as a Shared Value, Family as the basic 
unit of society, is not just to imply that the norm in 
Asian societies is to have well-formed aggregates of 
couples and children all playing 'happy families' together, 
but that these same families have an important function in 
socializing their children into the commonly-accepted mores 
of their community, society, and indeed nation. It makes 
sense then for the government to state that the "home 
46Lu,op.cit.,p.92 
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environment"; the family setting is to play an important 
t ·" . par 1n weavlng" the Shared Values "into our way of life, 
and inculcate them in Singaporeans" (section 54,56). The 
Shared Values as a general interpretation of "Asian" values 
is to have the family as a "training ground" for 
Singaporean morality. An aspect of this may also be found 
in section 44, which states (or admits) quite clearly that 
"traditional Confucian family relationships are strictly 
hierarchical" and that, for example, "sons owe an absolute 
duty of filial piety and unquestioning obedience to 
fathers". However the section then goes on to assert that 
such family relationships today in Singapore are more of 
respect and less authoritarian (not "no longer" 
authoritarian) in nature. However, "in all these respects 
Singapore practices must continue, without eroding cohesion 
and loyalty within the family unit". Remembering that the 
state is supposed to be the family writ-large in 
Confucianist thought, one can seek to read between the 
lines, and come to the conclusion that such a section in 
the White Paper does not just deal with the relative 
virtues of the family as a basic unit of society - but 
carries also a hidden message and reaffirmation that for 
all its openness, the PAP Government insists on a 
hierarchical, paternalistic stand vis-a-vis its citizens; 
"unquestioning obedience" is still the name of the game; 
"filial piety" in terms of loyalty is still owed to the 
"State-Father" who has, and knows how to give good things 
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to his children: these honoured "Singaporean practices must 
(indeed) continue". 
In the light of all this, the Shared Value NatioD 
~efore community and society above self may take on a new 
hue. One is not exactly sure as to how this is a "shared" 
value, unless this is a "nationalism" call. The nation (or 
the ruling party?) is invariably right and ultimately has 
precedence above all communal interests; one's self-
interests are to be subjugated to a higher good or calling: 
the nation. The "society above self" value has been 
directly identified as a "Confucian ideal" in section 41 of 
the White Paper, and the history of Singapore has also seen 
"society above self" in action: for example, in coping with 
the recession in 1985, the majority of the working class 
was asked, "for the greater interests of the nation", to 
suffer a reduction in pay and to forego pay increases until 
the recession was over, with the promise of financial 
restitution when that happened. The recession passed in two 
years, but it took considerably longer for employers to 
want to reward their workers for their sacrifices and 
efforts at maintaining profit margins for their companies. 
So although group sentiments may seem Asian enough, and 
according to Confucianist thought, "human relationships 
should start from the family and then extend to the nation 
and then to the world", 47 in the free-market capitalist 
47Lim Chee Then I "The Confucian Tradition And Its Future in 
Singapore: Historical, Cultural And Educational Perspectives" in 
Asian traditions And Modernization: Perspectives From Singapore, 
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economic that Singapore finds her niche in, one can ask if 
sacrifices are to be made for the sake of the group - what 
group? The multinationals or the workers? If "over the long 
term", such sacrifices "leads to greater success for all" -
who gets a bigger slice of the pie? The idea that cultural 
precepts like communitarianism are being used to justify 
political control which justifies, and is dependent on 
economic control will be explored further in this chapter. 
We can however also consider Analects 2:21: 
Someone said to Confucius, 'Why do you not take 
part in government? The Master said, 'The Book of 
History says, "Oh! Simply by being a good son and 
friendly to his brothers a man can exert an 
influence upon government." In so doing a man is, 
in fact, taking part in government. How can there 
be any question of his having actively to "take 
part in government"? 
This saying thus gives consolation to those who have no 
political power by saying that 
the practice of social virtues within the family 
must itself make a real contribution to 
government, Slnce it 1S contributing to the 
social harmony which is the purpose of 
government. So this is the Confucian version of 
the people's participation in government: they 
respond to examples sent down from above and 
contribute to the order of the state by securing 
harmony within the family, one of the microcosmic 
uni ts of which the macrocosm of the state is 
composed . .ts 
Almost all the Shared Values are reflected one way or 
another in that quote. But here a Confucian reading of the 
shared values of the family and of the nation seeks to 
ed. Yong Mun Cheong, (singapore: Centre for Advanced Studies, 
National University of singapore, 1992), p.205. 
4KOawson, op. cit. « pp. 67 - 68. 
affirm that the family, if it plays its socially-determined 
role, contributes to the well-running of the state, is in 
some way a political tool of the state, and even accedes to 
the authority of the state, even if orders are "sent down 
from above". 
The Shared Value "Nation before community and society 
above self" assumes the right of the state to take priority 
over the rights of any citizen. Regard and community 
support for the individual as another Shared Value would 
seem to soften or take some harshness from that assumed 
right. This partcular Value finds an echo in Analects 4:25: 
"Confucius said, 'Virtue is never isolated; it always has 
neighbours' ". Good people indeed are always willing to 
distribute blessings to those in need, or below them. It is 
interesting to note that The Institute of Policy Studies, 
which had been asked by the government to conduct a study 
and report back on the national values needed for an 
ideology, had added two more values to the original four: 
"compassion for the less fortunate" was one new one which 
was transformed into "regard and community support for the 
individual". (The other was "honest government" - it was 
dropped from the final list). 
The White Paper, in sections 30 to 33, does state that 
while communitarianism is indeed stressed, "we must 
remember that in Singapore society the individual also has 
rights which should be respected, and not lightly 
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encroached upon. The Shared Values should make it clear 
that we are seeking a balance between the community and the 
individual, not promoting one to the exclusion of the 
other". But, one asks in bewilderment, has not it already 
been stated that society - one component of which are 
communities - is above self? No answer to that, but one 
then reads "Singapore is a meritocratic society. Its free 
market system rewards individuals according to their 
contributions". It then admits that such an economic system 
does have "those who are less able and do less well" and 
"we must continue to do all we can to assist the needy". 
Who is the "we"? In promoting such a Shared Value, is the 
government going to take an active leading role in 
community-welfare support? The White Paper answers that 
Singapore "is a society whose members depend on and care 
for one another". Section 34 places the onus for such 
"regard" and "support" firmly on the Singaporean 
individual: "One way singaporeans can put society above 
self and show concern for others is participating 
personally in this effort. Many Singaporean~ volunteer to 
do community work. Many more contribute to community and 
welfare programmes". Sections 35 to 37 seek to legitimise 
such a stand by pointing to examples of Chinese, Malay, and 
Indian clan and mutual help associations as "good examples" 
of community support. In other words, while the government 
will provide minimal and basic social welfare assistance to 
those most at need, it is up to the ordinary singaporean 
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individual to practise acts of active charity to "keep 
singapore a humane society". And this is necessary to "help 
us avoid the dependent mentality" that can arise from 
depending on a welfare state. We thus have a paternal 
Confucian government which in many ways encourages its 
citizens to depend on it for wisdom and pragmatic guidance, 
but discourages any such dependency from those of its 
citizens which have not benefitted too much from its own 
policies involving economic growth. The White Paper uses 
the word "humane"; and surely that is significant when one 
learns that jen, variously translated as love, goodness, 
benevolence, kindness, human-heartedness, "is the greatest 
of all virtues and, in fact, the summation of all virtues" 
in the usage of Confucius. 49 Jen can also be translated as 
"humaneness". 
A disciple said, "If one can be generous to 
people and can help the masses, how would that 
be? Could it be ca lIed humaneness?" Confucius 
said, "One would not only be humane; one would 
surely be a sage. Even [the legendary wise kings] 
Yao and Shun had trouble doing this". [Analects 
6:30] 
One could also be cynical and say that for this Shared 
Value the government is following in a Confucian tradition: 
having trouble, like some ancient wise sage-kings, in 
practising "humaneness" for the community. 
The White Paper states that resolving issues through 
the Shared Value of consensus instead of contention 
"complements the idea of putting society before self". It 
USmith, op.cit., p.69. 
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goes on, "It means accommodating different views of the way 
the society should develop, and working hard to develop a 
consensus on particular courses of action which have 
majority but not unanimous support, in order to bring as 
many people on board as possible" (section 14). But who in 
actual fact decides how "society should develop"? To admit 
to social - and political - policies not having "unanimous 
support", thus necessitating action "to bring as many 
people on board as possible" for "majority" acceptance 
reveals more of the government's method of dealing with 
consensus, contention and dissent to its policies, than a 
value for Singaporeans to follow in daily community life. 
The truth of the matter is that there may be an absense of 
genuine and persistent discussion and debate because the 
necessary methods, means and mechanisms to do so are not 
present, or are limited in scope. Letters to the "Forum" 
page of The straits Times may bring up contentious issues -
and may actually get printed - from time to time, but 
subsequent replies and discussion will be hindered due to 
space constraints and editorial policy. There are no 
powerful mass organisations like trade unions that have an 
independent power base, nor is "civil society" powerful 
enough to actually defeat or alter any set government 
policy. Professional institutions -like the Law Society -
which have spoken out have had their influence severely 
curtailed. Consensus thus just means the thrusting upon the 
populace a pre-decided and pre-determined government point 
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of view. A good example of this approach would be this very 
White Paper on Shared Values itself. First, there was the 
bringing up of a subject or issue which is presented as a 
crisis affecting Singapore - in this case, speeches by 
senior Government leaders in 1988 on the need for Asian 
values, culminating in the President's speech at the 
opening of Parliament in January 1989 which highlighted 
four "core values", a "debate" incorporating studies and 
reports by appointed academics (the Quah book), and 
subsequent discussion with invited public representations, 
taking place within the PAP-controlled parliamentary 
bodies, and fr iendly med ia coverage, and ultimately the 
enshrining as public policy (in 1991) what the government 
had from the very start intended to do anyway. All this is 
supposed to show that the government seeks "consensus" with 
the people and is "consulting" them. 
It is hard avoiding the conclusion that "consensus 
instead of contention" as a Shared Value for the 
Singaporean citizen may just mean being ready to accept as 
reality whatever the government presents to him or her as 
an issue or policy. One may ask, but one should not make 
too many waves if the issue in question has been presented 
as one with the nation/community/society's interests at 
stake. This is of course a Confucian paternalistic way of 
presenting or managing things: directives or advice from 
above to be obeyed, and the way policies and issues are 
"pre-determined" or decided for the populace reaffirms 
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aga1n the Confucian notion apparently held by the Singapore 
government that govern1ng - deciding for the common good -
is an activity best left to "a specialist, elite ruling 
group" . 
The final Shared Value 1n the list, Racial and 
religious Harmony can be said to be an obvious one. 
singapore is indeed a nation of immigrants of different 
races and religions, and it has been claimed that the 
economic success enjoyed so far has partly been because of 
the order arising from the lack of any serious inter-ethnic 
or inter-religious conflict. The White Paper does not 
mention this, but it 1S obvious that any "dis-harmony" in 
this area will hinder or weaken the pursuit of the ultimate 
government ideology: economic progress, a prospect ser10US 
enough for it to pass the Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
Bill. More will be said of this in the next chapter, and of 
what "harmony" means 1n that context, but here it is 
suff icient to note the Confucianist linkage; Confucius I 
"goal for society is universal order and harmony under the 
rule of a perfect sage". 50 
Going on into the incorporation of actual religious 
and Confucian V1ews in the White Paper, we find in sections 
8 and 9 the argument that "each religion and culture 
encompasses many enduring values, but unfortunately we 
cannot use any single one of them as the basis for building 
a common Singaporean identity, without alienating the other 
~Smith, op.cit. c p.62. 
151 
groups". That disclaimer is then followed by the solution: 
"a few key values which are common to all the major groups 
in Singapore, and which draw on the essence of each of 
these heritages. All communities can share these 
values ••• ". This last assertion is obviously important to 
the government in wanting to avoid charges of "cultural 
arrogance" in appearing to promote Chinese Confucian 
values, for later on, in sections 39 to 40, effort is 
expended to show this is not so. The Shared Values are not 
Ita subterfuge for imposing Chinese Confucian values" on 
non-Chinese Singaporeans, and thus, by implication the 
values are not Confucian. Yet the very next section (41) 
starts off by saying plainly, "Many Confucian ideals are 
relevant to Singapore. For example, the importance of human 
relationships and of placing society above self are key 
ideas in the Shared Values", implying surely that such 
Confucian concepts and more are incorporated in the Shared 
Values; that some of the values are Confucian! 
To ensure then that the Shared Values "must be shared" 
and will be shared by "all communities", the government has 
to assert that "even for Chinese Singaporeans the Shared 
Values cannot just be Confucianism by another name", even 
if these same values do largely enshrine Confucian ideas! 
The government has to make this reassurance, because 
If Confucianism is to be seen as having any 
relevance to Singapore at all, it must be 
considered more than merely Chinese. Indeed it 
must be recognized as even more East Asian than 
Chinese, and prospectively, more a part of world 
culture than just of Chinese or East Asian 
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culture. Only so could it have any real meaning 
for the people of this tiny island, the health 
and survival of which is so dependent on external 
f 51 orces ... 
We are reminded here again not just of Confucian values 
being called Asian values, but whether these Asian values 
are also universal ones, as opposed to the beginning of 
this debate in which the government held up stereotyped 
"Asian values" as contrast and corrective to stereotyped 
"Western" ones. 
Be that as it may, others have had no problem 
identifying Confucian elements in the Shared Values, even 
if the government has appeared disingenuous about it. Two 
singapore social scientists (one of whom is a Member of 
Parliament) has stated clearly that the Singapore 
government is "trying to push ahead with the promotion of 
Confucian values in a broader format, such as building them 
into the National Ideology".~ We can consider also remarks 
- or confirmation - made by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime 
Minister and now Senior Minister, who told the audience at 
the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention that it was 
necessary in the Singapore situation "to make special 
efforts to pass on core cultural values, those dynamic 
parts of Confucian culture which if lost will lower 
5·Wm. Theodore de Bary, Confucianism as an Aspect of East 
Asian and World Civilizations (Singapore: The Institute of East 
Asian Philosophies, 1986), pp.1-2. 
5lJohn Wong and Aline Wong, Confucian Values as a Social 
framework for Singapore I s Economic Development (Taipei: Chung Hua 
Institution for Economic Research, 1989), p.26. 
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(Singapore's) performance". Indeed, he said, overseas 
Chinese in South-East Asia had succeeeded because they 
upheld Confucian values. 53 Is it too far-fetched to surmise 
that the core, cultural values he spoke of and which he 
identified as Confucian were perhaps the same ones passed 
in Parliament as the Shared Values making up the National 
Ideology, just a few months earlier? The last word should 
go to Confucian scholar' Professor Wu Teh Yao, a former 
director of the Institute of East Asian Philosophies, who 
stated that the White Paper contained what he described as 
values which were essentially Confucian. He identified the 
linkages between the nation, the family and the community 
as an integral feature of Confucianism, and said, "The 
emphasis on family and nation is also unique to Chinese, 
Confucian culture. The Chinese characters for nation are a 
combination of nation (guo) and family (jia) with nation 
above family". 54 
There should be no doubt then that the Shared 
Values/National Ideology do incorporate Confucian values. 
(ii) "Asian" Values and Ideology 
Is the conclusion then that "Asian" values are 
Confucian values - and vice-versa? We ask this because we 
remember that this Shared Values exercise came about 
because of the Singapore government I s perception of the 
erosion of "Asian" and especially Chinese cultural values. 
S7he Sunday Times, August 11, 1991. 
~he straits Times, January 9, 1991. 
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The White Paper itself starts by quoting the President in 
his January 1989 speech to Parliament: "Traditional Asian 
ideas of morality, duty and society which have sustained 
and guided us in the past are giving way to a more 
Westernized, individualistic, and self-centred outlook on 
life ••. If we are not to lose our bearings, we should 
preserve the cultural heritage of each of our communities, 
and uphold certain common values which capture the essence 
of being a Singaporean". The section above has identified 
and analysed the "common values" thus chosen, but one can 
still ask: are such values identified because they already 
exist in Singapore society, and therefore the intention is 
to summarise them into a formal statement to serve the 
cause of unity (akin to a Durkheimian conscience 
collective)? Or is the government saying that such Asian 
values do not exist, and recommends that they should (even 
to the extent of legislating them into existence)? 
This just reveals again the preoccupation the political 
leaders have with this concept of "Asian values", and on 
one level, the Shared Values issue is a continuation of 
this preoccupation. But what exactly are "Asian" values? 
Are those chosen as the Shared Values only found in 
Singapore, and alien to "Western" societies? Are there 
values that could be regarded as universal ones? S. 
Rajaratnam, long respected as the "ideologue" of the PAP, 
when he was in the PAP Cabinet had this to say: 
I have very serious doubts as to whether such a 
thing as 'Asian values' really exists - or for 
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that matter 'Asian" anything - Asian unity, Asian 
socialism, Asian way of life and so on. It may 
exist as an image but it has no reality. If it 
has any meaning at all it is merely a convenient 
way of describing the heterogeneous, conflicting 
and complex network of beliefs, prejudices and 
values developed in the countries which for 
geographical purposes have been grouped as being 
in Asia. 55 
An understanding such as this has not however prevented 
stereotyped generalisations regarding the concept of Asian 
values, whereby it is held that all Asian peoples, whatever 
their cultural, geographical, ethnic, religious or 
historical differences, still share certain common features 
in their philosophy of life. So, for example, Asians by and 
large are more spiritual, more religiously inclined, and 
less materialistic than Westerners. They are stoic 
("inscrutable" is a familiar word) in the face of 
adversity. They are attuned to Nature, and they respect and 
adjust to the environment. They study hard and seem to have 
a special affinity for education. This kind of stereotyped 
or idealized account of Asian values can be summed up 
thus:"Spirituality, moral preoccupations, renunciation and 
ascetism are the hallmarks of Asian mentality. Asians are 
therefore often regarded as tolerant people, non-
aggressive, non-violent and non-militant in their social 
relations with one another. They are also portrayed as 
eminently peace-loving peoples who prefer to settle their 
disputes and conflicts by mutual agreements, rather than 
"S.Rajaratnam, "Asian Values and Modernization" in Asian 
Values and Modernization, ed. Seah Chee Meow (Singapore: 
Singapore University press, 1977), p.95. 
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resort to war or formal litigations". 56 Ho goes on to 
properly debunk such sentiments: "Like most half-truths 
this somewhat flattering description of the characteristics 
of all Asians and the common values which they are supposed 
to espouse, may be pleasing to hear but is hardly anywhere 
near the truth". 57 Indeed, even a cursory look into the 
history - past and present - of Asian countries reveal 
violence, ethnic hostilities, wars of greed and 
SUbjugation, and more, which should put the lie to 
simplistic definitions of what Asian values are. One 
remembers Japan's occupation of Korea, and later, in South-
East Asia. Vietnam brought in, and humiliated the 
Americans. Military regimes in Thailand, Burma (Myanmar), 
and Indonesia had no compunctions about using force to 
quell dissidence - whether it carne from education-loving 
students or nature-loving peasants. The Marcos regime in 
the Philippines showed what it thought of ascetism in the 
steady misappropriation of public funds for private bank 
accounts. Racial riots, and the detention of political 
opponents - without trial - under the Internal security Act 
have happened in both Singapore and Malaysia. Rival tribes 
still fight each other - in the midst of a United Nations 
sponsored "peace" in Kampuchea. The introduction of 
"market forces" into Mainland China's economy has led to 
~Ho Wing Meng, Asian Values and Modernisation - A Critical 
Interpretation (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises/Department of 
Philosophy, University of Singapore, 1976), p.10. 
S7Ibid. 
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widespread corruption, joblessness in the countryside, and 
greater repression of dissenting voices (cf. Tiananmen 
Square). So much then for seemingly satisfying stereotypes 
which are seen to be superficial slogans, when examined a 
little closely. If it is recognised that the value-systems 
of the different nations within Asia do differ from each 
other, and one may find it hard to seek to reduce such 
diverse value-systems into any common cultural denominator, 
then one does wonder whether there can be such a thing as 
"Asian values" in the sense that this term denote a set of 
common components in the value-systems to which Asians (of 
all sorts) consciously subscribe. 
So why then do political leaders talk so quickly and 
glibly about Asian values? Surely one reason would be that 
"Asian values" - like "Back to Basics" - is a politically 
useful term with a certain emotional resonance which Asian 
politicians find useful to bandy about, when having a 
siege-mentality in the midst of uncomfortable changes 
facing their nations. The other possible reason for the 
term to be used is, of course, when these same Asian 
politicians wish to react against perceived undesirable or 
unwanted effects of "Western" lifestyles and attitudes on 
the behaviour and attitudes of the younger generation. 
"Asian values" are then put forward as morally, socially 
and culturally superior to those from, or of, the West, 
because they are supposed to maintain greater harmony and 
social cohesion in society. Along with this is the often 
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expressed rationale: "We welcome and accept western 
technology, but we don't welcome or accept Western values". 
There is then an attempt to have one without the other; to 
believe that there can be a sharp dividing line between 
importing Western technology, and at the same time keeping 
out the values that come with it. Singapore's political 
leaders have expressed such notions. 
But can such a dividing line be drawn so sharply? A 
cursory look at some of the appliances - products of 
technology - we take for granted in Singapore, and the 
effects they may have on our lives present a simple 
example. Households and families may be encouraged to have 
and use washing-machines, refrigerators, tinned foods and 
microwave ovens, but at the same time do not all these 
conveniences also introduce a whole new style of living and 
working, and along with it, a new system of values? If the 
uses of technology can be bad as well as good, then it may 
also be hard, for example, to make absolute judgements 
about the benefits or disadvantages to humankind of such 
things as the invention of explosives, the internal 
combustion engine, the computer or television. The point is 
that every new technology carries with it not just a new 
and hopefully more efficient way of getting things done, 
but also a new way of living and a new standard of valuing 
(or disvaluing) one's previous life-style. As such, modern 
technology, whatever form it may be in, is seldom value-
free in the sense that it serves solely the function of 
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solving some specific or technical problem. We could 
instead say that every new technology or invention comes 
about in response to a problem-situation of some kind. If 
it indeed helps to solve the problems or answers certain 
needs, then it becomes accepted and widely used. But the 
very existence of such new technology presupposes certain 
realised needs, preferences, wants, and desires - in other 
words, values. Surely then it is not possible to want the 
"technology", and then go on to try to ignore or dismiss 
the "value" premises that come with it. 
Technology and science have furnished advanced 
capitalism with everything to conceal class 
differences and legitimate political power. 
Domination no longer requires political 
repression; the manipulation of needs suffices. 
Industrial society creates necessities and 
satisfies them. The very freedom of choice 
between commodities, new brands and modes of 
relaxation is transformed into an instrument of 
domination. 58 
If this is true, the Singapore government I s Shared 
Values project appears to be an attempt to hold back the 
waves of "Western-values" domination, by holding up instead 
the nebulous concept of "Asian values". The rationale for 
such a project also implies that Singapore is a once 
"Asian" culture, now being profaned by Western values. One 
conveniently forgets that Singapore is an immigrant nation, 
with many different cultures, and that if there is indeed 
a distinctive Asian/Singaporean culture, it is through this 
mingling, mixing, and interacting of all these elements -
"Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideology (London: Hutchinson, 
1979), p.204. 
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including the Western ones, inevitable and unavoidable 
considering how much singapore is dependent on foreign 
technology, expertise, and markets - and, at the same time, 
priding itself as a cosmopolitan city-state. And if 
"Western" concepts and values like "democracy", "human 
rights", "freedom", "debate" do get enough thought to have 
local citizens pondering, comparing and contrasting their 
political system with others, then such Western values 
become threatening, and must be dealt with. They are not to 
be considered liberating in any sense. A local political 
scientist has observed that the concern is not on Western 
values per se, since many of such values are "positive and 
progressive", but on the "liberalizing tendencies" usually 
associated - perhaps exaggeratedly so - with the West. "The 
symptoms go beyond the crave for Western style dress and 
pop music and other forms of entertainment. Mr. Lee Kuan 
Yew and Prime Minister Goh have observed the growing 
preference for Western-style democracy and a more critical 
posture against authorities. This is in sharp contrast to 
the fiduciary type of government-people relations 
characteristic of Confucian political culture ... Responding 
to such trends, many a government leader has called upon 
Singaporeans to return to their basic 'Asian values'''.~ It 
is worthwhile here, I think, to have (and to consider) the 
"Hussin Mutalib, "singapore's Quest For a National Identity 
- The Triumphs and Trials of Government Policies" in Imagining 
Singapore ed. Ban Kah-Choon, Anne Pakir and Tong Chee Kiong 
(Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992), pp.82,83. 
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following extended quote: 
To be sure, to recognize the need and urgency of 
reviving or retaining the traditional Eastern 
values is not the same thing as to advocate a 
complete return to the old ways or a total 
replacement of Western values with Eastern 
values. Such an extreme course is neither 
feasible nor advisable - not feasible because we 
are no longer living in the old times, and not 
advisable because traditional values are 
themselves not perfect either. It does mean that 
we need to strike a balance between conservation 
and adventure, between collective interest and 
individual freedom, between social discipline and 
personal initiative, and between continuity and 
change. Here it is worth repeating ... that the 
Eastern tradition and the Western tradition, 
though diametrically opposed in assumptions and 
approaches, are not necessarily incompatible, 
since they are not so much conflicting with and 
contradictory to each other in nature as 
divergent in emphases and orientations. Precisely 
because of this, they can be made to complement 
each other in a useful way ... As a matter of fact, 
tradi tional or Eastern values have co-existed 
with modern or Western values in most developing 
Asian nations, and in at least some outstanding 
cases, they have clearly eased the pains and 
reduced the human cost of traumatic change 
brought about by modernization. w 
Singapore is obviously one of the "outstanding cases" in 
its "modernization" results, but the government has seemed 
unwilling to take the sort of reasoned approach vis-a-vis 
"values" advocated in the quote above, or to consider 
carefully the relative virtues of the various Western 
values. It has instead easily and ideologically opted for 
labelling certain values or attitudes as undesirable. One 
example would be "individualism", identified in the White 
~Chang Pao-Min, Traditional Values and Modern Singapore: 
random thoughts on the relevance of the eastern heritage 
(Singapore: Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, College 
of Graduate studies, Nanyang University, 1979), pp.26-27. 
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Paper as an "alien lifestyle and value". The government 
seems eager to focus on the negative aspect of 
individualism, while conveniently ignoring the fact that if 
individualism is now rampant in Singapore society, it is as 
a consequence of the PAP's own long-term economic policies 
which embraced capitalism and laissez-faire (albeit 
controlled) concepts. As such, one can theorize as to how 
"individualism" is in fact being reinforced or encouraged 
by the government's own marketplace-economics policies, and 
its meritocracy policies. Such "marketplace economics" or 
"the logic of the marketplace", for example, calculates the 
value of the individual in utilitarian terms, and not in 
social or moral concepts. This kind of utilitarianism 
surely encourages individualism, and since the government 
believes in, and emphasizes "free-market forces", this 
economic individualism is actually being strengthened by 
government policies and economic successes. 
The government has also consistently promoted 
meritocracy, in line with its efforts to promote 
"excellence" in all fields from Singaporeans. But this also 
has the result of encouraging the individual Singaporean to 
demand what is perceived by them as their just or deserved 
economic (and other) rewards, without sufficient care or 
concern for the social supports that are the foundation of 
such an objective. Further developments also occur at both 
individual and societal levels, for meritocracy legitimizes 
different income levels or stratification which then 
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becomes regarded as the natural and logical result of the 
different levels of individual work efforts. To show care 
and concern for the "poor and needy" then becomes 
voluntary; they are viewed as acts of charity rather than 
a necessary moral or intrinsic social obligation. All this 
surely adds to the growth of individualism. Indeed, 
"individualism is seen to be both the dominant ideology of 
capitalist society and a corrosive belief system which 
stands in opposition to collective and traditional modes of 
existence" • 61 
Being aware of such growth, the government is negative 
about it, even though its own economic policies encourage 
it. Its solution, as we know, is by moral and religious 
education, including Confucian ethics, in schools and by 
Shared Values constructs for (presumably) adults. The 
government also continues to practice the ideology or 
politics of "survival"; reminding the public that singapore 
is "small", and thus the breaking-up of any national 
cohesion or consensus by the demands of individuals (or 
indeed adhering to individualism as a personal ideology) 
can mean the end for all and the ending of the good life 
for everyone. This works, of course, when "everyone" is 
happy with what he or she presently has, but it does not 
remove the fact that the same people are becoming more 
aware of the growing gap between those who have - and those 
61Bryan S.Turner, Religion and Social Theory (London: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1983), p.155. 
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who have even more! And questions are being raised as to 
why "individualistic" demands made by those at the top of 
the economic pole seem to be met more readily than similar 
demands from those further down the ladder. Or are such 
queries to be fobbed off by counter-charges of inciting 
"envy and resentment"? 
Governing a society that is 75% Chinese, it apparently 
does not want to look at the behaviour of Chinese 
businessmen (and women) and entrepreneurs, which in terms 
of individualism, materialism and selfishness, could hold 
its own with that of any Western counterpart. Such local 
behaviour would probably be praised as fine 
"entrepreneurial spirit"! And if there was so much distaste 
about individualism, why doesn't the government tackle the 
root problem, and move away from capitalism? Again, the 
answer comes from the country's own history. Singapore 
started off as an immigrant society, and money-making was 
the immigrants' major concern. 
Subsequently, the government's all-out efforts to 
promote economic growth and modernization might 
have unwittingly reinforced the motive to make 
money. Actually it has often resorted to money as 
an incentive to good performance. So the dilemma 
and conflict of values here is how to strive for 
economic growth without in the meantime fostering 
in Singaporeans an overly-materialistic outlook 
of life. The PAP's answer is to re-establish 
traditional values as cultural ballasts to keep 
a tight rein on the undesirable effects of 
economic affluence.~ 
A familiar answer by now, but a more relevant answer 
QLu,Op.cit., p.S7. 
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(or reason) may simply be that the PAP government does not 
want change in its economic and political institutions. Its 
political dominance or power or success relies on economic 
control, and by the way it seeks to manage (or manipulate) 
culture in terms of values, it seems to believe that 
economic control rests on culture. It is readily admitted 
now, as an editorial (July 1, 1994) in The straits Times 
puts it, that "a consumer-oriented society bent on wealth 
creation is playing havoc with traditional moral and family 
values". Such "havoc" includes social changes which make 
even more visible emerging classes in a legitimised class 
structure which surely must have repercussions for future 
social and political developments or trends. As has been 
noted earlier, questions about such class inequalities have 
been quickly dismissed or condemned by the government as 
dangerous in that they promote "envy and resentment". And 
this again reveals the government's approach to such 
problems or implications: to view them in terms of 
attitudes or values to be changed or reinforced or 
encouraged, and not in terms of structures or institutions. 
The method (or indeed, belief) here that a change in values 
will result in the needed change in social practice is 
common enough in Singapore - as evidenced all too clearly 
in the constant campaigns and enthusiastic exhortations, 
ranging from having more children to flushing the toilet 
after use. This truly reflects a basically Chinese and 
Confucian cultural bias: that self-improvement must surely 
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follow if one heeded good advice and exhortation. 
"Confucius also includes social action and self-improvement 
in the practice of humanity ... Confucius believed that if 
enough people behaved in such a manner, then the problems 
of society would gradually become manageable". 63 
For all that the Shared Values (as Asian values) are 
supposed to include people of all social levels, religions 
and ethnic origins, and "to preserve the cultural heritage 
of each of our communities", one still gets the impression 
that these Shared Values actually embody a conservative 
middle-class morality while quietly shunting to one side 
any awareness of class consciousness. In that sense, 
although they are supposed to represent "common values", 
they actually reflect special or elite class interests, 
from ensuring the government (or the PAP) stays in power, 
to ensuring "harmony" reigns for the sake of the nation -
meaning everyone, especially the working class, continues 
to put the economic success story of the nation above all 
else. The government's desire for continuity and the status 
quo is masked as a cultural crisis and a cultural 
reaffirmation. There is the fear too that for all the years 
of political stability and economic growth and rewards, the 
people of Singapore are not truly happy with the 
materialism and consumerism way of life. There is high 
alienation; capitalism under a paternalistic authoritarian 
~homas Cleary, The Essential Confucius (New York: Harper 
San Francisco, 1992), p.4. 
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government has somehow not produced a satisfying and 
meaningful way of life; people are turning to religion; 
skilled professionals are emigrating. M At a Pre-University 
seminar for teenage students held in June 1994, the 
students themselves complained that society placed too much 
stress on material values. When told the standard 
platitudes - "not to get caught up unthinkingly in the rat-
race, but to make time to climb mountains or help the 
needy, or do whatever they wish" - the students replied by 
blaming the "system" for their apathy or attitudes; the 
education system, the Government, the schools, their 
parents and society at large! One of them said, "You want 
balanced individuals, change the education system to help 
us become balanced individuals". 65 In other words, change 
the structures instead of our beliefs and values by 
preaching at us. Is this just teenage angst against adult 
authority, or dare we hope that the youths were sensitive 
to, and had something, concerns and grievances included, to 
contribute to nation-building? Anxious itself over the 
changes, perhaps in unforseen or unconfortable directions 
that might force it to be more liberalised, the government 
reacts by sharing its anxieties in the form of an announced 
cultural crisis, in the hope that manipulating values will 
do the trick without touching, or dealing with, the basic 
64Chiew Seen Kong, "National Identity, Ethnici ty and National 
Issues" in Quah, op.cit., pp.73-75. 
MThe straits Times Weekly Edition, June 25, 1994. 
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institutions themselves. 
The unconscious aim of the ideologist is to 
diffuse his neurosis through society by creating 
and inducing states of anxiety, such that the 
actions of irrational persons such as himself 
will have the appearance of rationality. The 
ideologist in action thus tries to convert the 
abnormal into the norm by 'irrationalizing' the 
surrounding society with fears and anxiety. We 
might call this the Law of ideological 
irrationalization.~ 
Seen thus, the Shared Values are not just the National 
Ideology; they are an ideology, constructed to serve 
political functions and class-interest agendas. We have 
seen that as an ideology it proposes that the state or 
nation must take priority over the rights of any person; 
its Confucian elements add its patriarchal, authoritarian 
and elitist aspects; and it is basically safely 
conservative with the desire to have things remain the way 
they are, without any undue reference to uncomfortable (and 
"Western") ideas of economic or social justice, or human 
rights, and without making institutional changes. As one 
sociologist has observed, the success of the government in 
the generation of ideology "resides to a great extent in 
its ability to harness certain cultural forces already at 
work in the society and to project these as being the only 
sensible ones ... ideology must necessarily be an expression 
- indeed the key expression - of culture". 67 This ideology 
is thus presented as natural, so that criticising them even 
~Lewis S.Feuer, Ideology and the Ideologists (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1975), p.135. 
~Clammer, The Sociology ... , pp.17, 19. 
169 
appears wrong and unpatriotic and disloyal. "One of the 
most important ways in which 'misrepresentation' or 
'misrecognition' occurs is in bestowing an aura of 
'naturalness' or a halo of 'disinterestedness' on the 
social relations which they represent" .68 Here the 
naturalism appears to include a reference to cultural 
values, as well as a "nationalism" appeal. 
We can end this section by remembering again that the 
Shared Values or National Ideology do contain Confucian 
elements, and could be understood or regarded as generally 
Confucian. It might be good therefore for us to consider 
the following quotation, and ask whether this has already 
happened, or is happening in Singapore: 
if Confucianism were to become a state ideology, 
it would be used to legitimize autocratic rule 
and to advocate unthinking respect for authority, 
submissiveness and obedience to the status quo. 
In this way, it could easily be used by a 
particular political machinery to enhance its own 
power or control. This concern is not unfounded. 
It has been one historic expression of 
Confucianism. 69 
AKenneth Thompson, Beliefs and Ideology (Chichester: Ellis 
Horwood Limited, 1986), p.46. 
fiTu, op.cit., p.168. 
170 
(iii) A Singaporean Civil Religion? 
Can the Shared Values or National Ideology, as an 
ideology, be identified as a civil religion then? Indeed, 
are there elements of the National Ideology which make 
sense when one sees it as a civil religion? Is Confucianism 
really the state ideology, and is Confucianism really the 
civil religion? Questions like these, and more, can be 
asked, but before any sort of answer can be ventured, it 
would be helpful to have a summary of what could be loosely 
termed the sources of a Singaporean civil religion. 
Firstly, echoing the Durkheimian tradition, one must 
recognise that every functioning society; every relatively 
stable society will have a set of shared beliefs, values 
and symbols; a common set of ideas and ideals that express 
the highest values of the society and that are considered 
special or "sacred". The collective sharing of these values 
serves to remind the members of the society of what they 
hold in common, thereby providing for the order, stability, 
and integration of the society as a whole, as against the 
conflicts constantly present ln daily life. Collective 
rituals and rites will be held regularly, during which the 
shared values are celebrated and reaffirmed, and they make 
up the specific mechanisms through which these states are 
affirmed and sustained. There is some religious 
significance invested in these shared values and symbols, 
but the setting up of a national religion in a situation of 
religious pluralism prevents anyone religion from being 
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used by all in the society as a source of generalized 
meaning. However, people still need to invest their 
activity with meaning, especially when that activity brings 
together persons of different religious backgrounds. 
Therefore a sUbstitute meaning system is sought, and, if 
found, the people whose activities have been facilitated by 
it will tend to exalt it. 
It can be asked, however, why Singapore would need a 
set of shared beliefs or values if it is already a 
"functioning" and viable society, and if such success or 
stability is due to the PAP being able, so far, to deliver 
economic progress as well as keeping a tight control over 
society. The answer in this case is simply that the Shared 
Values are precisely to keep Singapore viable according to 
PAP thinking and interpretation. Acceptance and adherence 
to the Shared Values, so the PAP believes, will enable 
further economic prosperity and thus further PAP success. 
The attitude of the PAP government indeed seems to imply 
that it can simply invoke certain values and expect to see 
the desired effects once people accept them. Thus it has 
been pushing people to accept what has been deemed correct 
Asian values with exhortations of the need for a National 
Ideology based on these values, and the dire warning that 
Singapore will suffer economically and may not even survive 
as an Asian society into the next century, without these 
Shared Values. The need for such a "push" equally implies 
that the PAP is aware of opposition to its attempt to set 
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up a National Ideology with these Shared Values, whether it 
is seen as indifference and apathy or as active objections 
from the public and members of Parliament. So if the PAP is 
trying to make the National Ideology the "dominant 
ideology", it does not appear that it has fully succeeded 
yet. 70 
Nevertheless, the PAP government presses on with its 
launch of a National Ideology in Singapore. We remind 
ourselves that this was defined as the identification of 
certain abstract values common to all Singaporeans. 
Furthermore, this move was supposed or meant to synthesize 
the essence of each of the ethnic community's heritages for 
common adoption. "The overriding goal must surely be to 
complement existing efforts aimed at fostering group 
solidarity with something of a higher value which 
Singaporeans would look up to as the guiding parameters of 
their lives as citizens of the State". 71 civil values were 
also constantly emphasized by the government through 
various mass campaigns which were launched to inculcate 
what were deemed certain desirable values in the life of 
Singaporeans. And so slogans, posters, publicity blitzs, 
even specially commissioned and newly created "national" 
~. Abercrombie, S. Hill, B.S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology 
Thesis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980) indeed argues that 
supporters of the dominant ideology thesis tend to overestimate 
the extent to which different groups are integrated into the 
dominant culture, as well as underestimating the extent to which 
different groups can come up with ideas which run counter to 
dominant ideologies. 
71Muta 1 ib, op. cit., p. 79. 
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songs with such titles as "stand Up for Singapore" and 
"Count On Me, Singapore" were presented, all intended to 
sell certain positive images of the Singaporean ethos and 
identity. Campaigns had such themes as "Keep Singapore 
Green", "Courtesy is Our Way of Life", "One Nation, Many 
Races", "No Smoking" and "Keep Fit and Healthy". Singapore 
did not lack symbols too; such expressive symbols were 
given added significance by way of public occasions such as 
national holidays, rituals and ceremonies. We can point, as 
an example, to the National Day celebrations, held around 
August 9 each year. These celebrations have always tended 
to centre around some common themes which Singaporeans of 
different ethnic backgrounds and walks of life can identify 
or associate themselves with. It is obvious that there was 
the hope and desire that all these expressive slogans and 
symbols, regularly repeated in mass rituals and joyful 
settings such as the National Day celebrations, could and 
would help instil virtues and values in the hearts and 
minds of the people of Singapore. citizens are encouraged, 
of course, to buy and display State flags at their homes 
(in previous years there had been not-so-subtle grumbling 
in the press that residents in private housing and 
condominiums -presumably more well-off and more Westernized 
- were more reluctant or unwilling to display the flag, as 
compared to those in public housing who apparently were 
more obviously proud of their country). There is also a 
"Pledge to the Nation" which students especially are 
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supposed to know and affirm: 
We, the citizens of Singapore, 
pledge ourselves as one united people, 
regardless of race, language or religion, 
to build a democratic society 
based on justice and equality 
so as to achieve happiness, prosperity 
and progress for our nation. 
Perhaps then, from the perspective of the authorities, 
all these national songs, slogans, symbols, creeds and the 
like, in the context of officially sponsored (or decreed) 
ceremonies, celebrations, or rituals of creed-taking "could 
help people externalize and broaden their otherwise insular 
ethnic horizons to embrace one that 1S Singaporean in 
orientation".72 In other words, to promote loyalty to the 
nation and to what is "Singaporean"; to give allegiance and 
devotion to "a higher value which Singaporeans would look 
up to" as a guide to how to live their lives properly as 
citizens maybe even to provide a sense of ultimate 
meaning to one's Singaporean citizenship (one of the 
"national songs" begins "This is my country, this is my 
land; this is my future ... ") .It seeks to make people feel 
good about themselves as participants in the nation; a 
common destiny is possible and imperative; all as a "team" 
or "family" will swim -or sink together; indeed 
Singaporeans can thrive and survive in the years ahead 
because they have and accept "shared values" which will 
enable them to do so. We can begin to postulate then that 
Singapore's form of a civil religion is exactly the 
'nlbid., p.?? 
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combination of all these beliefs, rites, and symbols which 
the government is using in an attempt to sacralize the 
perceived values of Singapore society, and to anchor the 
nation in the context of a special or ultimate system of 
meaning. The government is firm on the necessity of 
singapore being a "secular state" , and has refused to 
include a value such as "belief in God" (which Malaysia's 
Rukunegara and Indonesia's Pancasila includes) in the 
National Ideology. This is in line with its ~driness on the 
role and influence of religions, especially when, for 
example, the different religions aggressively compete with 
each other for new converts. This indeed was one of the 
factors given for the necessity of the Religious Harmony 
Bill, and the Bill itself can be understood as a piece of 
pre-emptive legislation to maintain religious harmony by, 
in this instance, seeking to lessen the tension between the 
religious groups. It seems then that the government is 
trying to hold up this new meaning system, the civil 
religion as a primary source of devotion and commitment 
itself (the "operative religion"). It is not expected, of 
course, to replace the various religions, but seems 
designed to add a dimension to the existing religions, 
bearing in mind the Confucian values incorporated. The 
National Ideology/Shared Values were debated, the procedure 
for getting it recognized went without undue problems, and 
the government would thus say it was respected and 
accepted, and even obeyed even while in the process of 
176 
getting these same Shared Values inculcated in Singaporeans 
- the values appear understood as present and actually 
functioning, whi Ie seemingly dininishing, in the ongoing 
life of society. Language and imagery of purpose and 
destiny has been used; the President of Singapore is quoted 
in the opening pages of the White Paper on Shared Values as 
saying that the core values should be "enshrined" as a 
National Ideology to "bond us together as Singaporeans, 
with our own distinct identity and destiny". Senior 
government ministers at the beginning of this National 
Ideology exercise had posed questions as to the ultimate 
purpose of Singapore whether it was to be rootless 
without proper, grounded Asian roots and culture, and thus 
headed for an uncertain future or destiny in the face of 
'Western"/"alien" threats to Singaporean lifestyles and 
values -indeed, to the "Singapore (Asian) Way of Life". A 
glimpse of the ideology of purpose and destiny behind the 
Shared Values can be seen in the concluding section of the 
White Paper: 
Through careful guidance and patient consensus 
building, we can influence, even if we cannot 
completely determine, the values which future 
generations of Singaporeans will share, and thus 
improve their chances of thriving and prospering 
together. This is a key responsibility of the 
present generation. 
There is a challenge to help motivate each others' 
commitment and even sacrifice (a ~ord not new to 
Singaporean workers) to the nation's interests, which 
befitting its historic.)l role as a "commercial emporium" 
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are economic ones. The Shared Values are to enhance and 
continue economic progress; Singaporeans are to work for 
that, as well as enjoying such economic fruits of their 
labour. Singapore's survival and destiny as a nation 
depends on it. As The Next Lap, the PAP government's 
blueprint for the future puts it, "All our plans depend on 
strong economic growth ... To reach the next milestone, 
Singaporeans will have to work hard, work smart, 
continuously hone our skills and simultaneously acquire new 
ones ... The next step is to make it to the top league [of 
thriving modern economies]". The goal is to become "a 
business hub of the Asia Pacific" since "by becoming a hub 
city, we can bring prosperity to the region and 
ourselves".73 singaporeans will "thrive" and "prosper" as 
long as they continue on the charge for the sake of the 
country; the "national ethos" as the February 11, 1993 
editorial of The straits Times puts it, is "Work hard" and 
"is a given in the Singapore experience". In short, it is 
part of the Singapore Way of Life. It promotes materialism 
and the good things of life, and as such helps people be 
happy as "participants" in the ongoing economic life of the 
nation. There will always be some who will doubt the 
validity of such claims for the nation, but one cannot 
completely "determine" that everyone will accept such 
values on cue: there is the realisation that the promotion 
~he Government of Singapore, Singapore: The Next Lap 
(Singapore: Times Editions Pte.Ltd., 1991), pp.57,59. 
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of a national ideology or civil religion has just started, 
and it "will take many years" (section 54, The White 
Paper). 
In such a way then is the meaning of the nation, and 
the core values that unite Singaporeans defined; in such a 
way is the nature of the civil religion revealed. civil 
religion is to be influential in shaping the course of the 
nation, so Singapore as a society and nation has to 
represent an (Asian) ideal of itself to its members. Only 
then can there be, using Herberg's language, "the 
sanctification of the society and culture of which it 
[civil religion] is the reflection". 
To talk of "culture" is to remind ourselves of the 
Confucian influence and elements in the National Ideology. 
The government leaders obviously had faith in Confucian 
teachings' civilizing power, for "the civilizing impact of 
Confucianism on civil living should not be underrated .•. In 
that sense, Confucianism was a 'civil religion' that has 
positive connotations". 74 Almost as an aside, Lee also 
mentions that "Lee Kuan Yew as a matter of fact takes 
Confucianism seriously ... as a civil sanction, in will 
Herberg's sense of ' civic religion'''. 75 Another similar 
observation mentions: "Singapore, in the person of Lee Kuan 
~Peter K.H. Lee, "'Civil Religion' and 'Secularization' in 
Confucianism: Han Yu and Lin Chung-Yuan. Implications For 
Theological Critique in Asia Today" in Ching Feng, Vol. XXXIV, 
NO.1, January 1991, p.32. 
7sXbid., p. 42. 
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Yew has assumed some Confucianized autocratic 
characteristics, and it is interesting that he has taken 
special interest in Confucianism (as a form of ' civil 
religion' in support of the government?).n When the 
Shared values were first mooted, the public had no 
difficulty agreeing that the values were important for the 
country's social and political well-being and are, to an 
extent, already imbued in the people. Again, with the 
Confucianist tone of the Shared Values in mind, we become 
aware that "Confucian emphasis on political and social 
responsibility explains why during much of history 
Confucianism served the function of a 'civil religion,,,.TI 
One might even go as far as saying that the moral norms and 
values as elaborated through the National Ideology 
represents an intellectually sublimated and extended 
version of the kind of city-state Confucian civic morality 
which the government shares. 
Here we must take notice of the emphasis on 
nationalism in the Shared Values, and of the use of 
nationalism as an ideology in a new nation like Singapore. 
"The fact remains that most governments of post-war 
independent countries clearly recognize that nationalism, 
wherever it is manifested, emphasizes the need to nurture 
"Nicolas Standaert, "Confucian-Christian Dual Citizenship -
A Political Conflict?" in Ching Feng, Vol.XXXIV, No.2 June 1991, 
p.116. 
TIHans Kung and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese 
Religions (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p.75. 
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a political ideology for rallying the people together in a 
spirit of solidarty and also to develop a set of values 
which the nationals of those countries can understand and 
relate to" .78 Singapore is clearly one of these 
"countries", and we can ask if the "poli tical ideology" 
mentioned can be a civil religion being developed through 
a national ideology. It has been noted too that civil 
religion may be a very general form of natioJlalism, but in 
the Singapore context of the presence of Confucian values, 
nationalism and Confucianism are not mutually exclusive. 
"Indeed, where Confucianism serves as a stabilizing force, 
nationalism has acted as a catalyst for innovation •.• ,,79 
They need each other and have helped each other. 
For many people today, nationalism is still the 
most powerful force for social transformation 
albeit a morally ambiguous force. It motivates 
the peoples of the developing world to attempt to 
• catch up' with the developed and highly 
technological societies of the West and Japan, 
not only in order to enjoy better economic well-
being, but also to earn a greater sense of 
dignity and self-respect. w 
It can be proposed then that the Singapore civil religion 
consists of two aspects: secularized Confucianism, and 
nationalism. 
A general summing up of the characteristics of 
7IHo Wing Meng, "Value Premises Underlying the Transformation 
of Singapore" in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern 
Singapore, ed. Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p.673. 
"Ching, "Some Problems ... " op.cit.,p.392. 
IOIbid!, p. 393 . 
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singapore that would seem to have facilitated a civil 
religion are: the strong nationalism, the pervasive role of 
religion(s) in society, including that of Confucianism in 
the framing and interpretation of the Shared Values, the 
development and recognition of a "Singaporean" people and 
a "singaporean Way of Life" that has come out of the 
different ethnic communities, and the deliberate campaign 
itself to construct a civil religion. We can indeed say 
that the government was promoting a civil religion, in the 
form of a National Ideology incorporating Confucian values. 
We must next ask whether as a civil religion - and as 
an ideology - it does not also express the experiences amd 
aspirations, the ideal and material needs and interests of 
certain groups. Behind the need for "Asian values", is 
there another agenda for the civil religion? 
(iv) ot economic success and Confucian values 
Since the late 1970s, one of the questions 
consistently brought up in international economic circles 
concerns the economic success of East Asia and South-East 
Asia's "newly industrializing countries". It revolves 
around the theme of whether the Confucian culture that is 
prevalent in nations like Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South 
Korea, and of course, Singapore could in a~y way explain 
their fast economic development in the past few decades. 
Perhaps, trying to explain an economic event within the 
context of a culture is dangerous and even foolhardy! 
However, for our purposes, our short inquiry into the 
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relationship of culture and economy in Asia will have to 
start with Max Weber, who did pioneering work on this 
subject. In two studies, Weber traced the origin of 
capitalism to Protestantism, and provided a critique of 
Confucianism and its alleged role in retarding the 
industrialization and modernization of China. 81 
The rise of capitalism, according to Weber, was due 
directly to the ethic of the Puritans in the Calvinist 
movement. Profit-making was considered a religious duty and 
idleness a sin. Such an attitude was what was most 
characteristic of the social ethic of capitalistic culture, 
and was in a sense the fundamental basis of it. Weber felt 
that this social ethic was unique to the Puritans and was 
markedly missing among the people of historic China, India, 
Babylon, and the Middle Ages.~ If the pursuit of profit 
was a religious duty to the Puritans, it also meant they 
had to practice an ascetic life. On one hand, they had to 
work hard so that profit can be maximized for honouring 
God, but at the same time they had to minimize its use for 
themselves. There was to be a compulsion to "save", and not 
to needlessly "spend". 
This capitalist way of profit-making was thus a 
rational one: it took into account the eff icient 
IIMax Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 
1930), and The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, trans. 
Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe,II.: Free Press, 1951). 
UWeber, The Protestant Ethic ... , p.54. 
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utilization of manpower, and the calculation of profits and 
losses. This kind of (modern) capitalism, Weber stressed, 
was different from all previous economic movements in three 
aspects - the rational organisation of free labour, the 
separation of business from the household, and rational 
book-keeping. 83 
As for traditional China, Weber named two conditions 
as unfavourable to the rise of capitalism. The first was 
the Chinese socio-political structure which, to him, was a 
serious obstacle. The complicated monetary system, the lack 
of local autonomy of cities, the persistence of the guilds, 
there was no formal and independent legal order, the 
presence of a conservative kinship system, and the 
inhibiting and stifling effects of the imperial bureaucracy 
- these were all aspects of traditional Chinese society 
which prevented the emergence of entrepreneurs and 
contributed to economic stagnation.~ 
The second condition was the Chinese exaltation of the 
"cultured man" as the highest Confucian ideal. Such a 
Confucian gentleman was supposed to value harmony between 
nature and men and had a disdain for acquisitiveness in 
profit-making. The Confucian gentleman, as a scholar 
official or as a member of the gentry, would regard 
landownership as a socially acceptable econoIDic undertaking 
but would have no regard for commercial pursuits. Weber 
Ulbid., pp.21-22. 
"Weber, The Religion of China, Part 1. 
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felt that the Confucian ethic did not have a tension 
between nature and diety, or a demand from God that the 
people should work hard to make profits. Comparing the 
Chinese to the Puritans, he observed that the Chinese 
lacked the central, religiously determined, and rational 
method of life "which came from within and which was 
chracteristic of the classical Puritan. For the latter, 
economic success was not an ultimate goal" but indeed a 
means for serving God. Thus the Confucian gentleman was not 
any sort of "divine tool"; "in his adjustment to the world 
and his self-perfection he was an end unto himself, not a 
means for any functional end. This core of Confucian ethics 
rejected ... training in economics for the pursuit of 
profit".85 He concluded: "Confucian rationalism meant 
rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant 
rational mastery of the world". 86 
All is not lost however; Weber also believed that any 
failure of capitalism to rise in China did not mean it was 
impossible for China to adopt capitalism. There were other 
aspects of Chinese culture such as early abolition of 
feudalism, freedom of migration, free choice of 
occupations, and the high value placed on education, which 
were favourable to the dvelopment of capitalism. The 
Chinese, then, "in all probability would be quite 
capable •.. of assimilating capitalism which has technically 
Ulbid" pp.243-244, 246. 
16Ibid., p.248. 
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and economically been fully developed in the modern culture 
area".~ It must be noted, in passing, that Weber's ideas 
and theories on culture and economy have become the 
foundation of a contemporary sociological school to explain 
the process of modernization. Talcott Parsons, in 
particular, has elaborated on Weber I s concepts, and in 
books such as The structure of Social Action (1937) and The 
social system (1951) has developed a comprehensive theory 
to describe and evaluate the cultural and economic 
achievements of nations. This "Weber-Parsons paradigm" has 
been widely accepted and adopted by scholars of social 
change, and of Asian/oriental studies, with the idea that 
the main, distinctive feature of modern cultural and 
economic change throughout the world is a movement toward 
increasing rationality. This has been demonstrated by the 
historical experiences of the West, so, in other words, the 
West's rational model of cultural and economic change can 
be applied universally. Such a model has three features: it 
is aimed at achieving efficiency, it is facilitated by 
individualism and it is driven by dynamism. 
To sum up the thoughts so far: there was the belief 
that in a setting where someone is more individualistic, 
expressi ve and assertive, where the market system works 
better and self-interest (in Adam smith's understanding) 
predominates, then modernization from capitalism is 
possible. The kind of values usually considered Confucian 
17Xbid. 
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do not promote such modernization - or so it was thought. 
By the 1970s however, many had begun to reconsider and 
even reverse their assumptions when faced with the economic 
success of East Asian countries. Herman Kahn, for example, 
was one of the first to link Confucian culture to such 
economic success: "Under current conditions the neo-
Confucian cultures have many strengths and relatively few 
weaknesses. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and the ethnic Chinese minorities in Malaysia 
and Thailand seem more adept at industrialization than the 
West" and the Confucian ethic "will result in all the neo-
Confucian societies having at least potentially higher 
growth rates than other cultures". 88 In a similar vein, a 
much-cited report in The Economist commented at the time: 
For the 200 years since the onset of the 
industrial revolution, the west has dominated the 
world. Today that dominance is threatened, not 
just by the Russians, who are anyway heirs, at 
least in part, to the western tradition; nor by 
the Arabs whose stranglehold will relax as the 
sands run dry; but more fundamentally by the East 
Asian heirs to Confucianism, who have so far 
provided the only real economic ... challenges to 
the Euro-American culture." 
And again these "post-Confucian east Asians" are identified 
as the Japanese, "Koreans from South Korea.' Chinese from 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hongkong". 90 Japan has attracted 
UHerman Kahn, World Economic Development, 1979 and Beyond 
(Boulder, Co: westview Press, 1979), pp.118, 122. 
"Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Post-Confucian Challenge" in ~ 
Economist, February 9, 1980, p.67. 
~Ibld., pp.67-68. 
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special mention because of the awareness that the country 
has undergone economic modernization for the longest time 
in Asia, and yet it remains uniquely distinguishable from 
the West. Two Japanese economists, in two separate books, 
have tracked the economic success of Japan and the "newly 
industrializing economies" directly to Confucian values. 
Michio Morishima defines Confucianism as "a religion which 
unites with the governing power in a state; acts as 
guardian of its legitimacy and whose role is to sanctify 
the lineage of the ruling tribe" and also as "an ideology 
providing religious justification for the position of those 
in power and upholding the status quo", 91 and attributes 
Japan's success precisely to the working of this Japanese 
version of Confucianism. In his book he delineates the way 
in which ideology has been used dur ing the course of 
Japan's history, and that the ideology of Confucianism has 
played a crucial role in helping direct (and restrict) the 
possibilities of day to day Japanese economic activities 
"to within the framework peculiar to that ideology".92 
To Harry Oshima, the social values of Confucian 
culture were rational, pragmatic and utilitarian, and as 
such more conducive to modern economic growth, than those 
of Hinduism or Mahayana Buddhism. This helped to explain 
the difference in the economic performance between East 
91Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan 'Succeeded'? western 
Technology and the Japanese Ethos (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), pp.194, 196. 
92Ibid., p.201 
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Asia and South Asia. He also states that while Protestant 
ethics are the ethics of Western capitalism, "Confucian 
ethics may be said to be the philosophy of the Asian 
monsoon economy: harmony is seen as the key to social and 
political stability, and compromise, moderation, diligence, 
and cooperation as the means to achieve harmony".93 
Confucian cultures do not have to fear or be wary of 
science or modernization. 
[The Asian NICs] need not be held back by the 
dearth of new technologies and can continue to 
import them to speed up growth. Institutions 
concerned with importing technologies have 
improved in past decades, and co-operation and 
participation are more common than individualism 
and adversial relations. The work ethic in the 
NICs is quite strong as a heritage from 
Confucianism ... Confucianism is based on human 
relations and has been less affected by the 
spread of sc ient i f ic cu 1 ture . Aspects of its 
teachings that extol learning, harmony, 
cooperation, order, and diligence may be 
strengthened if the demands of emerging new 
technology are consistent with these ideals.~ 
Before going into what the "work ethic" or "Confucian 
ethics" might entail, we need to remember that East Asian 
societies are all different from each other. Japanese 
society is quite different from Korean, Korean society 
different from that of the Taiwanese, these three are 
different from that of Hong Kong and Singapore - and so on. 
Therefore, "it is inadvisable to assume that the Confucian 
ethic, or the type of entrepreneurial spirit it engenders, 
"Harry T. Oshima, Economic Growth in Monsoon Asia: A 




is identical in each of the five areas", and yet it was 
determined "that some sort of underlying work ethic must be 
common to each case, and that such an ethic provided the 
ingredient necessary for economic development".~ 
It would therefore be appropriate now to summarise 
what has been called "the post-Confucian hypothesis" before 
naming some of the values of this "post-Confucian" ethic. 
It is essentially simple: both Japan and the 
newly industrialized countries of East Asia 
belong to the broad area of influence of Sinitic 
civilization, and there can be no doubt that 
Confucianism has been a very powerful force in 
all of them. The hypothesis is that a key 
variable in explaining the economic performance 
of these countries is Confucian ethics - or post-
Confucian ethics, in the sense that the moral 
values in question are now relatively detached 
from the Confucian tradi tion proper and have 
become more widely diffused ... Robert Bellah has 
coined ... 'bourgeois Confucianism' to distinguish 
this from the 'high' Confucianism of the Mandarin 
elite of traditional China.% 
Berger is "strongly inclined to believe" that this "post-
Confucian hypothesis" will be supported. "It is 
inconceivable to me that at least some of the Confucian-
derived values intended by the hypothesis - a positive 
attitude to the affairs of this world, a sustained 
lifestyle of discipline and self-cultivation, respect for 
authority, frugality, an overriding concern for stable 
"Tu, op.cit., p.SS; 169. 
"Peter L. Berger, "An East Asian Development Model?" in In 
Search of An East Asian Development Model, ed.Peter L. Berger and 
Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1988), p.7. 
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family life - should not be relevant to the work ethic and 
the overall social attitudes of the region".97 
The features or values which have been named as 
important factors in successful economic development in 
East Asia include: "a very strong, achievement-oriented 
work ethic; a highly developed sense of collective 
solidarity, both within ... and beyond the family; the 
enormous prestige of education, ... and severe meritocratic 
norms and institutions, which, while egalitarian in design, 
serve to select out elites when they are at an early 
age" ;98 "self-discipline, group loyalty, willingness to 
work hard, frugality and self-denial, and obedience to 
authority - in short, the values of the work ethic, and 
those presumed to be congenial to authoritarian political 
structures" ;99 11 the tradi tional virtues of hard work and 
frugality ... close personal ties and respect for authority 
and one I selders" ; 100 "the primary emphasis on self-
discipline ... (which) is emphasized perhaps more in Chinese 
culture than any other cultures of the world ... the emphasis 
on hard work, exalting it as a virtue to be conscientiously 
97Ibid., pp.7-8. 
"Ibid., p.5 
"wm. Theodore de Bary, Confucianism as an Aspect of East 
Asian and World Civilizations (Singapore: The Institute of East 
Asian Philosophies, 1986), p.11. 
lOOChang, op.cit., p.27 
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pursued" • 101 
These values or virtues are thus part of the "post-
Confucian hypothesis" or "the newly-emerging Confucian 
ethic". There is however more to the equation: this newly-
emerging ethic has also contributed to a new kind of 
capitalism in East Asia. Such an ethic has been said to be 
the functional equivalent of the Puritan ethic and has also 
been described as basically compatible or comparable to the 
Western work ethic. Yet it can be seen to have a different 
structure and spiritual orientation. An excellent summing-
up is the following: 
This ethic, unlike the Puritanic ethic which 
stresses a consciousness of one's rights, entails 
duty-consciousness. It stresses the importance of 
social solidarity and finding one's niche in a 
particular group. This means understanding one's 
role in society with reference to a whole body of 
social conventions and practices. It is more of 
a harmonizing than a competitive model. It 
assigns great importance to the personal 
cUltivation and discipline (especially the 
spiritual and psychological discipline) of the 
self. It stresses consensus formation, not 
through the imposition of a particular will upon 
the society at large but through the 
participation of a large segment of the group in 
a gradual process of mutual consultation. This 
requires and elicits a spirit of cooperation. It 
also stresses the importance of education, not so 
much in terms of the accumulation of knowledge as 
in terms of character-building and personality 
formation. It seeks to create a kind of fiduciary 
commitment to a larger and more lasting goal. 
Leadership in government is encouraged and 
considered crucial. At the same time, government 
can lead the people only if it is also moral, 
dynamic and creative. This particular ethic 
places a great emphasis on a sense of history, 
IOIWU Teh-Yao, "Chinese Traditional Values and Modernization" 
in Asian values and Modernization, ed. Seah Chee-Meow (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 1977), p.48. 
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culture and tradition. It values wisdom gained 
and transmitted by experience over an 
accumulation of information ... We are talking 
about a new Confucian ethic which is a response 
to the impact of the West. As a creative 
response, this new Confucian ethic has already 
integrated some of the values taken for granted 
as Western within its ethical structure. It does 
not oppose Western ideas of rights, individual 
dignity, autonomy, or competitiveness in the 
heal thy and dynamic sense. 102 
One could speculate that this kind of model reflects to a 
great degree the Singapore situation. The government may 
decry the effects of Westernization (as it is perceived) in 
singapore, but such a reaction is also because there has 
been a combination of the values of the East and the West 
as part of, and as an adequate response to, the unique 
Singapore situation. Singapore has as part of its society 
the sense of the individual, of competitiveness, even the 
combined sense of self-interest, dr i ve and rights 
consciousness. The government does not want to eliminate 
values like these if they help make up the kind of 
entrepreneurial spirit it wants - but it does not want 
"Asian" (Confucian) values forgotten either. 
Keeping in mind then that the "post-Confucian 
hypothesis" or the "new Confucian ethic" are indeed 
hypotheses that are still being debated, we can go on to 
ask whether Confucian values have played an important part 
in Singapore's economic progress (and process), as they are 
supposed to have in the other Asian countries. Some 
Singaporean scholars are unsure, or reluctant to admit any 
I~U, op,cit" pp.ll0-lll. 
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such link. Thus, "it is very difficult to establish a 
direct causual relationship between Confucian values and 
the economic development of Singapore" .103 There have been 
other arguments for the proposition that noneconomic 
factors explain only a small part of economic success; that 
a good, coherent economic rationale ("good policies") can 
be provided for the East Asian countr ies' success; that 
such success (in three of the countries) came about only 
after these countries changed economic strategy (and the 
cultural factor was invariant); and that other countries 
with quite different cultures also were successful in 
achieving growth when they followed a similar strategy.l04 
Another Singaporean response echoes this proposition: 
"Surely the conclusion to be drawn must be that the 
economic success achieved by Singapore during the past 
quarter of a century has been the result principally of 
economic policies and practices imported from elsewhere and 
influenced only marginally, if at all, by indigenous 
cultural factors" .105 Yet these same writers also admit, 
"in light of recent industrialization programmes in various 
parts of East Asia, it is sufficiently evident that certain 
Confucian emphases which Weber viewed as inhibiting 
lmwong and Wong, op.cit., p.7. 
I(MGustav Papanek, "The New Asian Capitalism: An Economic 
Portrait" in In Search Of An East Asian ... , .76. 
IOSThe Editors, "Challenges of Success" in Management of 
Success; the Moulding of Modern Singapore ed.Kernial Singh Sandhu 
and Paul Wheatley (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1989), p.l096. 
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modernization, notably the educational, the disciplinary, 
and the organizational, can in appropriate circumstances 
function as factors contributing to economic 
development" .106 Why is there this reluctance to 
investigate whether such Confucian values, even if they are 
not the cause, could be more than "marginal" factors in 
singapore's economic development? 
John Wong and Aline Wong, while expressing their 
difficulties with any direct relationship between Confucian 
values and Singapore's economic development, do not feel at 
ease also with the dictum that for economic success, 
everything can be attributed to good economic policies and 
the people. "But good policies or strategies do not come 
about in an institutional vacuum, particularly in regards 
to the implementation of pOlicies. Ideology, leadership, 
political structure, social ethos and political culture all 
play a part in the formulation and the implementation of an 
effective development policy ... It should, however, be 
stressed that historically successful economic development 
has taken place under virtually all sorts of political 
regimes" .107 This last point has already been noted, but 
here it is linked with a role for culture. As MacFarquhar 
puts it, "Their political systems and complexions differ 
considerably ... the significant coincidence is culture, the 
shared heritage of centuries of inculcation with 
I06Ibid" p.l095. 
I07Wong and Wong, op.cit., p.13. 
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Confucianism" . 108 
The Wongs go on to develop their understanding of 
culture, politics, and government in relation to economic 
development: 
What are really needed are effective government, 
competent public administration and dedicated 
political leadership committed to economic 
growth ... In Singapore, the high commitment of its 
political leadership to economic growth is well-
known. So is the high integrity and efficiency of 
its public administration which operates on 
meritocracy, with high-level positions manned by 
scholars with outstanding academic achievements. 
The overall political style and the general 
practice of government in Singapore would seem to 
conform to the Confucian high ideals of a 
benevolent government with a strong moral 
obligation to perform and to "deliver the goods" 
in terms of higher GNP increases or more export 
growth. In the circumstances of a small city-
state, the prime principle of virtuous government 
must be, first and last, to ensure the economic 
survival of the state and to provide for the 
basic needs of its people. Is it too tenuous for 
us to interpret the development-oriented 
singapore government as the modern equivalent to 
the Confucian principle of government by 
virtue?l09 
The answer is "no"! Such an understanding of the 
workings of the Singapore government reaffirms its 
Confucian orientation, (and to repeat the earlier quote) 
Confucian "ideology, leadership, political structure, 
social ethos and political culture all play a part in the 
formulation and the implementation of an effective 
development policy". 
As previously asked, why is there a reluctance to 
I~MacFarquhar, op.cit., p.68. 
l~ong and Wong, op.cit., pp.13-14. 
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admit that Confucian values, if operative in East Asian 
nations with regard to economic development, may have 
something to do with that of Singapore too? One answer is 
simply that no government leader has openly or directly 
claimed that Singapore's success in economic development 
has been due solely to the working of Confucian culture. As 
mentioned earlier, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister, 
may have told the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention 
that in the Singapore situation special efforts had to be 
made to pass on core Confucian cultural values which if 
lost would lower singapore's performance, but he went on to 
(carefully?) name the Chinese in South-East Asia as those 
who had succeeded because of their adherence to Confucian 
values. Singapore is a multi-racial, multi-religious, 
multi-cultural society; ethnic sensitivities need to be 
taken into account. To baldly assert that Singapore's 
economic success is due to Confucianism even though 
Singapore is 75% Chinese would imply that racial 
minorities the Malays, Indians, Eurasians, Arabs, 
Europeans and others - have played no part or role in such 
development, and this is patently false. This would be 
clearly be politically unacceptable in a multi-racial 
society (and would also antagonise neighbours like Malaysia 
or Indonesia). It is also convenient to point to the 
government's "pragmatic" economic policies or strategies as 
the reason for success, made easier by the fact that the 
government itself has not been hesitant in talking about 
197 
such "pragmatism" as the basic characteristic of its 
economic philosophy. 
But even in the "pragmatic" planning of a strategy of 
development, the government was all too aware of the 
importance and need for cultural values. The observation 
has been made that "obviously a society has to initiate a 
broad range of changes to accomodate economic 
modernization. How a society makes the necessary social 
changes while retaining its traditional values may 
determine the success or failure of a development 
effort" .110 Also, "economic development is caused by a 
variety of factors, and culture is one central factor 
inexorably linked to the development process" and today 
Confucianism, even if only one force, continues to be a 
formidable cultural force shaping the life of the peoples 
in East Asia. lIl Two social scientists have summarised the 
PAP government's strategy of development, and Hartfield's 
observations about cuI ture are echoed in it. The 
'strategy's" first requirement is strong Leadership and 
Organisation = Achievement of Goals, with the prerequisite 
of a continuing political stability in the region. We have 
seen that the PAP has provided what it deems strong 
Leadership by its authoritarian, paternalistic style of 
IIOEdward F. Hartf ield, "The Divergent Economic Development 
of China and Japan" in Confucianism and Economic Development: An 
Oriental Alternative? ed.Hung-chao Tai (Washington, D.C.: The 




governing (and more will be said on this shortly). 
Secondly, "the leadership should inculcate in the 
population the right values and attitudes that are 
supportive of or may even quicken the pace of modernization 
and development" (italics mine) and some of these values 
and attitudes include a sense of future-orientation, 
achievement-orientation, efficiency, social discipline, 
self-discipline, the willing acceptance of change as part 
of life and an inclination to hard work .112 As has been 
pointed out already, the government has indeed been aware 
of "values" and has been busy "inculcating" them, then and 
now - as in the Shared Values project, with its pervasive 
Confucian influence. 
Thirdly, the government has been carefully and 
consistently following the particular principle of not 
allowing the pace of development to slacken when initial 
success is achieved. The government continually stresses 
that complacency of any kind must be fought against to 
maintain growth. Thus the Prime Minister, Mr. Goh Chok Tong 
in his National Day rally speech in August 1992 can tell 
Singaporeans that the going will get tougher because they 
are now competing in the super league of developed nations, 
but the future will be bright if, among other things, 
Singaporeans work together to stay competitive. According 
1l2Chan Heng-Chee and Hans-Dieter Evers, "National Identity 
and Nation Building in Singapore" in Studies in Asian Sociology; 
Urban Society and Social change eds. Peter S.J. Chen and Hans-
Dieter Evers (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 1978), p.124. 
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p.7. 
to Goh, there is no choice in this: there is to be no 
complacency. Similarly, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew is 
reported to have said that to stay ahead, singapore must be 
that much better, more productive and more capable. The 
headline for the report was "Shake Singaporeans out of 
complacency" .113 And in his 1994 May Day message the Prime 
Minister was busy telling Singaporean workers that they 
will get higher wages in 1994, but he also warned that they 
must not forget the lessons of the 1985 recession, and must 
continue to be trained, to have their skills upgraded, to 
continue to work and compete as a team - and then "we can 
continue to improve our standard of living". Another 
warning then, to Singaporeans from their leaders: no 
resting on their laurels, even though Business Environment 
Risk Intelligence (BERI) has rated Singaporeans as the 
world's best labour force, and this is the 13th straight 
year that Singapore has topped that section of the BERI 
report .114 
By such continual exhortations and unsubtle 
encouragement, the government not just seeks to prevent 
complacency, but also is following the fourth aspect of 
their "strategy": "It is extremely important to create an 
atmosphere of confidence as success breeds success. Thus 
the spirit of dynamism and political stability must be 
1I1The stra its Times Week Iy Overseas Edi tion, January 9, 1993, 
117he straits Times Weekly Edition, May 21, 1994, p.l5. 
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preserved", and if all develops as planned, then "with 
time, this development will be institutionalised" (the 
fifth aspect) . 115 
"Development" and success has not just been 
institutionalised; one could say that the whole process of 
singapore's continual and watchful struggle for political 
and economic survival has been institutionalised into the 
politics of survival. Such "politics" include a set of 
policies and strategies aimed at curbing domestic dissent 
(authoritarian rule; tight social control and laws) and 
promoting stability and industrial peace to attract much-
needed foreign investment (trade unions curbed; 
multinational corporations welcomed) while instilling in 
the nation's different ethnic communities a sense of 
national identity. 
As such, "this preoccupation with survival and the 
belief that economic development is the corner-stone of 
security and the best counter-insurgency strategy have 
motivated the government to tirelessly pursue economic 
development and relentlessly push its people toward 
excellence" and again, "As a goal setter, the PAP 
government has pushed the people of Singapore in furious 
pursuit of a new, economic rationale for Singapore's 
existence. Economic development is seen as a necessary 
1I5Chan and Evers, op. ci t., p. 125. 
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condition for the survival and security of the 
nation" 116 (italics mine). A Confucian scholar has also 
commented: lilt is clear that the leadership here is totally 
committed to the economic development of Singapore as a 
question of survival. Everyone here is inspired by this 
project. They recognize the necessity and choose to be a 
part of it".1l7 And this "seige mentality"/ ideology of 
survival came about because of historical reasons. Since 
the PAP did not come to power as the sole champion of 
singapore independence, and as anti-colonial sentiment 
would simply have been inadequate for governmental 
authority, especially among a mainly immigrant population, 
"the government had little choice but to present its vision 
of a new nation in terms of economic progress". 118 
This is still true, nearly 30 years on. The ideology 
and politics of survival persists. And this is one reason 
for the paternalistic authoritarian style of government the 
PAP adopts for its running of Singapore. There is a summary 
of the general model of authoritarian (East Asia) 
governments which also fits Singapore well: 
In East Asia power is monopolized by a relatively 
small elite, dissent is not easily tolerated, 
political controls tend to reinforce a dominant 
party or ruling group, and boundaries are set on 
1160W Chin-Hock I "The Role of Government in Economic 
Development: The Singapore Experience" in Singapore: Resources 
and Growth eds. Lim Chong-Yah and Peter J. Lloyd (singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), pp.233, 236. 
117Tu, op. cit. I pp . 177 -1 7 8 . 
lI'The Editors, "Challenges ... " op.cit., p.1087. 
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press freedom all of which add up to 
authoritarianism by any definition. Yet, there is 
another side to the East Asian governments. They 
tend to recognize merit, extol technocratic 
skills, encourage national development, and 
generally press for modernization and egalitarian 
economic development. Leaders cling to their 
rights of power, but they can be broadly 
supportive of all who contribute to national 
development, just as long as they are not also 
politically unruly and disruptive. In short, the 
sytems are paternalistic ... They are also 
authoritarian in that they are hypersensitive to 
any threat to their power and status. 119 
Many Singaporeans would indeed agree that the above quote 
is also a good description of the Singapore PAP government. 
The point about a government being "broadly supportive" is 
well echoed in a recent report of the Singapore Prime 
Minister observing that young Singaporeans today pursued 
career, credit card, car, condominium, and club membership 
(the five CIS), unlike older generations who were content 
with "one wife, two children, three rooms and four wheels". 
There was nothing wrong with this, he said, "as long as the 
young kept the family unit strong, worked hard, and 
supported public policies underpinning Singapore's 
prosperi ty" 120_ the same old necessary song. 
pye also summarizes the common characteristics of "The 
East Asian Political Model" in a "dozen boldly stated 
propositions" which reflects in most aspects "its Confucian 
roots". What is of interest to us are three "critical 
119Lucian W. Pye, "The New Asian Capitalism: A Political 
Portrait" in In Search of An East Asian ... , op.cit., p.S3. 
IMthe Straits Times Weekly Edition, July 9, 1994, p.1. 
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features of the Confucian tradition which at one time 
impeded economic progress but which have endured and now 
seem to support the paternalistic authoritarianism that is 
compatible with East Asian capitalism" .121 First is the 
strong ethical-moral basis of government in the Confucian 
tradition; the dimension of the Confucian sense of 
legitimacy that enables the East Asian governments to feel 
that they not only have the right to intervene in people's 
lives but that they have a definite obligation to do so if 
it can improve the people's condition economic or 
otherwise. "The Confucian tradition had to be coupled with 
advances in economics as an intellectual discipline in 
order to produce the economic miracles of East Asia. The 
new mandarins had to be schooled in the wisdom of Western 
economic theories and practices". 
Second is an elitist view of the sociopolitical order 
which justifies the existence of hierarchy and, related to 
it, meritocracy. "In recent times the idea of rule by an 
educated elite has meant the legitimization of technocrats 
in government. Those who rule know best what is good for 
everyone because they are the best trained and have the 
appropriate skills. In this tradition the common man should 
defer to his intellectual betters". 
Thirdly, there is the Confucian stress on harmony, 
which when applied politically, means a demand for 
consensus and conformity. The reverse side of this is the 
12lpye, op. cit., p. 86. 
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belief that individualism is a manifestation of 
selfishness. This value of harmony promotes scorn for those 
who would disrupt the social order by dissent and by 
participating in oppositional activities. "Rulers are 
expected to preserve order, prevent social confusion, and 
thus keep in check any and all who are likely to disrupt 
the smooth flow of economic and social life. This valuing 
of harmony in Confucian political cultures places obstacles 
in the way of political critics, labor agitators, student 
rebels, and other challengers of the status quo" .122 
We can compare the Singapore government with these three 
qualities just cited, and thus to remember and re-affirm 
that it is indeed a government run on Confucian lines. It 
may subscr ibe to an ideology of "pragmatism" and 
utilitarian "efficiency", but it also has cultural values 
closely linked to economic development. Thus, such already 
identified Confucian values as thrift, diligence, hard 
work, respect for educational achievement, avoidance of 
overt conflict in social relations, loyalty to authority 
and hierarchy, stress on order and harmony, self-
discipline, and more, would be accepted by them. This is 
completely understandable when we look again at the Shared 
Values, and realise anew the similarities and Confucian 
parallels between the Shared Values, and those given as 
examples above. And more: it has previously been mentioned 
that these values are congenial to authoritarian political 
lnlbid., pp.86-87. 
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structures, and the same can be said of the Shared Values -
the Values selected to make up the National Ideology of 
singapore are those functional for Singapore~ns living and 
working in an authoritarian capitalist state. 
There may be no hard, irrefutable evidence, but it is 
surely reasonable to propose, from all the studies, reports 
and observations, that Confucian values do play a part in 
the economic success of East Asian countries and Singapore, 
especially when we consider that Confucianism is part of 
the ideological framework of the PAP government. We have 
also considered and discussed the Shared Values, and have 
seen Confucian cultural values enshrined in them (and thus, 
the National Ideology). Again, remembering that some of the 
reasons for a National Ideology was to bind singaporeans 
together, with a distinct national identity and destiny, 
and the Values chosen were to help Singaporeans to prosper, 
we can go on to say that the motive for the Shared Values/ 
National Ideology is not just for nation-building but also 
for nation-prospering or nation-surviving. The Shared 
Values are to help in promoting continued economic growth. 
"Since Singaporeans share the same core values of hard 
work, thrift and sacrifice as the Japanese, Koreans and 
Taiwanese, these values must be preserved in the form of a 
national ideology in order to ensure Singapore's continued 
prosper i ty and long-term surv i va I" . 123 As a National 
123Jon S. T. Quah, "National Values and Nation-Building: 
Defining the Problem" in In Search of Singapore's ... , op.cit., 
p.l. 
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Ideology, it is supposed to be the standard and pattern for 
the proper living of Singaporeans as citizens; indeed it 
is, as Mr. Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister of Singapore, has 
himself called it, "our way of life". To the PAP then, the 
National Ideology is to be Singapore's Way of Life. This, 
of course, has a resonance to how a civil religion can be 
defined, and if understood as a civil religion, the 
National Ideology obviously calls for the allegiance and 
devotion of Singaporean citizens to continue to work hard, 
put the nation first, so that the nation can survive and 
prosper, and achieve its goal (and proclaimed destiny) of 
being a significant, meaningful, and important "hub city" 
for the region, and for the world. In wanting to promote a 
civil reI ig ion in the form of a National ideology, the 
government is conscious that "a sense of identity derives 
from a shared awareness of a common heritage and is the 
pre-requisite of a sense of loyalty and commitment that 
holds a nation together and makes continuing progress 
possible. Without it, an independent nation cannot 
survive". 12-1 
We should not be anxious, then, in trying to find in 
the Confucian values the "causes" of economic development. 
We can however expect to look for - and it would be a more 
satisfactory view to do so - these values as the "trigger" 
of development. In other words, Confucian values are 
considered as a factor that is a positive force for 
I~Chang, op.cit., p.G. 
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development when the right set of structural conditions and 
economic policies are also present. This is thus to accept 
that the cultural factors could not act alone without other 
supporting political and economic conditions (with the 
knowledge also that it may be necessary to identify the 
kind of political and economic environment in which these 
cultural factors will be able to make economic activity 
dynamic and lively). Indeed, "the most outstanding feature 
of the modernization experience of East Asia's ..• Confucian 
societies is the acceptance of culture as a significant 
force shaping a human-oriented workforce 1n the service of 
industrialization. That may be the most important legacy of 
Confucianism for modern times". 125 
Even if one is unwilling to accept any such "legacy" 
in the history and process of economic development in Asia, 
or specifically in Singapore, preferring instead to talk of 
"pragmatic" and "efficient", "wise" policies, one still 
cannot get away from the fact that the Singapore political 
leaders must have been aware of this "post-confucian 
hypothesis"; that Confucian values have been linked with 
economic progress in the NIEs of Asia. In 1982 Dr. Goh Keng 
Swee, a former Deputy Prime Minister, did make such a 
connection with Confucian values to economic growth in the 
NIEs when he said, (and was duly reported in The straits 
Times of February 4, 1982) "The economic growth of these 
countries ... came about through a generation of people 
IlSH tf' ld 't 110 ar 1e ,Op.C1 ., p. , 
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exposed to the Confucian tradition. This tradition produced 
a people of a certain mould of character which made it 
possible for these countries to achieve spectacular 
economic growth". One may choose to believe in the minimal 
or marginal effects of such cultural factors then, but the 
point for us now is that the Singapore government, being a 
"Confucian" one, would have no difficulty in presently 
accepting the socializing or social-discipline-enforcing 
benefits of Confucian values in the pursuit of economic 
goals, and as has been argued, 1S in fact through the 
Shared Values/National Ideology using them now precisely to 
produce "a people of a certain mould of character ... to 
achieve spectacular economic growth"! 
"Survival" does not just mean the nation's; it extends 
to the PAP government too. In being aware of the common 
sentiment shown by Singaporeans toward this issue of 
"national survival", the PAP government would consider it 
ideologically sound to link, and push, "national survival" 
with "economic success" as part of the fate and destiny of 
Singapore. Singaporeans (as with other Asians) do take 
their nation's survival as a real problem facing their 
society (especially when constantly reminded of how small, 
and thus vulnerable, Singapore is), particularly in the 
face of challenges presented by Western societies 
culturally, economically, or otherwise. These attitudes may 
thus have influence in pushing people to work harder under 
the National Ideology toward the goals of national 
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strength, survival and success - something the government 
is all too happy to encourage, since it too will survive if 
the fostered dependency on it by the people can be answered 
with a sustained delivery of "the goods". 
Indeed , it is this sense of dependency which 
makes the Confucian tradition of paternalistic 
authority so effective in working for the 
collective goal of national economic development. 
Yet, that same spirit of dependency can become an 
angry explosive force when authority has failed 
to provide the expected benefits. Thus, as long 
as economic progress continues, the East Asian 
political systems will operate well with their 
quasi-authoritarian institution£, but 
disappointment over the expected benef its from 
governments can produce explosive reactions 
against the failure of paternalistic authority. 
The ultimate safety valve for the East Asian 
system is ... mutual respect and binding ties 
between paternalistic leaders and dependent, but 
articulate, constituents. 126 
One could be cynical and say that the singapore 
government, being always IIpragmatic" over its "survival", 
had already prepared for such a situation by having such 
Shared Values as regard for the family, harmony and 
consensus! Yet, even if the government seems to give the 
impression that economic success is the "be-all" and "end-
all" for the nation, "articulate" voices have been heard 
wondering if this should be so, either for the nation or 
the individual. "There are those who look forward to a 
future in which economic considerations will serve as the 
engine of the vehicle of development rather than its 
driver; or, in more formal terms, that the nexus of 
l~pye, op.cit., p.97~ 
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adaptive (economic) interactions will indeed function as a 
subsystem of society rather than as a total action 
system" . 127 In other words, that the state should move away 
from claiming legitimacy on 'social eudaemonic' grounds -
"seeking legitimacy through acts of rule that assist the 
economic system in producing an ever-increasing flow of 
goods and services for the consumer-citizen" .128 And a 
Confucian scholar adds a wistful comment to the necessity 
of economic development: "Were the (Singapore) leadership 
to show that in addition to economic success we need to 
succeed in terms of the moral quality of our characters, 
this could be an extremely powerful incentive for society 
as a whole". 129 The government would predictably say that 
there can be no let up and no complacency in such economic 
efforts, but it is interesting to note what the Singapore 
Prime Minister recently said of the "National Challenge" 
(the latest slogan) - sustaining Singapore's prosperity and 
"building a gracious society" .130 Perhaps Professor Tu' s 
wish is beginning to come true after all. 
But for now, we end this chapter by reaffirming that 
the Singapore government was promoting a civil religion in 
the form of a National Ideology which incorporated 
Confucian values, to enhance and continue economic growth; 
I27The Editors, "Challenges of Success", op.cit., p.1106. 
128Thompson, op. ci t., p. 60. 
I~Tu, op.cit., pp.177-178. 
I~he Straits Times Weekly Edition, June 11, 1994, p.ll. 
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that the Confucian values enshrined as the Shared Values 
were to reinforce and facilitate the economic growth-
supporting forces now in progress, which are part of the 
modernization process underway. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANY ROLE FOR THE CHURCH? 
In seeking to consider what role, if any, the Church 
in Singapore has with regard to a civil religion and a 
national ideology, or in asking how the Church can 
contribute, and on what terms, to the process of nation-
building, it would be instructive to first look at two 
recent additions to the ongoing "campaigns" to uphold and 
preserve "values" which have been deemed essential for the 
nation's health by the government. 
A. "Family Values" 
The first of the two deals with (again) "Family 
Values". On February 5, 1994 Mr. Abdullah Tarmugi, the 
Acting Minister for Community Development, announced five 
"core values" - love, care and concern; mutual respect; 
filial piety; commitment; and responsibility - which were 
what Singaporeans had apparently stated they needed most to 
keep families intact. This conclusion was drawn by a 
national committee based on ideas given by 84 individuals 
and organisations since September 1993. Furthermore, 
Singaporeans themselves could read the first draft of the 
document, entitled "Singapore's Family Values", later the 
same month, after which public forums would be held, 
presumably for the process of "consultation". 
However, it 1S surely no coincidence that on the 
213 
previous day, February 4, 1994, the Health Minister George 
Yeo was reported as saying that Singaporeans' respect for 
the family and reverence of elders must stay no matter how 
quickly the world changes. He warned that Singapore must 
not go the way of the West where the family system had 
collapsed and old people became lonely as the young were 
too busy and self-absorbed. "Whatever we do in Singapore, 
we must never undermine the family and thE reverence of 
elders. The two are related". Indeed, reverence of elders 
was the glue that held families together.! 
And thus the usual process began. In mid-April 1994 
the Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong himself affirmed that 
Singaporeans generally had no quarrel with the five family 
values and were even now focusing on how best to transmit 
them, and that it was indeed necessary to transmit these 
values through schools and families. 
After due feedback from certain sectors of the public 
had been gathered, and irregardless of whether the feedback 
was truly representative of the public at large or not, the 
inevitable revised "final list" of "five key Singapore 
Family Values" was then announced: Love, Care and Concern; 
Mutual Respect; Filial Responsibility; Commitment; and 
Communication. Mr. Abdullah Tarmugi came back on-stage to 
call this list "a people's document" because of the 
enthusiastic support received and the contr ibutions and 
views which had come in from all quarters and in different 
'The Straits Times Weekly Edition, February 12, 1994, p.7. 
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languages. The challenge now, he said, was to promote the 
values and translate them into a living document, and to 
make them a part of everyday life. 
To this end then, mosques, churches, temples and 
family service centres which ran pre-marriage courses and 
family life education programmes could incorporate the 
family values into their programmes. So could the National 
Trade Union Congress, grassroot bodies and employers who 
organised family outings, and schools and child-care 
centres, which taught moral education and civics. In other 
words, all civic, community, voluntary and commercial 
organisations were to work with the Government on new 
projects to promote the "family values", and they were 
assured "In the process, the importance of family values is 
brought out in a manner that is fun and without coercion".2 
"Fun" and a lack of "coercion" may not exactly be in 
mind when one considers the next development (or on-going 
stage?) in this "Family Values" campaign. In late May 1994 
Nominated Member of Parliament walter Woon introduced a 
Private Member's Bill, which was to be called the 
Maintenance of Parents Bill. The Bill allows a parent 
unable to support himself adequately to go to the courts to 
claim maintenance from one or more of his children 
including step-children, adopted or even illegitimate 
children. Also, a family member, relative, care-giver, or 
any other person may apply for the order on the parent's 
1The Straits Times Weekly Edition, June 4, 1994, p.2. 
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behalf, so long as consent is thus given. The child being 
sued for maintenance may also name others, such as 
siblings, who may also be liable to support the parent. 
Those who ignore a court maintenance order can expect to 
face penalties such as a fine of up to S$1,000 or a jail 
term of up to a year, or both! In other words, as the 
editorial of The straits Times of May 27, 1994 trenchantly 
puts it, "Be filial or be sued"! 
It is not necessary here to go into too much detail 
over the responses both for and against to this 
proposed piece of legislation. Those against essentially 
object that such a law 1S "unAsian", (the implication of 
course that being Asian is synonymous with being filial), 
or that love for one I s parents cannot be legislated and 
that this law will not promote filial piety. It was 
considered an affront to the family values and the strong 
sense of filial piety Singaporeans presumably upheld. Those 
for the proposal argue that the Bill is not intended to 
promote filial piety or love - it is simply a matter-of-
fact acknowledgement that in extreme cases, neither filial 
piety or love exists. If children do not take care of their 
own parents, who will? Harsh words abound - Wa 1 ter Woon 
himself has been criticised as "ignorant" by 
traditionalists outraged at the possible use of legislation 
in such matters, but he has replied that the Bill is not an 
indictment of Singaporean youth. Rather more bluntly, he 
comments "We are fooling ourselves if we think we have a 
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perfect Confucian society where all children look after 
their parents". Stressing that most people do not need such 
protection, there is still however "the recalcitrant, small 
minority that cannot be counted on to do what is right".) 
Thus the (usual, expected?) need for, and answer in, 
preventive legislation. 
The Singapore Parliament on Wednesday, July 27, 1994 
backed the Bill with 50 MPs voting to send it to a Select 
Committee, and 11 opposing it. After some fine-tuning, it 
will be sent back to Parliament for a third and final 
reading. 
What significance is there in all this? On one level 
it may well be that, in the face of material wealth, 
consumerlsm, and individualism (the results of its own 
successful policies), the Government does want to hold up 
"traditional" concepts such as family values and filial 
piety to counteract what it fears is the erosion of a 
properly well-behaved "Asian" (Confucian) moral society. On 
the other hand, let us remember that the concept of the 
loyal, obedient family with filial piety being demonstrated 
towards the elders is a central Confucianist tenet. 
Furthermore, this tenet is one of the Shared Values 
Family as the basic unit of society - which make up the 
National Ideology, and thus the civil religion of 
Singapore. One can naturally ask then, why pick out 
something that had already been stressed, elaborated, and 
JIbe Guardian, July 29, 1994, p.10. 
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discussed as part of a National Ideology, and g1ve it a 
full-scale campaign on its own? Does it have anything to do 
with the civil religion - for example, promoting subtly the 
civil religion (or aspects of it) through I'family values"? 
Singapore may be a Confucian society, albeit an Asian 
multicultural, multiracial one, but in such a society 
cooperation among different groups is made possible by the 
fact that they are all based on the family model. Also, the 
"Asian" values that we have encountered so many times in 
this thesis - self-discipline, group loyalty, self-denial, 
obedience to authority, willingness to work hard, etc., -
are the basic values of a Confucian family ethic which, 
seen in a Singaporean setting, has cut across classes, and 
has adapted to the local economic, social and political 
system. A properly trained member of a Confucian culture 
will precisely be hardworking, responsible, skilful, etc., 
in helping the group (extended family, community, or 
company) cohere togther and prosper together. No wonder 
then the constant exhortation to traditional Asian values, 
family or otherwise. The Singaporean Government has 
confirmed that efforts to promote filial piety will 
continue, through campaigns or legislature if necessary. 
Any reading with an ideological tinge reminds one of, and 
affirms the conclusion "that filial piety fostered habits 
of disciplined subordination and acceptance of authority 
which could be applied to the factory and the nation".4 
4MacFarquhar,op.cit., p.70. 
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It all comes together in the Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong's National Day Rally speech, which stressed the theme 
of moral values being the foundation of a vibrant society, 
and more especially traditional moral and family values as 
the ones for Singapore. Yes, the country was doing well 
economically, and would be so for the next 5 to 10 years, 
but Mr. Goh felt correct economic policies were not enough 
for continued success. Equally important and crucial, he 
said, were "non-economic factors - a sense of community and 
nationhood, a disciplined and hardworking people, strong 
moral values and family ties". All this economic success 
could thus be unravelled if traditional values were not 
strong. "The type of society we are determines how we 
perform. It is not simply materialism and pursuit of 
individual rewards which drive Singapore forward, but more 
important, it is the sense of idealism and service, born 
out of a feeling of social solidarity and national 
identification".5 Or, in the context of what we are 
discussing in this thesis, we might say that what drives 
Singaporeans forward (according to the Pr ime Minister) 
should be the idealistic regard and devotion for the nation 
which results in disciplined and committed service to the 
nation, and what creates this devotion is the kind of 
feeling of social cohesion and nationalism fostered by the 
civil religion in the form of these "values" 
"traditional", "family" or "Shared". And, as if to confirm 
jThe Straits Times Weekly Edition, August 27, 1994, p.l. 
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our point that Asian or Confucian values are to strengthen 
the moral fibre of the society for economic ends, Mr. Goh 
also stated (quoted in Britain's Daily Mail but not in The 
straits Times), "Our institutions and basic pOlicies are in 
place to sustain high economic growth. But if we lose our 
traditional values, our family strength and cohesion, we 
will lose our vibrancy and decline. This is the intangible 
factor in the success of East Asian economies" (italics 
mine) .6 
He concludes, "These values are tried and tested, have 
held us together, and propelled us forward. We must keep 
them as the bedrock values of our society for the next 
century". This has a familar ring indeed, and is quite 
similar to the exhortations employed by Mr. Goh when he 
first spoke out on the need for Asian values at the 
beginning of the whole Shared Values/National Ideology -
and Civil Religion - campaign, as described in Chapter II. 
In other words, there is a certain symmetry between this 
current campaign for "Family Values" and legislated filial 
piety, and the earlier "Shared Values" one. It is not just 
in subject matter - that "Family Values" are part of the 
"Shared Values" themselves, but also in the manner in which 
both campaigns were touted: a social problem is suddenly 
brought to the attention of the public, "discussion" and 
"debate" takes place in parliament and through the media, 
6Da ily Mail, August 22, 1994, p.ll. 
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"consensus" is apparently reached, and legislature IS 
brought about to solve the "problem" in the way the 
Government has determined. And because this is so, one is 
led to ask whether this latest campaign does not also have 
a deeper ideological agenda - one, like the "Shared Values" 
campaign, with the ultimate economic goals, or destiny, of 
singapore in mind. 
The answer, I believe, is yes. The "Family Values" 
campaign is an attempt by the PAP to complement the Shared 
Values - and as such, to promote acceptance of the National 
Ideology and civil religion. Family Values writ small may 
apply well to the home, but Family Values writ large carry 
through to the nation. As noted, this campaign carried 
great similarities to the original "Shared Values" one, 
which we have seen formed the foundation of the civil 
religion. Here too, the Family Values cited - love, care 
and concern, commitment, responsibility, etc. take on a 
different hue when applied to valueing the nation, or 
showing filial piety, and thus obedience and devotion, to 
it. And if the Family Values are part of the Shared Values 
which make up the civil religion, then this new campaign 
has the same function of hammering home the attitudes, 
attributes and behaviour patterns which puts the nation 
first in the name of love, for its economic well-being. The 
Prime Minister has more or less admitted above that the 
loss of these traditional values, whether they be called 
Asian, Shared, or Family will lead to a decline in economic 
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growth (and thus a lessening of the influence of the civil 
religion), and therefore, a loss of "love" or "respect'· for 
the country. National pride will suffer, the nation may 
slowly stop being admired - or worshipped - for coming up 
with the goods all the time, the sacred nature of the 
society that has so far convinced people to be willing to 
make sacrifices on behalf of the larger society; has 
persuaded people to do that which they might not want to 
do, in the name of the country, may start to be questioned 
- and nationalism may suffer. That must not be allowed by 
any means. And so a civil religion is rushed into the 
breach. 
How have the churches and Christians in Singapore 
responded to this new campaign? We do not yet know, for 
nothing has been reported or printed yet regarding such 
response. 7 It may well be that the Church has easily and 
simply accepted the role given to it by the Government - to 
"incorporate the family values into their programmes"; 
after all the Church as an institution is supposed to 
promote personal, spiritual and moral values, doesn't it? 
And so if the churches obediently carry out this directive, 
"family values" are inculcated which, on a deeper 
unconscious level (remembering how much the family model is 
ingrained as an archetype in Asian cultures, as with those 
70ne indeed has to be patient for official statements to be 
issued to get any inkling of what the Churches' position may be, 
on any subject. It is of no use asking wary spokespersons for 
views if such views are to be "off the record" or "not to be 
quoted" . 
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in singapore) trains one to be loyal and obedient and 
receptive to the demands of the "paternal" state. Looked at 
this way, the Church finds itself in the position of 
actually promoting a civil religion on behalf of the 
Government, without the discernment that it may be a 
poisoned chalice. 
Returning to the Shared Values/National Ideology 
campaign - was there response with regard to the role that 
the Church can play in the examination or promotion of it? 
Again, there seems to be indifference on the part of 
Christians to the whole issue. Any representation would 
appear to have been made or submitted to the Government 
during the "debate/discussion" stage of the campaign, and 
tacit agreement seems to have been given concerning the 
validity of the campaign or the importance of the Shared 
Values. Only in one article 1n Impact, the leading 
Singapore Christian evangelical magazine, does a writer, a 
lawyer and State Counsel, seem to raise some questions 
concerning the . a1m or validity of the Shared Values 
campaign. He comments that the Shared Values have been 
acknowledged as not "writ large on tablet, unchangeable for 
all time" but that some may be jettisoned and new ones 
added to meet changing needs. "Such pragmatism reinforces 
the notion that these values are merely instrumental in 
achieving some other end in mind". stating that the 
"ephemeral quality" of some of the values have been 
acknowledged, he feels "it would be difficult for people to 
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be imbued with any real sense of conviction when it comes 
to their transmission. And when, rightly or wrongly, the 
values are perceived to be politically motivated, the 
resul t is cynicism". 8 In other words, are such values truly 
from a community's cultural soul, or are they just imposed 
on a community in the guise of Asian-ness? 
If, on the other hand, the Shared Values are but 
manifestations of a deeply held belief in our 
basic humani ty , the need to respect the 
individual and recognise his inherent dignity, 
the need for a community comprising diverse 
racial groups who by dint of historical accidents 
now find themselves having to search for a 
national identity and to shape its own ethos, to 
have regard for each other's concerns and 
aspirations, the likelihood of these shared 
values being assimilated into the national psyche 
would be better. Only when these values are 
"internalised" and manifested in everyday social 
relationships would they attain the desired 
degree of permanence; mere propagation will not 
succeed in so doing. The strength of these values 
will lie in their soundness historical, 
philosophical, social and moral - not just in 
their expediency.9 
If the Singapore Government is promoting a civil religion 
through a National Ideology incorporating the Shared Values 
to ensure the desired end of prosperity for Singapore, then 
"expediency" will not get in the way. After making his 
point, Foo however goes on to comment that the 
identification and transmission of the Shared Values is "a 
laudable attempt to unite Singaporeans of different races, 
religions and cultural traditions and to maintain peace and 
8Foo Kim Boon, "Shared Values: Does It Matter What You Value 
If What You Value Doesn't Matter?" in Impact, April-May 1991, 
p.s. 
9I bid., pp.8-9. 
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stability so that the future well-being of all Singaporeans 
can be safeguarded". Or we can put it another way: it is a 
laudable attempt to unite all Singaporeans into a love of, 
and devotion to nationalism; to putting the nation first 
above one's race, religion or culture so that the economic 
well-being of Singapore - its destiny - will survive. Such 
is the civil religion. And judging from these two campaigns 
alone, it seems to be surviving well. A factor surely must 
be the churches' apparent inability (or reluctance) to look 
beyond the surface of anything that is presented to it by 
the Government, and being happy with whatever agenda is set 
for them by the Government. A good example of this 
"reaction"-based response in place of a grappling with the 
underlying ideological issues can be seen in the reaction 
to the "Religious Harmony Maintenance Act". 
B. "Religious Harmony", Politics and Religion 
We turn now to the campaign for the maintenance of 
religious harmony which formally began with the publishing 
of A White Paper presented to Parliament on 26 December 
1989. In the process we will again note the response of the 
churches to the issues raised in this campaign which 
included that of religion and politics. 
After the White Paper was presented, three weeks later 
on 15 January 1990 the Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
Bill was read in Parliament for the first time. According 
to it, the Bill seeks to protect inter-religious harmony 
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and separate religion and politics. 
Its provisions state that religious leaders and 
members of religious groups who threaten Singapore's 
religious harmony by what they say or do can be served with 
prohibition orders. These people are defined as those who: 
- cause feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility 
or prejudice the maintenance of inter-religious harmony; 
- carry out activities to promote a political cause, or a 
cause of any political party while, or under the guise of, 
propagating or practising any religious belief; 
carry out subversive activities under the guise of 
propagating or practising any religious belief; or 
excite disaffection against the President or the 
Government of Singapore. 
The Home Affairs Minister can thus serve a prohibition 
order on any priest, monk, pastor, imam, elder, office-
bearer, or anyone in a position of authority in any 
religious group or institution, or indeed any member of the 
group deemed gui 1 ty of breaking any of the injunctions 
listed above. (Cases and examples of what the government 
has called the mixing of religion and politics will be 
given in p.236 and following of this chapter). 
So far the Religious Harmony legislation has not been 
used against any person or group. The consequences however, 
if a prohibi tion order has been issued, are clear and 
deta i led. Once served with an order, the person cannot, 
without the minister's prior permission: 
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- address any congregation, parish or group of worshippers 
or members of any religious group or institution on any 
subject, topic or theme which may be specified l.n the 
order; 
- print, publish, edit, distribute or in any way assist or 
contribute to any pUblication produced by that religious 
group; 
- hold office in an editorial board or a committee of a 
publication of that religious group. 
Penalties are, as expected, harsh. Those who violate 
the prohibition orders can be fined up to S$10,000 or 
jailed up to two years, or both. A second or subsequent 
offence will cost the offender a fine of up to S$20,000 or 
up to three years jail - or both. 
What may be deemed a measure of "check and balance" 
comes in the provision for the setting up of a Presidential 
Council for Religious Harmony, to advise the minister 
whenever prohibition orders are issued, and also on other 
matters felt to be affecting religious harmony. To complete 
the pre-emptive strike, all orders and decisions of the 
minister and recommendations of the council will be final 
and cannot be questioned by any court. 
Parliament Select Committee hearings were then held, 
beginning on September 20, 1990, where it was duly reported 
by The straits Times the following day that the Bill 
received "firm support" and that it was "a welcome 
preventive measure to deal with aggressive 
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proselytisation". The hearings also saw a newly tabled 
proposal to have the elected President of Singapore, acting 
with the Presidential Council, having the power to overturn 
the minister's decision to issue such Prohibition Orders. 
This, it was suggested, was an additional "check". although 
the elected President entered the picture only after the 
Prohibition Order had been issued. 
The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 1990 came 
into effect in March 1992. The first Presid~ntial Council 
for Religious Harmony, headed by a former Chief Justice, 
was appointed by the President of Singapore on August 1, 
1992. The nine-man council included six representatives of 
the major religions (Buddhist, Muslim, Roman Catholic, 
Protestant, Hindu, and Sikh), and two others who were 
social/community leaders. 
Like the proposed legislation for filial piety, 
religious harmony is now to be enforced by the Act. If one 
were to ask what "harmony" meant, then page 4 of the White 
Paper on "Maintenance of Religious Harmony" gives an 
answer: "Two vital conditions must therefore be observed to 
maintain harmony. Firstly, followers of the different 
religions must exercise moderation and tolerance, and do 
nothing to cause religious enmity or hatred. Secondly, 
religion and politics must be kept rigorously separated". 
The second is clear: do not mix religion and politics. The 
first, however, becomes distinct when one remembers the 
afore-mentioned "aggressive proselytisation", and notes 
228 
what Hindu leaders at the Select Committee Hearing stated: 
that they welcomed laws to protect religious harmony 
because their small community was constantly threatened by 
the aggressive conversion tactics of other religions. One 
example given by them left no doubt that Ch~istianity was 
one of the "aggressive religions". The Act will thus ensure 
that the "Hindu community will be protected from groups out 
to convert it".10 In other words, the first "condition" 
simply means: do not try to convert those already in a 
different religion. 
"Tolerance" is thus demonstrated simply by leaving 
each other religious group alone. The role of the religious 
groups, according to the "two vital conditions" above, 
would just be to retreat into their individual spiritual 
ghettos and seemingly have nothing to do with things 
outside their particular religious sphere including 
politics. But others assure us such an understanding of 
"tolerance" and "harmony" is necessary: "In short, 
understanding, tolerance and harmony between the different 
races and religions in Singapore is a sine qua non for its 
survival as a nation. Singapore's rapid economlC 
growth ... has been the result of its political stability, 
which can be attributed in turn to the absence of racial or 
religious conflict during the last 20 years" .11 
This constant factor of Singapore's economic growth 
I~he Straits Times, September 21, 1990, p.26. 
IIQuah, "Searching for Singapore's ... ", op.cit., p.9S. 
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helps one read anew the provisions of the Religious Harmony 
Act. If religious harmony is needed for the country to be 
united, cohesive and peaceful enough for economic progress 
to take place, then this Act is also serving the cause of 
the civil religion. If Singapore's economic survival as a 
nation can be at stake, then it could be counted as 
"subversive" for any group to raise questions concerning 
(for example) the influence or power of multinational 
corporations in Singapore's economy, or the sort of wages 
being pa id to workers or labourers, or of how "guest 
workers" from other countries are treated and used. In 
other words, it would be subversive to ralse any questions 
that would threaten the economic success, and thus 
undermine the nationalism of the country. Religions such as 
Christianity or Islam which not just have a "mission" to 
evangelise or proselytise, but are also "socially 
concerned" (meaning being politically aware) would seem to 
be targeted by such an Act. One recalls the official 
disapproval (and clamping down) on the Roman Catholic 
Church's efforts to provide care and facilities for runaway 
and abused Filipino maids, and the "Marxist conspiracy" in 
1987 which involved again Catholic social workers. Indeed, 
one can postulate that the Shared Values Bill and the 
Religious Harmony Bill should be read and understood in 
conjunction with each other, and that they are part of the 
PAP Government's response to religious revivalism in 
Singapore, and to the fear that growing economic 
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inequali ties in Singapore may lead to concepts such as 
liberation theology being espoused (and perhaps, even 
accepted) in Singapore society. 
Whether or not the churches or their leaders would 
believe or admit that the Act may have been partly directed 
at them, there was no holding back the reservations over 
the legislation. It would be instructive here to look at 
the views expressed, not just on the Bill when first 
proposed, but also on the question of religion and 
politics. As church leaders, their views would be fairly 
representative of the Church in Singapore as a whole. 
Shortly after the Bill was first read in Parliament, 
the Evangelical Fellowship of Singapore (consisting of more 
than 200 Protestant churches and para-church organisations) 
organised a forum to reflect on the Religious Harmony Bill. 
It was he ld on February 6, 1990 and attracted over 400 
participants. Concern was voiced by them over the following 
issues: 
- the need for such a Bill as existing legislation, such as 
the Internal security Act or the Penal Code, already 
enabled the Government to deal with those deemed to 
threaten religious harmony; 
the possibility of the Bill actually accentuating 
religious sensitivities; 
- the ne~r ~bsolute powers given to the minister to decide 
who would be regarded as mixing religion with politics or 
causing religious disharmony; 
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- the difficulty of interpreting phrases in the proposed 
law such as "causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will 
or hostility" and "prejudicing the maintenance of harmony", 
which might limit the scope for evangelisation; and 
- the difference in views between what churches might see 
as social issues but which the Government deemed as 
political in nature. 12 
The responses seem to reveal a Church which feels 
itself under threat. The issues raised could be summarised 
in three questions: (1) will the Minister of Home Affairs 
use his wide-ranging "unfettered" powers to stifle 
preachers and religious bodies the Government deems 
undesirable? (2) Are there safeguards to ensure that 
evangelisation can still be carried out? (3) Can the Church 
steer clear of politics? Reportedly the sole speaker 
unreservedly in favour of the Bill was a Member of 
Parliament, Dr. John Chen who was also an elder in a local 
Presbyterian Church. He stated that, as guaranteed under 
the Constitution, religious groups could continue to 
proselytise. As for politics, religious groups could still 
take a position on government policies as long as these 
were issues of moral concern and conscience. He went on, "1 
do not believe that it is the business of the church to be 
involved in the political system and to try and bring down 
the Government. But it is the responsibility of the church 
to teach its members how to lead their lives in accordance 
11The straits Times, February 8, 1990, p.18. 
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with the teachings of the Bible in an environment governed 
by secular law". Apparently to submit to such "lawn with 
nothing from the Bible to say about society? others were 
more forthright. Dr. Choong Chee Pang, then principal of 
Trinity Theological College (and in August 1992 appointed 
to the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony) opined 
that it all depended on the nature of the political 
activity. "If the Government is blatantly corrupt, 
totalitarian, oppressive, is it not the duty of a 
responsible citizen, regardless of religious conviction, to 
organise as 
overthrowing 
many subversive activities with the aim of 
such a regime?" (One remembers that the 
Confucian "Mandate of Heaven" carries a similar thought). 
Dr. Choong also drew from the Bible to show that 
Christianity was a holistic faith which touched on all 
aspects of life, including politics. He said that the 
Church had been grappling with the issue of separating 
religion from politics without total success. Mr. Francis 
Lee, a lawyer and lay leader of a Baptist Church, commended 
the good intentions behind the Bill, but felt there were 
not enough checks on the minister's powers. He said he 
agreed with the separation between Church and state, but 
there were also areas where the people's welfare covered 
both the religious and political arena. Keeping politics 
completely out of religion might thus limit the scope of 
Christian social responsibility. "Christian social 
responsibility ... cannot be merely concerned with providing 
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social services to relieve human suffering, or promote 
philanthrophic activity, or minister to individual needs or 
carry out works of mercy. It must also concern itself with 
the causes of human suffering, political and economic 
activity broadly defined, the transformation of structures 
in society and the quest for justice". 
A month earlier The straits Times Political Desk had 
canvassed 20 religious leaders for their views on the White 
Paper. 13 of them, including Roman Catholic, Muslim, 
Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu and Sikh leaders, had replied, with 
most indicating that the proposed laws would 
(significantly?) not affect the way they practised or 
spread their faith. The strongest support for the new laws 
came from Buddhist and Hindu leaders, who welcomed the 
changes wholeheartedly, presumably because they would help 
curb over-zealous and thus, offensive evangelists with 
their aggressive conversion tactics. Similarly, the Mufti 
of Singapore, the Muslim religious authority, pointed to 
the white Paper as saying that some Christian groups were 
particularly "aggressive", and felt that the new laws might 
help to avoid clashes between Christians and Muslims over 
the issue of conversion. 
The response of the Roman Catholic Archbishop Gregory 
Yong was specific and detailed. He started by saying that 
the purpose of the legislation was "entirely praiseworthy", 
and it was "good to see the Government's concern about 
preserving and fostering inter-religious harmony". He 
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assured that Catholics were well aware of Singapore being 
multi-religious and multi-racial, and that for harmony to 
prevail, they must be sensitive to the religious beliefs, 
practices and cultural heritage of others. In view of the 
nature of singaporean society then, "it is clear that the 
right of any religion to propagate its beliefs must be 
exercised with great prudence and restraint". The Catholic 
Church, he stressed, did not approve of aggressive 
proselytisation. He also felt it was "regrettable" that 
legislation was needed to prevent people from causing 
feelings of hatred or hostility towards those belonging to 
other religions. 
One might feel, so far, that these are all sincere if 
necessary disclaimers. But the Archbishop also went on to 
deal with the question of whether religion and politics can 
really be kept strictly apart. He - and the Muslim Mufti -
both called for a clearer definition of "politics" because 
the separation of politics and religion was a complex and 
problematic proposal which would cause confusion if a 
careful definition was not available. 
Thus, if defined narrowly to mean party politics, it 
was acceptable to say that, in singapore, no religion 
should espouse the cause of any political party and 
polities should be left to the layman, including lay 
Catholics. But if politics meant "the study and practice of 
public affairs", it was similar to religion in that it 
affected the whole of human life. "To say that religion and 
235 
politics can be separated is, at best, an ambiguous 
statement It • The Archbishop noted the Government's 
distinction between the right of a religious leader to 
speak as a private citizen and as a religious leader, and 
that it would be wrong for him to use his position to foist 
his personal political or social views on his fellow-
believers. 
"However, when Government policies have a bearing on 
faith and morals, then the religious leader has a right and 
duty to teach his co-religionists the stand they have to 
take according to the authentic and authoritative teaching 
of their religion". Archbishop Yong felt this was where 
confusion could arise. It was not sufficient to say that 
the state was autonomous in secular matters and religion 
was autonomous in religious matters. "There can often be an 
overlap between the secular and the religious. In such 
cases, the religious leader cannot be accused of going 
beyond his competence in speaking on the moral and 
religious overtones of what might appear to be a purely 
secular matter. Just as the state shows its concern about 
inter-religious harmony because of its political 
implications, so religion must show its concerns about 
'secular' Government policies when there are moral and 
religious implications". 
The Archbishop also showed awareness of the often too-
easy linkage between the ruling party and the country. He 
said that while "loyalty to the nation is not to be 
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identified with loyalty to the Government", it would be 
"quite wrong to brand as disloyal or unpatriotic those who 
oppose some of the decisions of the Government of the 
day ... It is possible for a person to be a great critic of 
the Government and a great patr iot". He pointed out that 
the Government had stated in the White Paper that it did 
not claim that its policies were always right. Therefore, 
"there must be room for criticism and dissent". 
His conclusion, accomodating yet not totally accepting 
the Government line, is that "as far as the Catholic Church 
is concerned, religious leaders, whether bishops or 
priests, may not use the pulpit to voice their own personal 
dissatisfaction with Government policies, except in so far 
as these affect Catholic teaching on faith or morals". \J 
One could interpret this as a message to his bishops and 
priests to know and improve their theology; use good 
theology to highlight bad policies. criticism and dissent 
of the state is not necessarily forbidden; theologise well 
so that in the marketplace of ideas, yours and the Church's 
will be taken seriously. Whether the Government will accept 
or endorse this churchly view is open to debate of course. 
Christians in Singapore have always been aware and 
conscious of the consequences of dissent and disagreement, 
when received badly by the Government. In May 1987, the 
Government detained 16 persons under the Internal Security 
Act, charging that they were involved in what the PAP 
"The straits Times, January 11, 1990, p. 20. 
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called a "Marxist 
further S1X were 
conspiracy" to 
detained the 
subvert the s ta te . A 
following month. The 
detainees were not allowed trails, and no specific charges 
were brought against them. 13 of them were Roman Catholic 
Church workers involved in programmes to help foreign 
workers (for instance, Filipino maids) or to raise social 
issues in the Catholic community through avenues like the 
Catholic News, the Church's newsletter, which often 
presented critical views on local policy. others were 
members of a drama group, the Law Society, student 
organisations and a political party. To the Government 
however, these people had "infiltrated" these organisations 
and groups to propagate Marxist and leftist ideas. Vincent 
Cheng, the alleged "ring-leader" of the group detained, 
later confessed to the Government charges on national 
television, and also implicated four Catholic priests in a 
conspiracy to use the Church to advance communist 
interests. (In September 1989 however, Cheng repudiated his 
televised "confession", claiming that it had been made 
under duress). The four priests were later barred from 
preaching or from having any contact with the Catholic 
organisations involved. Fearful of arrest, they left 
Singapore. By the end of 1987, twenty one persons out of 
the group detained had been released - only Cheng was still 
in prison. In April 1988, eight of those released asserted 
their innocence and alleged they were ill-treated during 
their detention. They were promptly rearrested, and they 
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then reaffirmed the truth of their original statements. 
Another example was in December 1987 when the 
Christian Conference of Asia, a regional Protestant 
organisation which represented 93 denominations in 17 
countries, had its offices in Singapore closed down, and 
the organisation itself was expelled from the country. A 
singapore Government statement said that the CCA "had used 
Singapore as a base to promote political causes in other 
countries and had provided covert support for radical 
activities here" .14 The Government also charged that the 
CCA had supported other "pro-communist" and "liberation 
movements" in Asia, and that it had financially aided 
vincent Cheng. 
On February 24, 1995 sixty nine members of the 
Jehovah's witnesses religious group were arrested, and 
sixty five of them were later charged in court, on March 
17, with attending meetings of an unlawful society. The 
Government banned the group in January 1972 on the grounds 
that its continued existence was prejudicial to public 
welfare and good order. specifically this meant the 
religious group's opposition to military service and basic 
military training as "National Service", and their members' 
refusal to salute the state flag or swear oaths of 
allegiance to the state. It was also reported by the police 
that since 1972, more than 100 members had been detained 
and court-martia11ed under the Singapore Armed Forces 
WThe straits Times, May 6, 1988. 
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regulations for refusing to perform National Service, and 
that their number had been rising faster in recent years. 
The pol ice went on to say, "I f left unchecked, the JW 
movement ... would, in time to come, ser ious ly undermine 
vital national interests" .15 
other religions have also experienced Government 
intervention and warnings. Two examples will suffice here. 
The first concerns Hindu and Sikh organisations. After 
Indira Gandhi was assassinated on October 31, 1984 in India 
by sikhs, tension arose between the Hindu and sikh 
communities in Singapore. Against a background of reported 
cases of assaults and acts of vandalism on sikhs and their 
properties, as well as some threatening phone calls to Sikh 
individuals and institutions, some Hindu temples and 
organisations made plans to hold condolence gatherings for 
the late Indian Prime Minister. The authorities felt that 
these gatherings would have exacerbated tension between the 
Hindus and sikhs in Singapore, and so the police called up 
what were termed the Hindu "activists" to warn them not to 
proceed with the gatherings - and even to remind them that 
what happened in India did not concern Singaporeans. On 
their part, sikh temples in Singapore since 1984 had been 
commemorating the anniversary of the storming of the Golden 
Temple in Amritsar by Indian troops by holding prayer 
vigils for the sikh martyrs. In January 1989 a few of these 
temples held requiems for the two sikhs executed by the 
ISThe Sunday Times, February 26, 1995. 
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Indian government for the assassination of Indira Gandhi. 
Officials of the Sikh temple at Niven Road announced in the 
obituaries section of The Sunday Times that prayers for the 
two would be held at the temple. Photographs of the 
executed pair and newscuttings were displayed in the 
temple. The police then stepped in by calling up Sikh 
leaders and temple off icials to warn them not to hold 
further requiems, nor to "import foreign politics" into 
Singapore, or involve their religious organisations in 
politics. It would appear, however, that that warning fell 
on some deaf ears, because two months later another sikh 
temple held a 48-hour vigil for the sikh "martyrs". 
The second example involves the Muslims and Islam. It 
was claimed by the Singapore Government that in mid-1978 a 
group of "extremists" called ttIkhwan" or "Muslim 
Brotherhood" was formed with the long-term aim of 
establishing an Islamic state in Singapore, by armed means 
if necessary. The group was said to comprise 21 members, 
mostly recruited from religious classes led by a Malaysian 
religious teacher then residing in Singapore. According to 
the Government, Ikhwan had planned to recruit pre-
university students and undergraduates by setting up 
religious discussion groups in their respective schools and 
universities. These students were to be trained as writers 
and religious teachers in order to disseminate (in the 
words of the Government) "revolutionary ideas and sow 
disaffection among the Muslims". Led by the Ikhwan, the 
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Muslims would then demand that the Government implement 
Islamic laws similar to those in Saudi Arabia or Iran. If 
the Government refused, then the next step in the scenario 
would have the Ikhwan bringing about an armed uprising. By 
september 1979 the Ikhwan had apparently managed to 
"penetrate" the Malay language societies in the Ngee Ann 
Technical College and the Singapore Polytechnic, and had 
even "taken over" a Muslim organisation, the Pertubohan 
Muslimin Singapura, as a "front" for their activities. It 
was then that the Singapore Government stepped in and 
arrested 5 of the Ikhwan leaders under the Internal 
security Act. The remaining 16 members and their parents 
were summoned to the Internal Security Department and given 
a warning. The Mufti (the chief Muslim religious leader) 
was also present to exhort those summoned to adhere to the 
correct Islamic teachings. The Malaysian religious teacher 
who was involved was expelled and banned from entering 
Singapore. 
Such examples as given above in the view of the 
Government only serve to highlight what the PAP has 
identified as two trends in Singapore. Firstly, the 
Government feels there has been increased political 
activism by certain religious groups and that this is not 
healthy for a multi-religious society such as Singapore, 
since the intrusion of religious groups or leaders into the 
political arena could, so the Government believes, threaten 
the social fabric of society. Secondly, it is claimed that 
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in recent years there has been an increase 1.n reI ig ious 
fervour and assertiveness among the religious groups. An 
example given of this has been what has been termed 
"agressive and insensitive proselytization" carried out by 
some Christians towards Hindus and Muslims. The Government 
feels that this "religious fervour and assertiveness" has 
heightened tension betwen the various religious groups and 
if left unchecked, could lead to sectarian strife. These 
then are the kind of problems which the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Bill is intended to prevent; legislation 
is introduced to maintain harmony between different 
religious groups, and to also keep religion and politics 
rigorously and firmly separated. 
with all the above examples and measures taken by the 
Government in mind, it was thus no surprise at the Select 
Committee Hearing that the Graduates' Christian Fellowship 
voiced the concern that people might be less willing to 
speak up on religious matters for fear that "over-
sensitive" people will report them to the authorities under 
the law on maintaining religious harmony. The Fellowship 
itself organised seminars touching on religion and politics 
or on other faiths, and the new law might make participants 
afraid to speak up on these matters. "The Bill would curb 
and hamper some of the free discussions going on in our 
seminars" , stated the Fellowship's president, Associate 
Professor Ernest Chew, Head of the History Department of 
the National University of Singapore. 
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Tired cynics might well ask whether such views , even 
if expressed by respected academics or other "top guns" in 
other professions, will actually cut any ice with the 
Government if it has already decided, debate or discussion 
notwithstanding, to do what from the very beginning it had 
already decided to do. "A climate of fear" might just be 
the right thing to have if it will discourage any 
unnecessary or inconvenient "free discussions" - especially 
positive exchanges of ideas or examinations of policy -
from interfering with the attainment of desired objectives 
or ideological ends. 
Last but not least, let us look at the reaction of 
Bishop Ho Chee Sin of the Methodist Church in Singapore to 
the White Paper and Bill. It is a cautious and guarded 
response. After some appreciation shown to the Government 
for its efforts on the behalf of Singapore, Bishop Ho 
states that while religious belief or faith is personal, 
Christian leaders do have a "prophetic" responsibility to 
speak out against social injustice and to speak up for the 
less privileged. Again, "on matters of 'socio-political 
involvement', we need to look at the implication of the 
word, 'politics' ". Quoting and using John stott's 
categories of "Social Service" (philantropic activity, acts 
or works of mercy) and "Social Action" (political and 
economic activity, removing or transforming causes of human 
need and structures), Bishop Ho then says, "genuine 
Christian social concern may at times embrace both the 
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social service and social action", without giving concrete 
examples of what this might mean in the Singapore context. 
To the questions "Should our church become politically 
involved?" and whether Christians can become "politically 
disinterested" persons, he replies: 
This is where we must caution ourselves as 
Christians. We do have socio-political 
responsibilities. However, we may bring confusion 
to ourselves over Christian political 
involvement. There is a distinction between 
Christian individuals and churches. All 
individual Christians should be politically 
active in the sense that, as conscientious 
citizens, they will vote in elections, inform 
themselves about contemporary issues, share in 
public service, etc. Further, some individuals 
are called by God to give their lives to 
political service in the Government. Granted the 
propriety of political thought and action by 
Christian individuals, however, should the church 
as church involve itself in politics? Certainly 
the church must teach both the law and the gospel 
of God. This is the duty of the church's pastors, 
teachers and other leaders. In aff irming the 
biblical faith or righteousness, the church is 
required to take a public stand on some issues, 
as it is called to obey God's Word and trust Him 
with the consequences. However, as a Methodist 
Church we must not find ourselves embroiled in 
active political involvement. 16 
Looking at the life of John Wesley, or of the 
activities of the early Methodist Church, one wonders what 
Methodist Church Bishop Ho is talking about. He appears 
unaware that if the church does "take a public stand" on 
any issue to the extent that one must trust God's grace and 
mercy with regard to the consequences, then the Church is 
already "embroiled in active political involvement", more 
so if "prophetic" and "genuine Christian social concern" is 
16"Bishop Ho's Concerns" 1n Impact, April-May 1990, p.23. 
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practised which includes action to "transform the 
structures of society" and not just to alleviate the 
symptoms. One often gets the feeling, when reading 
statements like the one quoted above, that form apparently 
is all that matters, not substance; the words say 
everything and nothing. One also suspects that most other 
churches 1n Singapore would give similar answers or 
statements to that of the Methodist Church, in the same 
situation and to the same questions. The Catholic Church 
might just possibly be the exception, if only because it 
has got in trouble before by practising what it preaches. 
If the statements or responses are similar, it may be 
because the Church has not seriously considered such 
questions before, or have never felt the need or necessity 
to do so, or to ask what role it has or can play or can 
extend further in the political processes of the country -
nation-building or others. It is as if speaking about 
"speaking out" and "speaking up" fulfils one's socio-
political duties. 
From observing what the Religious Harmony Bill 
contains as provisions, we obviously get a good idea of 
what the Governmental view concerning religion and politics 
is. Since we have noted the individual views of some of the 
Christian leaders, it would be fair to also have the same 
from some Government leaders. 
We can do no better than to start with the views of 
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, who when Prime Minister, gave a speech 
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entitled "Politics and religion should best be kept 
separate" to the Singapore Buddhist Federation. He said: 
Religion is the strongest part of the culture of 
a people. It en]01nS its followers to moral 
values and practices. A religion looks after the 
spiritual, moral and social well-being of its 
followers. But religious organisations should 
leave the economic-political needs of people to 
non-religious groups, like political parties. 
This is because if any religious group tries to 
define the socio-economic agenda of Singapore and 
mobilises the grass-roots by "social action 
programmes", other religious groups will do 
likewise. Once people are mobilised on socio-
economic issues on the basis of religious 
loyalties, the consequences will be bad for 
all. 17 
One notes that the then Prime Minister assumes the right to 
define the nature and content of a religious faith; that 
religion should be a personal, private, "spiritual" affair; 
that religious groups have nothing to do with socio-
economic-political issues (even though they affect All 
groups and people in society); and the awareness that there 
are inadequacies in the socio-economic agenda that can be 
stoked up as issues by concerned "social action" groups. 
The use of the word "define" is interesting: it surely 
implies that the Government believes it only has the right 
to define what reality is for all the social agendas of 
Singapore. Any counter-definition of what (for example) the 
socio-economic agenda should or could be becomes a threat 
since it could expose failings in the officially sanctioned 
picture or model of what Singapore society is. Caesar would 
I7Lee Kuan Yew, "Politics and religion should best be kept 
separate" in Speeches, Vol.12 No.6, 1988, p.13. 
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prefer to keep the lion's share and dispense the 
remainders, the trivial to God or Allah. 
Such thoughts are echoed by others, although if the 
leader concerned . Christian, 1S a more attention and 
credence seems to be allowed to "spiritual, moral" aspects. 
The late Tay Eng Soon was for many years Senior Minister of 
state for Education, and an active Methodist in his church. 
Looking at a situation where Christians were a minority 
living in a multi-religious society - like Singapore - he 
said that it was unwise for the church to get involved in 
politics to impose its values and to make that country a 
"Christian" one. It would be better, Tay said, to keep all 
political parties separate from all religious 
organisations; the best guarantee for religious freedom 
would be that politics and the state be kept secular. 
Having said that, I acknowledge that the church 
has views in the areas of morality, ethics and 
justice. The question is how the church should 
make these views known to the political leaders 
and yet not get embroiled in partisan politics. 
I think it should avoid public posturing or 
forming pressure groups. To do so is to 
participate in partisan politics and this invites 
counter-blows and is unproductive. Rather, it 
should convey its views quietly and calmly 
through private channels. The political leaders 
are waiting to hear people's views. And if these 
leaders are basically moral and just, they will 
1 isten. There are channels and they have been 
used .18 
Elsewhere, he has said, "The authority of the state exists 
because it is sanctioned by God Almighty ... The Christian 
"'Tay Eng Soon, "Religion and Politics in the Singapore 
Context" in Church and Society: Singapore context, ed. Bobby E.I<. 
Sng (Singapore: Graduates' Christian Fellowship, 1989), p.76. 
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perspective of government, secular matters, laws of the 
land, is that these are under the sovereignty and authority 
of God. Indeed our very being is in existence because of 
our Creator and Saviour God. Therefore the obligations and 
responsibilities of a Christian citizen should be clearly 
taken with the full knowledge that his ultimate allegiance 
is to God".19 
This surely sounds more positive, depending on how you 
interpret what Tay says. If government is under the 
sovereignty of God, then it is also under the judgement of 
God in the way that it fulfils His will and purpose for 
people and for societies. If, as a citizen, one's ultimate 
allegiance is to God, then it is also possible for a 
religious commitment in politics that works for a just and 
humane society, a commitment that is rooted in one's 
understanding of the Christian faith; that gil of life 
belongs to God. In the Singapore context, the question may 
well be the kind of "avenues" that are carefully permitted 
for such expressions of "religious commitment" go 
tthrough "official channels" and "speak softly", and hope 
that they will be taken seriously. If one asks whether such 
a response is enough or adequate, then the other question 
arises: would Singapore Christians be sensitive enough or 
committed enough to look at society with a discerning eye 
with a view for coherent analysis and expression? We can 
I~ay Eng Soon, "In the Master's Footsteps" 1n Impact, 
August-September 1981, pp.18,19. 
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start asking the question: if God is really sovereign, does 
the Government or any leader have the right to "define" 
what is or not for us? Are the permitted avenues of 
religious discussion only deflecting us from the real 
issues that need to be raised - such as a civil religion _ 
and how the expected submission to the calls of the state 
for the nation may lead us into an uncritical devotion to 
the nation that is unhealthy and unworthy - especially of 
a Christian's allegiance ultimately to God? 
The views of Brigadier-General (BG) Lee Hsien Loong, 
currently First Deputy Prime Minister, should also be 
noted. During the Parliamentary Debate on the Religious 
Harmony Bill he maintained that existing social problems in 
Singapore were manageable and were being tackled. There was 
no need for religious "social action groups" in Singapore 
which would raise tensions. "From this starting point, we 
better leave politics to the politicians. If there are 
rights to be championed, wrongs to be put right, policies 
to be changed, let us do it through the political system. 
If the government pursues misguided policies, or ignores 
pressing social problems, it is only natural men of faith 
will be concerned". If we ask, how should men of faith then 
express their religious reservations of such SOC10-
economic-political policies or problems? - the answer is 
familiar. "Then it is their duty to enter politics. They 
should organise public meetings, seek election as MPs, hold 
the Government to account, and eventually campaign to oust 
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the Government in a general election, in order to form the 
government themselves and to put things right. That is how 
democracy is supposed to work". If that is true, then it is 
understandable if Singaporean religionists prefer to be 
"wise" by being "silent" and murmur in private instead. If 
the only way to express what may be legitimate social 
opinions as a religious person is to become a full-time 
politician (a surreal choice indeed), then it would be 
tempting to sit back instead and enjoy the Good Life that 
is given. 
Mr. Lee is aware of the argument that the division of 
politics and religion was impossible for some "flocks". 
"And theologically speaking, they are quite correct. Many 
Christians believe that their faith is exclusive and 
comprehensive. And so do most Muslims for whom Islam 1S a 
complete way of life". It was neither possible nor 
desirable for a person to "separate his rational and 
secular mind from his religious and spiritual impulses". He 
stressed that it was important for "individuals of deep 
religious conviction" to carry out in their public lives 
what they considered to be right for the country. "But it 
is also important that religious groups do not seek to 
bring about political outcomes which they prefer. The 
individual should participate as individuals, the groups 
should stay out as groups. If religious groups enter the 
political arena, there will be trouble".20 
Xlhe straits Times, February 25, 1990. p.15. 
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Last but not least, we can also examine what then 
National Development Minister S. Dhanabalan (also a 
Christian lay-leader) had to say about religion and 
politics at the same Parliamentary Debate. He began by 
noting that the White Paper pointed out that the division 
between religion and politics was a matter of convention 
and added: "I would go further and say that it is in fact 
artificial". For many people, their deepest moral values 
and priorities in life were shaped by their religious 
belief and faith. "To ask them to separate these deep 
convictions in their life from their political duties, 
responsibilities and rights as citizens is to ask them to 
be schizophrenics". So far, so good. Nonetheless, he then 
went on, the influence of religious faith or belief in 
political matters and on political matters must be "a 
personal, private matter, a motivation that must be 1n the 
quietness of a person's own conscience". Echoing the 
standard argument, he said that while religion might form 
a large part of a person's motivations in all aspects of 
his life, including his views and actions in political 
matters, those convictions must be expressed through 
secular, political institutions, and not through his 
religious body or institution. Any move to use religion as 
a rallying calIon a political issue "must turn what may be 
purely a political or moral issue into a religious issue 
and invite, and even incite followers of other religions to 
do the same. Surely it'll be the road to ruination in our 
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multi-religious society". 
He ended by saying that there would always be grey 
areas between politics and religion and that it was not 
something any government could arbitrarily define (which as 
we have seen, does not mean the government will not try). 
"There is a test of what is acceptable in the population as 
a whole. There must be sincerity, goodwill and sensitivity 
on the part of government leaders as well as religious 
leaders and followers of religion. We need to work 
together" . 21 
That indeed is a positive and honourable proposition. 
But of course "needing to work together" does not apply 
only to the campaign for religious harmony or to the 
campaign for "family values" and filial piety. The results 
may well be a socially cohesive, disciplined, tolerant 
society made up of small "happy families" (couples, 
extended families) and big "happy families" (different 
religions/religious groups). The Government would also want 
us to continue needing to work together to accept the 
constant ideology behind all these campaigns: sustained 
economic growth. such growth will bring prosperity, and 
this coupled with the firm control exercised by the 
Government over all that happens in Singapore will bring 
about a tightly-knit. cohesive society so the PAP 
bel ieves. Harmony and social obligations and discipl ine 
ultimately serve the economic cause that by which 
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singapore is defined - and nothing, least of all religious 
conscience or querying, must interfere with this process. 
This constant call, with the special "Asian" or Shared 
Values we have, to work together with the Government for 
the sake and destiny of the country is a call, and use of 
nationalism and as such, is a promotion of the Singaporean 
civil religion. 
This would be a good place then to gather some 
thoughts and reflect on some of the issues raised above. 
C. Church, state and society. 
The Catholic Church in Korea, as a single 
distinct Church belonging to the universal world 
church, must be true to its prophetic mission in 
the face of the political and social problems 
which have appeared in Korea. In particular, 
since the 1960's and on up to today the Church 
has made ceaseless efforts in order that a true 
and just society, a free society based on 
democracy be established and that human rights be 
respected. All of these efforts have been 
accompanied by oppression and suffering but she 
has overcome all difficulties. n 
The Church in the Philippines takes as her own 
mission the identification of Christ with the 
dispossessed, the hungry, the lonely, the 
oppressed. The Church, the "expert in humanity" 
realizes that the characteristics of poverty are 
not only individual but collective, not merely 
material but spiritual and that its roots are not 
only situational but structural as well. When the 
Church boldly acts to alleviate poverty and 
insure human dignity, she draws her inspiration 
and strength from her inner being as depository 
and herald of man's liberation from all forms of 
nHan Yong Hee, "Korean Society and Catholic Ethics in 
Government" in Impact (Philippines), Vol.17 No.8 (August 1982), 
p. 259. 
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domination, discrimination and injustice. n 
TWo different statements by two churches on their mission 
in their respective societies South Korea and the 
Philippines, both Asian countries, but very different from 
singapore, and not just in the way their churches function 
in society. In both these countries, the Church has been in 
confrontation with the government, and so we meet again 
this issue which continually vexes yet challenges all 
rulers and all Christian citizens: Church and state. After 
all that has been said so far, what is the proper role of 
religion in the political realm? Can Church be really 
separated from the State? 
The basic question that has to be asked, however, is: 
What is the nature of the State? "Is it a political 
creation that transcends the moral order and is therefore 
impervious to pastoral admonition? Is its authority as 
supreme and final that it brooks no challenge or limitation 
from the People?"~ Or can the Church instead assert that 
the rights of the person, the family, church and all 
associations freely organised for economic, cultural, 
social and religious ends constitute an order of rights 
that is prior to the State? 
For the State exists to serve the human person in 
himself and in his social life and to serve as 
well the ends of the order of justice. Therefore, 
the State as servant of these objectives has only 
!'Jaime L. Cardinal Sin, "Church-State Relations" in Impact 
(Philippines), Vol.17 No.4 (April 1982), p.131. 
)04 b'd -11 I, p.126. 
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a relative value. The state is not an ultimate 
end with supreme rights over the individual. 
Since the state exists to serve the common 
welfa:e in t~e arena of justice, peace, security 
and llberty lt comes under the moral order.~ 
That means that the government must subject itself for 
judgement based on the truths held by society and not be 
itself the judge of the truths in society. If so, is the 
singapore Government right in deciding on what truths there 
are in society, and then formalising a list to serve the 
civil religion purpose of overcoming the divisiveness of 
contrasting value systems by constructing one that opts 
ultimately for nationalism? How is justice, peace 
security and liberty served by this civil religion being 
constructed? Or is it going the other way? 
There is no doubt, however, that state and Church each 
possess individuality and autonomy. The State, however, is 
not superhuman nor the embodiment of an ideal. It exists 
for the people, it pursues the common good; people do not 
exist for the State. The Church, for its part, stands for 
human salvation. It symbolizes, and acts as an instrument 
in the spiritual and physical aspects of humanity. To put 
it simply then, the State is a created "being", a created 
order in human community, and comes under God. 
Under God's absolute authority, therefore, the 
state is commisioned a conditional authority to 
promote the welfare of the people, to keep 
peaceful order and to realize soc~al 
justice ... Christians as citizens of (the) natlon 
must fulfil their duty and responsibility to a 
legitimate political order that fulfils the above 
J\ b' 'I ld., p.127. 
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role. But when the established power abandons the 
justice of God, goes beyond its limits and is . , 
not fa1thful to the duties entrusted to it by the 
people, Christians as witnesses of the Word of 
God, must have the resRonsibility to criticize 
and rectify this power. 6 
The Church may have to pass ethical judgement on the 
political order then, and there should be no disinterested 
neutrality towards the government, or neglect its prophetic 
role in this respect. "Ever and again the Church has to 
direct the question to those in power: 'Are you harnessing 
your authority to serve the causes of justice and 
love?,"VGod then makes no distinction or "separation" 
between Church and state in the sense that He is one God 
for politics and a different one for the Church. There is 
only one God, and He is both God of politics and of the 
Church; He is God of life. And if God does act through 
politics as well as through the church to show what He 
wills, then the Church itself has a political existence. 
The Church is part and parcel of this world, this total 
political world, and therefore impact and influence between 
the Church and the World is mutual and inevitable. 
How is the mission of the Church "political"? Does it 
become so by becoming part of the struggle for political 
power, as BG. Lee Hsien Loong seems to be say ing? The 
Mstatement by Korean National Council of Churches, 1974 in 
Asian Voices in Christian Theology ed. Gerald H. Anderson 
(Maryknoll,N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976), p.118. 
J7Johannes Verkuyl, The Mesage of Liberation in QY,r ~ge 
trans. Dale Cooper (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publlshlng 
Company, undated), p.99. 
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answer is no. Rather, the Church "is expected to direct 
critical questions to the use and forms of power in given 
human situations in the light of the structure and dynamics 
of God" . 28The Church has the respons ibi I i ty , in other 
words, to discern and interpret the will of God in and 
through political structures of power. (Mr. Tay Eng Soon 
and Mr. S. Dhanabalan may well say that they are precisely 
seeking to do that as Christians, and as politicians, in 
Government). The difference is that both are members of the 
Government, and thus would predictably be following the 
civil religion agenda of unquestioningly putting the PAP 
first ahead of any religious considerations. 29 Has the 
Church started discerning or interpreting God's will with 
connection to the way the Government uses the pol i tical 
structures of power to boost its own ideological ends? 
There are implications, then, for this "mission of the 
Church". 
On one hand, it is the joyous task of the Church 
to make explicit the will and purpose of God in 
the powers of this world when they reflect the 
structure and dynamics of God, that is to say, 
when they reflect the love and justice of God. On 
the other hand, it is the responsibility of the 
Church not to keep quiet when the powers of this 
world have fallen short of the structure and 
dynamics of God. Thus, the Church lives in 
]KChoan Seng Song, Christian Mission in Reconstruction - An 
Asian Attempt (Madras: The Christian Literature Society, 1975), 
pp. 45-46. 
~And by inference, Singapore "f irst" also since the 
government does not think it wrong or strange in equating 
Singapore with the PAP, as a Member of Parliament has reiterated, 
and reported in The straits Times Weekly Edition, october 1, 
1994, p.23. 
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tension. She cannot be a partisan to any 
political power. She maintains creative tension 
with it in order that her prophetic vision is 
sharpened as events unfold themselves before her 
eyes to shape the destiny of men and women.~ 
To be in this "tension" does not mean the Church is always 
against or in constant "tense" confrontation with the 
State. surely God can work through a government and the 
Church should be able to gladly rejoice in that tool 
We shall support positively a government that, 
following God's will, expands human rights, 
promotes the safety and welfare of the people, 
establishes social justice, and contributes to 
world peace. But when a regime is against the 
will of God, does not listen to the voice of the 
people, and ignores the appeals of conscience and 
faith in order to perpetuate the power of the 
regime, we feel a strong responsibility before 
God not only to withdraw our co-operation, but 
also to resist actively such a regime. 31 
Put in this way, the mission of the Church can thus be 
described in Jesus' words in Luke 4: 18-19 (TEV): 
The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, 
because he has chosen me to bring good news to 
the poor. 
He has sent me to proclaim liberty to 
the captives 
and recovery of sight to the blind; 
to set free the oppressed 
and announce that the time has come 
when the lord will save his people. 
But then we are reminded that whenever the Church does 
align itself with just causes, when it sides with those who 
have no power or no voice to be heard - whether they are 
called "the poor; captives; oppressed" - it, like Jesus, 
30Ibid., p. 47. 
31Statement by Korean National Council of Churches, 0D. cit. , 
p.248. 
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becomes the focus of the state's watchful eyes (and often, 
the target of the State's repressive apparatus). We are 
told that history, however, gives us hope by teaching us 
that a threatened and persecuted Church becomes more 
dynamic and grows more vigorously whenever it identifies 
with the people - and they with it. One may have doubts as 
to whether this aspect of "church growth" is true in the 
singapore situation - churches here may be increasing in 
numbers (this is not the same as "growth") because 
Singaporeans are looking for meaning in the midst of 
anomie. So the "free market" may be operating here too: 
"customers" are "flocking" like lost sheep to the church 
that can best "sell" them spiritual comfort and reassurance 
without disturbing their middle-class preoccupations while 
they are busy living lives dominated by economic concerns. 
Another question arises. If there is such involvement, 
are Christians, Bishops, pastors, etc. then all forgetting 
their place and becoming politicians instead? Is the Church 
being dragged into the "secular" (and to many that means 
"evil" and "corruptive") pit of politics? A quick answer 
might be that any alignment with "the poor and needy" or 
any call made on their behalf is done so in the name of the 
People of God and in the moral and spiritual spheres. One 
could also look at what "politics" means itself, and try to 
understand it as being more than that "evil" or devious 
sector of societal life where power- or money-hungry 
persons battle it out for supremacy. If politics is 
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understood as the art or science of managing, regulating 
and administrating society, one must still remember that 
"politics" is derived from the Greek word politikoa, 
meaning "belonging to the citizens; the people or the 
state". So if politics can be generally understood as the 
efforts of a community or people to organize themselves for 
a better or fuller life, then one can see that every 
person, anyone who lives in society is already involved in 
"politics". Politics II about improving the lot of the 
people. 
The problem then may not be so much between the state 
and the Church as between the state and the People. The 
Church is made up of People, and is present in the People. 
"The Church is in pastoral alliance with the People ~whom 
she is rooted, with whom she is in solidarity and !2r whom 
she must be both shepherd and the prophet". 32 Therefore if 
the rights of the people are violated by the state, the 
Church which is in the people becomes involved! 
If the freedom of the people to organize, to 
express dissent, to be authentically represented 
is curtailed, then the Church stands by their 
side as advocate. If the State does not abide by 
the people's mandate to establish ... a regime of 
justice, peace, liberty and equality - then the 
People's demand becomes also the Church's 
demand. 33 
Equally then, if the State respects, builds up and nurtures 
nSin, op.cit., p.126. 
"Jaime L. Cardinal Sin, "Church and State Commitment to 
Human Human Development" in Impact (Philippines) Vol.lS No.6 & 
7 (June-July 1983), p.193. 
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the God-given rights of the People, then it will find the 
Church for it, and being its happy ally! 
There are, of course, governments such as 
totalitarian ones - that will seek to impose their own 
faiths and ideologies - or civil religions - on all their 
citizens, and churches in those situations are tolerated 
and "allowed" to exist only if they are just as happy not 
to challenge or criticize the state. Churches are therefore 
expected to confine themselves to "the salvation of souls" 
and to prepare their members for the "next" world. Can any 
really self-respecting and aware Church - aware that God is 
over it, and that the state must be required to acknowledge 
God-given rights - accept such limitations? Often certain 
Biblical passages are used to advocate submission to the 
governing authorities; Romans 13:1-7, and 1 Peter 2:13-17 
being the most well-known. But these passages refer to the 
Roman Empire of that time. "It is not possible to derive 
from these passages adequate guidance for Christians ethics 
in relation to the state as the political structure of a 
nation in which Christians have the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens", so one writer says.34 Thus 
while Romans and 1 Peter have a positive attitude towards 
the political authorities as God-given instruments of order 
in society, one must not also forget a passage such as 
Revelation 13 which affirms that the Roman Empire had 
~John C. Bennett, "state"" in A Dictionary of Christian 
Ethics ed. John Macquarrie (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967), p.331. 
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become idolatrous and demonic in demanding the worship of 
the Emperor. It had thus exceeded its authority, and 
Christians therefore had to resist it, even if there was 
suffering to be borne. 
It is not an answer nor a solution to just simply 
assert that religion must stay out of politics. And if one 
were to say why this is so, it (and what has been said 
above) could be summarised in two points: 
(1) "Silence means consent": if one in practice 
withdraws from the political sphere, 
providing a legitimation by default. 
then one is simply 
So if there is no 
Church or religious protest against certain unfair and 
unjust policies, there would then appear to be a tacit 
approval of them. "Not to decide is already to decide". 
Thus one motive for declaring that religion should stay out 
of politics is simply to silence such criticism. 
(2) A faith and commitment to God that is aware of the 
whole sphere of "politics" would be opposed to the 
privatization of religion; to the narrowing down of 
religion merely to the 1nner life and the private sphere of 
a person. We do have a "personal" relationship to God; 
religion must be personal, but this does not mean it is 
private. Religion (being personal) is immediately involved 
in a variety of social relationships and responsibilities, 
and this religion is aware of the Biblical perspective of 
social responsibility. One cannot claim a private religion 
stating what he believes and does is of no concern to 
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others. One soon learns that social responsibility leads 
quickly to the political sphere. 
Generally, Christianity in Singapore is self-absorbed 
in personal salvation. And taken to extreme levels, such 
religion soon becomes a harmless opiate with the purpose of 
relieving pressure and stress, providing a useful network 
of like-minded Christians to bolster up each other's faith, 
in the middle of anxious talk about falling share prices 
and the declining value of one's stockmarket portfolio - as 
well as providing business contacts. There is no discerning 
awareness of the social order here, no threat of any sort 
to the prevailing ideological ethos, and all are good and 
useful, productive citizens. 
The Rev. T.C. Nga, formerly President of the Trinity 
Annual Conference of the Methodist Church in Singapore, 
when second Vice-President of the National Council of 
Churches of Singapore (NCCS) had some words to say 
concerning World, State and the Church in a NCCS seminar. 
The world belongs to, and is loved by, God because God 
created it. God has also chosen the world to be the arena 
of His action and concern, and the Church has to be related 
to this. Rev. Nga reminds the Christians in Singapore (just 
as the government constantly reminds its citizens) that 
their nation is a multi-racial, multi-religious one, and 
the existence of other religious communities cannot be 
ignored. Understanding and dialogue must thus be improved 
between the religions. In particular, the NCCS must call 
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the Church in Singapore to discover the meaning of loving 
the nation. 
In the past, the Christian Church has chosen to 
remain silent on many of the issues affecting the 
lives of our people in our Nation. If we are to 
love the Nation, we cannot remain silent any 
longer. We must come out of our comfortable pews 
and begin to contribute our Christian thinking on 
matters that are affecting the lives of our 
people. We must also begin to move out of our 
comfortable Christian fellowships.H 
A prophetic call indeed, calling for hard thinking and 
discernment in Singaporean Christians seeking to understand 
God's will for themselves, and as part of society. And it 
remains prophetic today for the Singapore church, ten years 
after it was voiced. The more things change, the more they 
remain the same. "The strange silence of the church" is no 
longer enough, nor is the Church to be satisfied with a 
spiritualism consisting of personal well-being and 
salvation with God alone. And yet it appears to be so. 
Surely one issue "affecting the lives of our people" could 
be that of a civil religion being steadily promoted so that 
it will command the devotion of all who are citizens of 
Singapore, and nationalism is to be the new be-all and end-
all for all? The National Ideology ultimately to transcend 
any religion, since it embodies the values of a nation and 
is thus above all? Can this become a new "god" in any way? 
Or are all those "comfortable pews" and "fellowships" just 
too lulling and secure to want to do anything about it? 
\~"Singapore NCC sets itself new tasks", CCA News Vol.19 No.8 
(August 15, 1984), p.6. 
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The previous two sections om religious harmony, and 
the relation between church and state were included 
precisely to show the level of discussion taking place 
between the Church, in response to the state, and some of 
the ways the Church could talk to itself in reminding 
itself on its role or responsibilities in the general area 
of politics for the people, and not politics as defined for 
it by the state. 
certain observations, relating also to our civil 
religion thesis, can be made concerning the Government's 
Religious Harmony campaign. Firstly, if the Government has 
indeed constructed a civil religion to be implemented or 
inculcated into all its citizens - no matter what religion 
he or she may be in, then it is to the Government's own 
benefit and in keeping with its ideological agenda to try 
and displace or deflect and make minimal and non-
threatening the traditional religiosity so that the 
national loyalties and a transcendent meaning to the 
nation, typified by the civil religion, can be more in the 
ascendent. If this can indeed lead to a unified culture, or 
a "Singaporean identity", or the prevention and absence of 
religio-ethnic conflict, then such harmony or stability 
present is to enable continued economic growth. 
Hence, having a big debate and legislation on 
Religious Harmony also serves the purpose of letting the 
different religions know where they stand in terms of 
functions, which tend to be conf ined to the spir i tua 1 
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aspects, and thus "privatized". Religion can be dangerous 
in that one never knows the forms it may take, or the 
developments that can occur, intellectually or otherwise, 
in its functioning. Its very nature thus is a challenge to 
the kind of world view promoted by politicians who think of 
the bottom-line only. Hence the clampdown on the activities 
of each religious group - examples have already been given. 
The Government is thus free to continue what it has 
constantly been doing - pursuing economic goals, and offers 
at the same time, a civil religion with an aim for the 
nation that goes beyond the parochial objectives of the 
religious organisations. 
The Government benefits too from keeping discussion 
firmly on uncontentious "harmony" issues. That way, 
everyone, including the churches, is lulled into believing 
that the issue of religion in Singapore society is limited 
solely to talk of politics and avoiding excessive 
evangelisation. Churches will be fearful, so they will 
spend their time and attention making sure they don't cross 
the line, or keeping an eye on what they discuss. In short 
they will be so preoccupied with staying out of trouble 
that they will not think further into other issues. The 
churches do not therefore go beyond the Church/State 
discussion to ask what more there is besides this. The 
Government itself would be very happy for the churches to 
remain on this basic and traditional level, so there 18 
less attention being paid to what it is doing, in other 
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campaigns and activities and exhortations - such as the 
Family Values campaign, or the assertion that Confucian 
values help Singapore to prosper, or the constant call to 
Singaporeans to put their country first by working together 
to ensure Singapore's economic progress and survival - to 
promote the civil religion. Even the presence of the 
Presidential Council, comprising religionists, can be seen 
as both reassuring worried Christians that their religious 
representatives in it are respected leaders, and thus know 
how to work responsibly to safeguard the interests of each 
group. The existence of such a high-powered Council helps 
to focus one's attention again and again on the sort of 
issues it is supposed to mediate, namely that determined by 
the religious Harmony act. Again, keeping issues at that 
"conflict/Contention" level merely emphasizes how important 
to the security of the nation they are, and prevents one 
from seeing how a civil religion is also important to the 
security of the ruling party. 
We have to ask then what role the Church has, not just 
ln Church-State issues, which is, as shown, well 
explicated, but also what role the Church has in the face 
of a Government steadily and persistently promoting a civil 
religion. The civil religion is used to promote a 
nationalism that encourages economic growth, with all the 
fruits of such labour to be enjoyed. The Church may well be 
happy with (and humbly grateful for) the "religious 
freedom" granted to it by the Constitution gng within the 
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limits of the Religious Harmony Act. This enables the 
churches to continue doing what they have been doing _ 
which does not disturb the state - a.nd also enjoy the 
affluence that has come through the Government's economic 
progress, and which the civil religion is set up to 
enhance. Can it be then that the Church has been enticed by 
such affluence and materialism, and by the Government not 
acting against it as long as the Church remains 
"spiritual", that it is willing to support the Government 
in all it does in "the national interest" for its economic 
policies? If so, then it has been seduced into giving 
allegiance and devotion to something that seems right and 
proper - standing up for the nation's interests - but which 
is also insidious: the civil religion making the nation an 
end in itself. The apparent logic and reasonableness of the 
Government's campaigns also hides or conceals their actual 
excesses: directing or asking for commitment to the 
ostensible campaign is also directing the devotion asked 
for into something more ideological and therefore less 
worthy - the nation itself. 
The following section goes into asking what a role of 
the Church could be, in the face of, and experience of the 
affluence, materialism and consumerism that has come 
through successful state economic policies, and which the 
churches happily enjoy. Are the churches therefore also 
being idolatrous in worshipping such a golden calf? 
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D. The Role of the Church in Singapore Society. 
"The unique role of the church is to preach the gospel 
unto salvation", so says a Christian who is also a 
Government minister. 36 He goes on, "the church has three 
roles: 1. to preach the gospel; 
2. to minister to its own members - there are many 
Christians who have spiritual and personal needs; 
and 3. to serve the needs of society, i.e., non-
Christians".37 
summarise points two and three, and Dr. Tay seems to 
be saying that the church has to serve the spiritual and 
personal needs of all - Christians and non-Christians - in 
society; the Great Commandment is to be put concretely into 
action. 
There is surely no argument with such a call to 
action. However, one still remembers that the same 
Government has affirmed that any such action (by the Church 
or any other religious organisation) should not include 
anything deemed "political", which appears to be anything 
that would question its running of the nation or its 
policies, and anything that would create disharmony l.n 
society. Presumably, "personal needs" then mean what used 
to be called "good works" or "acts of charity". In 1966 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew spoke at a conference organized 
by the Tamil Muslim Union, where he expressed "the hope 
~ay, op.cit., p.79. 
n1bid., p.SO. 
270 
that leaders of the Muslim community would always interpret 
Islamic doctrine in a way that would be to the benefit of 
its followers and the general good of the community".~ 
This meant an interpretation "that is conducive to multi-
racial, multi-religious tolerance, forbearance and 
togetherness". It is clear that this advice presumably 
could apply to the interpretation of their respective 
doctrines by other religious leaders and groups, Christian, 
Hindu, Buddhist, etc. and it is equally clear that this 
advice is still valid and to be taken seriously today. The 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act is there to ensure it. 
But is the Church's role necessarily the same as that 
of the individual Christian? The Government seems to say 
that the Church should not be "political", but individuals 
are welcome to press their case in one way or another as 
Christians, even to the extent of becoming a politician. 50 
it may not be that Christians should not be involved in 
politics - just do so as individuals, and do not use the 
Church (or any other religious organisation) as a political 
party or cover. 
Then again we have Christians-who-are-politicians such 
as 5. Dhanabalan or Dr. Tay who actually appear to berate 
individual Christians for not being involved in society. At 
a united Thanksgiving Service (organised by the majority of 
Christian denominations) to celebrate National Day in 1987, 
BStraits Times, July 18, 1966 cited in Trevor Ling, 
"Religion", in Management of Success, p.694. 
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Mr.Dhanabalan noted that 1n 1986 at least S$30 million was 
given back to Protestant Christians as an across-the-board 
tax rebate. "This was money that came into our hands 
without any extra effort, without asking. How much of that 
was given back to the Lord not only for church work but for 
charity in general? For giving to the poor and needy is 
giving to the Lord also". The $30 million could have funded 
the whole of the Community Chest (an umbrella body 
collecting and distributing funds to charities) for two 
years, he said, adding "There will always be the poor and 
needy among us. I mean the really poor and needy and not 
those who think that they are poor because they can't 
afford an annual holiday. The poor and needy we will always 
have with us". He then told all the Christians present, "We 
can try and pressure a secular and non-Christian government 
to show charity. Or we can walk the extra mile. We can go 
in directly and help the poor and needy. What a tremendous 
opportuni ty there is for Chr istians to show that we are 
impelled by the love of Christ".D 
Similarly, Tay Eng Soon has commented, "It is a fact 
that Christians in Singapore are among the best educated, 
the most affluent and best housed. They are also a minority 
and largely English speaking. How do others look at us?". 
He went on, 
Presently, most people are tolerant of the rich 
Christians who have the best things in singapore. 
\~S. Dhanabalan, "That's Not Enough!" in Impact, October-
Novernebr, 1987, p.37. 
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But should they wake up one day and ask how it is 
that these Christians who are a minority have so 
much, a situation develops. Pray that day never 
comes. At the moment it is peaceful calm 
tolerant and accepting. But as people get bette~ 
educated and more aware, the politics of envy 
would grow. And there would be people rousing 
this. 40 
The question to him is basic: are Christians doing 
enough in society? Like Dhanabalan, he believes that some 
Christians may deci.de that to do more and champion the 
rights of the bottom 5% of the population, "they should 
pressurize the government to do more for them. It's a 
simplistic approach and leads to more counter-attacks from 
other quarters". And here a slight but pointed criticism: 
"It is passing the buck because any group that is tempted 
to do that is really not willing to dirty their hands and 
work with these people. They think that they are helping 
them by getting the government to do the job. It's too 
easy". Commenting again that Singapore churches were among 
the richest and most affluent in the community, he asked 
whether they were giving enough money to charities. If not, 
how were they witnessing in society with the resources that 
they had? While there were good examples such as centres 
ministering to drug addicts, homes for the aged sick and 
destitutes, "schools and hospitals, originally Christian 
developments, are now state enterprises" and "as other 
religious groups and the government are also doing that, 
~ay, op.cit., p.78. 
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it's no big deal. So Chr istians should do more". ~l 
Here you have the situation where two representatives 
of the Government, Christian, are admitting that there are 
dark corners in Singapore's success story where, using a 
familiar phrase, the "poor and needy" can be found. A 
challenge is then issued to Christians ( one suspects, 
aimed at those who try to be "socially conscious" by 
talking about the "poor and needy") to be directly 
invol ved; to get one's hands dirty; to be thus 
"politically" involved as an individual Christian. 
But the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act is now 
enforceable, and not just religious leaders, but "members 
of religious groups" - ordinary Church members - can be 
hauled up if they "carry out acti vi ties to promote a 
political cause ... while ... propagating or practising any 
religious belief". So, theoretically, a Christian speaking 
in, or leading a weekday Bible Study group can be 
considered guilty of infringing the Act if he or she 
cri ticises the economic policies of the Government and 
seeks to relate Biblical teaching or Christian ethics to 
them. So although the call to Christians to get their hands 
dirty being involved in society is laudable, it would 
appear the arena of action for any role of the church has 
been circumscribed and is small indeed. Almsgiving and 
charity work treats symptoms; structures are left unchanged 
and assumed to be all right. It may well be that the 
~lIbid., p.79. 
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Government has planned this to be so. If individual 
Christians get fired up and become preoccupied with 
treating such symptoms of economic malaise in individual 
cases, and doing so from an elevated, more prosperous 
position, they will feel they are doing the Lord's work as 
well as being good responsible citizens by taking care of 
the neighbour, as directed by the Government. They can feel 
they are "politically involved" as individuals; they are 
getting their hands dirty in Christian social work, thus 
fulfilling a function in society that is moral and approved 
by the Government, and therefore well within the parameters 
of the activities allowed by the Religious Harmony Act. And 
all this activity distracts them from asking what else they 
can do vis-a-vis the state and its ideology, other than 
charitable works. The state would like the various 
religions to be thus distracted, so that it can pursue its 
own "religious" agenda in putting forward a civil religion 
that claims ultimate devotion to it. 
The Government may speak of the need for sincerity and 
goodwill between all concerned, but there persists the 
"climate of fear". 
And it is not only fear of repression that is the 
problem. The Government also has a reputation for 
a kind of intellectual intolerance and thuggery. 
In Singapore today, critics risk having their 
arguments over-simplified, being labelled as 
belonging to some dangerous int~llectual 
tradition, having their motives quest,loned and 
their qualifications ridiculed publIcly. One 
senses, for example, that Singaporeans cannot 
talk about the poor without being labelled a 
welfarist or, worse, someone playing the politics 
of envy. It seems to be impossible to talk about 
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openness without being labelled a Western-
influenced. liberal. And nowadays, anyone who 
feels pass10nately about any issue is eventually 
told that he is distracting Singaporeans from the 
all-important "big picture" of international 
economic competition.~ 
If this is true generally, how much more so for those 
speaking from a "spiritual"/theological perspective. Small 
wonder then that all seems quiet on the religious front. 
And it is the politicians in Parliament who are busy 
apparently speaking for the "poor and needy". "MPs had an 
endless stream of requests for more to be done to help 
them ... taken together, low-income Singaporeans were better 
represented in the House" than others, including 
bus inessmen. 43 If" it's no big dea I" that churches have set 
up old folks homes and hospitals, and that they don't seem 
to give much to charity, and are too self-preoccupied to 
think about the "poor and needy", then what, if any, role 
do they have in the life of Singapore? Are Christians 
politically reliable and socially desirable from the 
viewpoint of the Government? Is indeed the presence of a 
Christian minority community beneficial and wholesome ln a 
country like Singapore, building its own kind of 
nationhood? If it is indeed true that the Gospel has always 
exerted pressure and influence for social and political 
change, then what are the churches doing to be true to that 
42Cherian George, "Here to Stay", The Straits Times, July 11, 
1993, p.7. 
4.lHan Fook Kwang, "Has enough been done to help the poor?" 
The straits Times Weekly Edition, April2, 1994, p.15. 
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claim, yet apparently being limited or forbidden to do so 
by legislature? Most of all, how will they express their 
loyalty and belonging to their nation, while simultaneously 
giving a distinctive prophetic and evangelical witness? How 
will they be empowered or freed to do this? 
We do not know, and we are not sure. One thing that is 
certain though - as Tay Eng Soon has mentioned - is that 
Christians are among "the best educated and the most 
affluent". "The majority of Christians come from the higher 
socio-economic groups ..• 25% of those who earn more than 
$5,000 a month are Christians compared to 22.2% of those 
who earn between $3,001-5,000, and 12.1% of those who earn 
between $1,501-3,000. The figure drops to only 7.9% for 
those who earn less than $600 a month and 7.3% for those 
who earn between $601-1,000 a month. Adherence to 
Christianity is highest among those in the professional and 
administrative services, and lowest among housewives and 
production workers".~ 
Tong also notes in his study that "mainline 
churches .•. have witnessed gradual growth over the years. 
For these churches, the last few years have seen an 
increase in the rate of growth ... Churches that have 
winessed phenomenal growth are the charismatic renewal 
movements" with their "more emotional approach to religious 
"Tong Chee Kiong, Religious Conversion and Revivalism: A 
~.s.-..t=U=d4-y--....:o::::..Lf---.:C~h!...!..!:..r...:!:i...!:isu:tui~a:!..!nL.Li~· t.:.Ly_..:It.i.!..ln:......-~S...:=i~n~ga...:a::..llp;=...;o=r=-=e (Singapore: Ministry of 
Community Development, 1989), p.5. 
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worship".45 However, the type of theology that is present 
in all these churches is the pietistic, fundamentalist type 
with nothing much of any social theology. Link this with 
the general affluence of the churches, and a picture 
emerges which seems to place Mammon in as prominent a place 
as God in them. Even a solidly "evangelical" magazine ran 
a report on materialism and wealth, admitting that 
materialism "also" exists in the church, and asked 
(disingenuously) "Can rampant consumerism dull the spirits 
of Christians so that they begin to view affluence as 
essential to their lives?" Amidst the obvious, 
selfcongratulatory, and banal answers, there was one 
respondent with a sting: "Materialism is such a subtle 
thing that even if it is obviously there, one can easily 
write it off with an excuse that 'It's all right. The Lord 
allows it. It's for the establishment of the Kingdom.' Just 
look at the rich churches bigger buildings, better 
equipments and facilities, grander celebrations and 
programmes. We've got to be careful. 
deceptively dangerous".~ 
'Things' are 
Money talks - powerfully. "There was, and still is in 
Singapore, a ruling elite and a power elite who influence 
the rulers. Clearly the religious worker belongs at the 
bottom, not at the top of the pyramid. No matter how well 
trained the pastor might be, the crucial decisions within 
4~Ib . d . 1 ., pp.J9-40. 
~Impact, October-November 1988, p.1J. 
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most churches are made by a small rUling elite over whom 
the pastor has limited influence. These are usually the 
successful and monied businessmen and executives". 47 And 
people actually ask whether Christian spirits can be 
dulled? Going back to the question of the role of the 
Church, can that be "dulled" too if the Church, as with 
apparently everyone else in Singapore, is also captive to 
materialism, affluence and consumerism? Can anything be 
done about it? Do we want to? Does it matter? will we lose 
our "steady growth" in numbers? Who really cares? 
Bellah had some words to say: 
Corruption ... is to be found in luxury, 
dependence, and ignorance. Luxury is that pursuit 
of material things that diverts us from concern 
for the public good, that leads us to exclusive 
concern for our own good, or what we would today 
call consumerism. Dependence naturally follows 
from luxury, for it consists in accepting the 
dominance of whatever person or group I or, we 
might say today, governmental or private 
corporate structure, that promises it will take 
care of our material desires ... And finally 
ignorance, that is, political ignorance, is the 
result of luxury and dependence. It is a lack of 
interest in public things, a concern only for the 
private, a willingness to be governed by those 
who promise to take care of us even without our 
knowledgeable consent.~ 
Bellah was of course talking about America and the 
lack of Republican virtue, but we can surely see a lot of 
the Singapore Church, Christians (and the populace at 
~Keith Hinton Growing Churches singapore Style: Mission in 
an Urban Context ' (Singapore: Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 
1985) ,p. 51. 
4lISe llah , "Religion and the Legitimation ... ", op.cit., pp.19-
20. 
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large) reflected in that quote, harsh as it may sound. 
Moving closer to home, we can check ourselves against a 
detailed list, from a Sri Lankan theologian, of the 
"forces" around and within ourselves which go against the 
need (or consciousness of the need) for conversion in us. 
It is a list deserving to be quoted in full: 
- self-complacency 
- love of material security 
- disinclination to let one's daily routine be upset 
- insensitivity to the many injustices around one 
superficiality (seeing social issues in relation to 
values emphasized by the mass media, distorted 
educational objectives, etc.) 
- work and family demands absorbing all of one's time 
and energies 
- complacency with palliatives and minor changes that 
do not touch the substance of problems 
- crusades for issues of little relevance (overconcern 
with sexual morality) 
- ignorance of the real issues and unwillingness to 
learn 
- unawareness of being confined to the limits of one's 
own social, cultural, racial, and religious 
groupings, and thereby overlooking their wider 
implications 
- overconcern with structures; infighting within 
groups 
- fatalism ("I can't do anything about it") 
- uncritical acceptance of educational systems, the 
mass media, the promises of those in charge 
- fear of being misunderstood by the majority 
- fear of punishment for nonconformity 
- failure to acknowledge and heed prophetic voices 
- unwillingness to exert oneself 
- overconcern with money, security 
- belief that the poor are lazy, selfish, unwilling to 
help themselves 
- political neutrality (which normally favors the 
status quo) 
- belief that all change must be violent, and 1S 
therefore to be avoided 
- providing for one's posterity for a century ahead, 
but not providing for those who suffer due to 
today's social structures.~ 
4~issa Balasuriya, Planetary Theology (London: SCM Press Ltd. , 
1984), pp. 261-262. 
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An exhaustive list indeed - has anything really been 
left out! Yet honest reflection will show that the "forces" 
listed above are precisely the "forces" that move us 
towards what we term the Good Life as happy, complacent, 
comfortable Christians. But surely we are not our real, 
authentic, genuine selves - such as God created us to be 
and become - if we really do define the Good Life as that 
which is centred on acquisitiveness, personal security, 
competition for work and position, and distancing ourselves 
as much as possible from the issues and ideologies of the 
world? This time, how much do we see ourselves in the list 
above? 
There is a Cult of materialism and prosperity, not 
just in the Church but in society also. If it has roots in 
churches, what advice and guidance can they offer society 
at all that would be practical or even accepted? Are they 
aware of such manifestations amongst them, in their 
"fellowships"? 
However, prosperity and material well-being, 
while appreciated by most Singaporeans, have also 
given rise to a host of newer problems, not the 
least of which is the growing cult of 
materialism, and with it, the related phenomena 
of cupidity, philistinism, political apathy, 
alienation and, for many people, a sense of 
spiritual deprivation. For most Singaporeans, 
this cult of materialism takes the form of an 
obsessive preoccupation with the pursuit and 
acquisition of pecuniary and material gains and 
the honorific display of wealth ... Increasingly 
acquisitiveness has become the very soul of 
society, penetrating almost every aspect ,of 
social life and thought. Everything has a prlce 
attached to it, so much so that 
Singaporeans ... appeared to be fast developing a 
system of values according to which the worth or 
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significance of any person, object or activity 
was calculated exclusively in terms of his or its 
potential or actual pecuniary value. It was the 
market value (an expression which was used with 
increasing frequency) of any person, his services 
or his goods in terms of dollars and cents which 
mattered most; and anything which was not 
reducible to such quantitative terms (for example 
love, courage, honour, sacrifice, integrity, 
selflessness, each with its irreducible 
qualitative wholeness) was largel~ ignored or at 
best regarded with mild contempt. 
So it would appear that the churches have nothing to 
say - not of love or goodwill to each other, no updating of 
the parable of "the rich fool" to fit Singapore society, no 
awareness that such affluence tempts them to worship 
further at the altar of a nation that promises further such 
blessings if one were to worship the civil religion that 
enables them. If indeed a "materialistic philosophy of 
life" seems the norm, then the sort of spiritual and moral 
values religious organisations are supposed to embody and 
represent would receive low ratings on the ladder of 
societal values. For churches to therefore stress the 
expected (if valid) message that material gains are not 
lasting but ephemeral, or that such a quest merely brings 
about not just acquisitiveness but also competition and 
contention, or that one should be seeking a balanced 
approach to life, would most likely only bring reactions 
and questions as to whether the Church is living in the 
twentieth century, or is relevant at all. It is difficult 
for religious bodies like the Church to try to provide 
~o, "Value Premises Underlying ... " op.cit., p.678. 
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singaporeans with a national sense of ethical purpose when 
it too appears to reflect uncritically the spirit of the 
time in society. 
And if Leslie Fong, the Editor of The straits Times, 
(and therefore hardly a radical) can bring up this aspect 
of the "ugly Singaporean", then that is indicative of the 
anxiety in semi-official circles of competitiveness and 
acquisitiveness advancing "a bridge too far". "In this 
regard, I have often wondered why, despite our vigilance 
against negative values and influences that upset our way 
of life, or our social order, we have not paid much 
attention to what the culture of the bottom-line can do to 
us as a people". 51 The answer surely 1S that too much 
attention or scrutiny cannot be afforded to this issue. The 
Government dangles the "carrot" of prosperity ("the bottom-
line") before its citizens to keep them happy, as well as 
carrying the big "stick" of strict control (and repression) 
to keep things in check - this, to the Government is what 
makes for a harmonious, cohesive Singaporean society. Also, 
the Government's "vigilance against negative values", as we 
have seen, has taken the form of "positive, Asian" Shared 
Values which in the end promotes the kind of mind-set 
appropriate for economic growth, with the results of 
consumerism and acquisitiveness as the fruits of such 
"growth". Small wonder then, if this kind of approach is 
~lLeslie Fong, "Of self-centred S' pore~n~ and cul,ture of the 
bottom-line", The straits Times Weekly Ed1tlon, Apr1l 9, 1994, 
p.15. 
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touted as the most desirable of all human pursuits in 
modern Singapore, that a breed of people may well be 
produced whose most notable features are brashness, 
"philistinism", and easy contempt for anything that does 
not easily make money. Of what use then are things of an 
intellectual, cultural, aesthetic, literary or moral nature 
to people who pride themselves on hard-headed pecuniary 
practicality? 
When all around them, the talk is of cost 
recovery, value for money, and of measuring 
people according to their net worth, the first 
question they will ask when approached to do 
something is likely to be: what's in it for me? 
And this is likely to be the attitude they will 
adopt, consciously or not, in other spheres of 
life. It is every man for himself - and leave 
sacrifices and other romantic stuff to dreamers 
or fools. Can anything be done about it? My gut 
feeling is that we have gone too far down the 
road. still, we should try.~ 
A kind of hope exists though, if one believes in 
surveys, in the results of some findings of a Nationa 1 
University of Singapore study on the values and lifestyles 
of 2,000 Singaporeans aged between 15 and 40. When they 
were asked to select the top three things they wanted most 
in life from a list of 17, "the majority (56 percent) chose 
happiness. This was followed quite closely by health (51 
percent). The other things which were clearly preferred by 
Singaporeans were success in work/study (35 percent), 
security (32 percent), love (31 percent), friends (23 
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percent), freedom (22 percent) and wealth (15 percent)".~' 
In other words, the average Singaporean wants happiness and 
health, and money is not all that important! 
It would be too easy and snide to laugh out loud and 
say increduously, "which part of Singapore or what 
'singapore' do these people come from?!" The summary above 
may well be true; one may just be wondering about the 
statistics. But we will accept the truism that improvement 
in the standard of living and enjoying the fruits of 
economic prosperity does not necessarily make people 
happier or indeed more contented with their lot. And so 
Leslie Fong' s question comes back as a challenge to the 
churches: "Can anything be done about it?" Christianity, in 
the name of Jesus, promotes "life in all its fullness"; can 
the churches promote anything more spiritually and morally 
whole than just a full materially comfortable life? 
The University survey also reveals that 58\ of 
Christians wanted to get ahead financially, although only 
23\ of them believed that money could solve most 
problems.~ If a perhaps facile observation may be allowed 
here, it seems that a high percentage of Chr istians may 
just find themselves necessarily caught in the "rat-race"to 
earn a living, without wanting to really be part of "the 
cult of materialism". If so, this would be a healthy sign 
'3Kau Ah Keng , Charles Yang, Values and Lifestyles of 
Singaporeans: A Marketing Perspective (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1991), p.44. 
~Ibid., p.37. 
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in the life of "affluent, prosperous" Singaporean churches 
- that there are Christians struggling to serve God and not 
Mammon. This may indeed be a struggle, for sections of the 
churches, charismatic or otherwise, find it easy to promote 
a theology of "wealth and health" as a "selling point". If 
there is a problem among those who adhere to this kind of 
"theology" with any reminder by the mainline churches of 
the need for balance, restraint or even "poverty" (i.e. a 
simple life-style) as a Christian duty, then they are 
reassured that it is all right to make money; that 
prosperity is a Biblical doctrine, proved by blessings 
given by God to the faithful like Job or Abraham. The real 
appeal of this kind of thought or worship to its elite 
followers may just be no need for any guilt concerning the 
link between religious belief and worship with money and 
prosperity. In the first place, no Singapore church would 
be so naive as to actually push or promote any "poverty" -
not in materialistic Singapore, and not among its middle-
class congregations. What would be more socially relevant 
is the need for Christians to be more discerning and 
responsible for their wealth - both in getting it, hoarding 
it, and spending it. The Christian term here is 
stewardship, and what is also involved here is ethies. 
Secondly, to link prosperity with God's blessing 
easily leads to the conclusion that the poor (including 
poor Christians) are thus not favoured and blessed by God. 
God therefore (figuratively) looks down on the lower 
286 
classes, and the lower classes do not really deserve God. 
Hence the middle-class churches have a justification for 
being, and remaining as they are. And a class structure is 
thus in operation, with the "elite" churches clear examples 
in a society that has its own class structure based on how 
much you have and earn. 
If therefore Singaporean churches are increasingly 
being held captive to materialism and affluence, then how 
can they have, or want to have, any critical discernment 
concerning the ideological practices going on around them 
in society? Bringing the Shared Values/National Ideology 
and Civil Religion of Singapore squarely into focus now, 
why would rich Christians want to think through, consider 
carefully, evaluate with intellectual rigour, seek to 
adjust, object to or even oppose a Government-sponsored 
ideology and civil religion that seemingly promotes also 
positive moral values, instils love and devotion to the 
nation, and to the causes of the nation (patriotism and 
nationalism as honourable and natural), elaborates a 
Singaporean Way of Life that would transcend - if need be -
one's personal religious and philosophical beliefs, and 
also has the end (desired) results of producinq economic 
prosperity? The very same prosperity that keeps churches 
filled with complacent people in comfortable pews? As Prime 
Minister Goh has said so succintly, "don't kill the goose 
that lays the golden eggs". In other words, the link 
between churches in thrall to materialism and the Shared 
287 
Values and civil religion is that the Shared Values seeks 
to promote continued economic growth, the fruits of which 
include the affluence which many churches enjoy. 
The Shared Values and the civil religion are being 
promoted steadily and consistently in Singapore. To a 
recent comment that not much appeared to have been done to 
realise the aims of the Shared Values, an official reply 
came from the Assistant Director, Public Relations for 
Permanent Secretary (Education), and reported in ~ 
straits Times on February 26, 1994. She said that 
impression was "erroneous", and that "our Schools have been 
teaching the five shared values through Civics and Moral 
Education, Social Studies and History. In designing the 
syllabuses, the shared values were incorporated into topics 
which best lent themselves to the transmission of these 
values". There is no doubt that the economic history of 
Singapore is one of these "topics". Also, multi-media 
instruction packages on these subjects have been prepared 
for use in all schools; teachers attend training workshops 
and briefing sessions on the teaching of these sUbjects. 
"Parents,the community and the media need to play a 
supportive and complementary role vis-a-vis schools in 
inculcating the shared values in our younger generation so 
that these values will endure in our society". In short, 
everyone is to promote the Shared Values, and unconsciously 
or not, to have the civil religion inculcated in themselves 
too. Devotion to the nation is being institutionalized. 
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Whatever its advocates may claim. amassing wealth 
throug~ economic develo~ment is not necessarily 
a recIpe for affordIng people a happier 
existen~e •.• Whi~e economic development and 
prosperIty are Important for developing a sense 
of confidence and security, Singapore's own brand 
of nationalism seems to be based very largely on 
the value of material acquisitions and pecuniary 
gains the most ephemeral of human val ues .ls 
(italics mine) 
Is not this kind of "human values" and "nationalism" 
opposed to Christian values? Is not this kind of query 
irrelevant to churches whose majority of members are 
contained, co.tortable and co.placent? 
Churches are contained not just because the Government 
does it to them, as for example, through the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act. Fear and uncertainty over the 
Government's intentions and sincerity In wanting 
constructive dialogue over church policies and actions 
makes them hesitate and reluctant to act. The churches 
"contain" themselves too by perhaps not really knowing what 
their societal agenda is, or how it should be spelled out. 
Apart from familiar and occasional easy talk about the need 
for them to care for the poor and needy, and to have social 
responsibility, there is the reluctance to truly test how 
they can get their hands dirty being involved with ~ the 
needs of those in society. What this might actually mean in 
the current situation is for the churches to take the 
Government at its word of wanting dialogue on moral and 
spiritual issues and therefore put forward views and bring 
~~HO, "value Premises ... " op.cit., pp.683, 690. 
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forward issues that they, as religious bodies, are 
concerned about. A good example of this may well be the 
reported response of three Christian organisations to the 
proposed legislation of "living wills" - or as it was later 
termed, "advanced directives". The National Council of 
Churches, the largest umbrella Protestant organisation in 
singapore representing some 100 churches and embracing at 
least five mainline denominations, and two Catholic bodies 
Family Life Society and Catholic Medical Guild of 
singapore - came out firmly against the proposed law. They 
said the proposal to allow adult Singaporeans to specify if 
they want to stop life-support when terminally ill was 
unnecessary and could lead to euthanasia. A month earlier, 
a smaller umbrella Protestant organisation, the Singapore 
Council of Christian Churches, had expressed similar 
reservations, saying that there was no necessity for such 
a law. The Christians (comprising about 13 per cent of the 
population) thus stand out on this issue which will affect 
the whole of the population, considering that the leaders 
and spokesmen of the Buddhists and Taoists (54 per cent of 
the population), the Muslims (15 per cent), and the Hindus 
(4 per cent) have said they have no opposition to the 
proposed legislation.~ As Government ministers have 
hinted, old standbys for social involvement such as Homes 
for the Aged, hospitals and schools are fine and valid -
but it is nothing really special. However, many churches 
~he straits Times Weekly Edition, October 1, 1994. 
290 
seem happy and self-satisfied with this level of activity. 
They have paid their dues. They can live with it. They are 
comfortable. If one can use Martin Marty's distinction 
between "priestly" and "prophetic" versions of civil 
religion to apply to the Singapore civil religion, then the 
singapore version appears to be of the "priestly" type: 
celebrating the greatness of the nation, its achievements 
and economic success, and indeed super ior i ty (the 
Government likes to show lists in which Singapore is at the 
top of whatever it is about). In asking its people to have 
the values of the civil religion inculcated in them, the 
State 1S just not asking its people to celebrate the 
nation's achievements, but ultimately to show devotion to 
it, a devotion that is owed the state for what it is. Where 
is the "prophetic" voice in the Church, calling the 
nation I s attention to its presumptions and ideological 
offences? 
Churches are coatortable partly because they have 
learned to be so. If they are constantly unsure of what 
they can do as organisations in society - even if they 
really wanted to do anything then they learn to be 
contented with what they have and what has been granted 
them. So long as they don't rock the boat, the Government 
leaves them alone to practise their "religious freedom". 
And since the churches are by and large affluent and 
prosperous ones, they have the resources to happily 
minister to their own personal and spiritual needs and to 
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busily oil the wheels of their own parochial machinery. All 
this takes time and energy, so it is no surprise that very 
few issues or occasions arise (unless sometimes forced by 
the Government) to jolt them out of their "comfort zones" 
and to take a look at what is going on outside the church 
walls. 
If you are "comfortable" long enough, and have become 
used to enjoying the Good Life in a successful economy like 
singapore, and are not required to do or think much out of 
your own defined ("contained") spheres, you become 
complacent. You will think "God will forever be in the 
heavens, and all will continue to be well forever here on 
earth (or at least in Singapore)". Your complacency, self-
satisfaction, and smug satisfaction tells you everything is 
fine since most everyone seems happy with what they are 
receiving in church. Those who question the values or 
policies or inaction of the churches can be dismissed as 
"dangerous" or (worse) "a liberal". And because you are 
complacent you will not see the need to be discerning of 
the intellectual and ideological trends in society, and 
whether or not they may be in conflict with, or a threat 
to, the value and belief system that is Christianity. There 
is no need to do more than is expected of you as a 
Christian or as a church. You can accept readily the 
justification and role for your religion (valid enough 
though banal as it may be), as that of encouraging your 
members to lead decent and wholesome lives and to stay out 
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of trouble, thereby strengthening the fabric of society. 
The rest is silence. 
What role is there for the Church in Singapore? What 
leadership is there to offer a constructive, critical, 
discerning, accepting and honest accomodating of events and 
policies (especially from the Government) that will affect 
all the people of Singapore - and to want to do so not 
because of any arrogant or triumphalistic attitude, but 
because the Church really believes it has the obligation to 
try and serve fully the needs of all in society? Or will 
the "three Cs" win in the end? One does not know. One is 
not sure. We can end here, however, with this evaluation: 
In actual fact the ideologies of Church and State 
contradict each other on many points and at many 
levels. Unfortunately strong Christian social 
analysis is underdeveloped in Singapore, and with 
it a weak grasp of authentic Christian social 
action and of social ethics. This will be one of 
the major issues facing Singapore Christians in 
the future. 57 




..• an ~deology is ,the reduction of a philosophy 
by a k1nd of comm1ttee of the generation into a 
uniform credo; the inconsistencies, hesitations 
and doubts banished, it becomes the generational: 
and then, perchance, the governmental dogma. When 
ideas are used as weapons, they are finally 
evaluated for their fire-power in psychological 
warfare, not for their truth.l 
The quote above is a succinct summary of much of this 
thesis; of the way the Government of Singapore has sought 
to impose on its citizens through a National Ideology 
carefully selected values justified by their apparent 
ability to save the nation from degenerating into the 
insidious ways of the West. The "psychological warfare" 
comes in the invoking of the "siege mentality" approach (a 
tried-and-tested way to get fearful and uncertain citizens 
back in line), which stresses that Singapore is a small 
country, vulnerable to all sorts of pressures and 
influences from the world, and if to survive it needs 
something in the shape of a list of Shared Values to 
protect it, then so be it. 
We are told that the contents of this Shared Values 
ideology, appropriately called the National Ideology, are, 
in part, derived from so-called common elements of the 
various religious traditions in Singapore, but we have also 
seen that Confucianist values are largely enshrined in the 
IFeuer, op.cit., p.190. 
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National Ideology. If the ideology here is meant as a 
sUbstitute religion, indeed a secular religion, then the 
Shared Values\National Ideology is a form of civil 
religion. 
The Government thus requires this civil religion, 
through schools, the mass media, campaigns, etc., to 
instill in Singaporeans those values which are deemed 
essential to the maintenance of Singapore society; social 
cohesion is to be sought through the imposition of this 
ideology. No one denies easily the belief that if the 
people of a country have a common cultural identity, that 
society is indeed kept strong and united. The Singapore 
situation is one, however, where the Government, with its 
much vaunted "pragmatism", has seen fit to try and mould, 
manipulate, force and shape the behaviour of its citizens 
into pre-approved ways, justifying all its policies and 
decisions in terms of economic progress and prosperity. 
The goal is always "economic progress"; Singapore's 
destiny is to be an enclave of order and prosperity. The 
values of the civil religion are to be inculcated to serve 
that all-important end. 
But what of the Church in Singapore? Do Christians, in 
the main middle-class and affluent see themselves having a 
role to play in the life of the nation apart from affirming 
the economically (and ideologically) driven view that 
Singaporeans should be motivated only by money, 
materialism, consumerism - in other words, the fruits of 
295 
economic progress? Or are the churches 1n captivity 
themselves to materialism and affluence? If so they are 
thus captives of the civil religion itself. 
The role of ideology also has to be examined to 
see how far it is used as a cloak to disguise 
what is really happening, how far it is an 
instrument of social control, helping to keep 
people 'in their place' and content with 
oppressive conditions, and how far it illumines 
reality and shows us what is going on. 2 
This thesis has been a small attempt to examine and 
investigate such a "role" of the civil religion being 
promoted in Singapore. One can suggest, however, that the 
churches and Christians there should be taking up, as part 
of their role in Singapore society, precisely this role of 
evaluating and discerning what the National Ideology and 
the civil religion does, and how it functions to fulfil all 
the activities named in Forrester's quote above, to enable 
the Government's economic ends to be met, under the motive 
of having desirable Asian attributes surV1ve in the nation 
for the moral and spiritual good of all. 
The State indeed defines "reality"; control is not 
just over the economic infrastructure of the country, but 
also over its culture, arts, and societal norms. 
"Politically correct" behaviour is expected, and here it 
means behaviour that is "correct" and right in the eyes of 
the ruling "political" party - the Government. Anything 
else 1S to be severely dealt with and repressed. The 
20uncan B. Forrester, Theology and Politics (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988), p.82. 
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churches in Singapore are expected to behave too, as we 
have seen in the discussion of the issues raised by the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, according to the 
"reality" defined and the roles circumscribed for them by 
the Government. 
Does the Church have the insight, discernment, and 
courage to "illumine" such "reality" as is presented to it? 
Is it aware, in the first place, of such socially 
constructed views of reality by the Government? 
There are social constructions which tend to 
legitimize things as they are and other social 
constructions which prophetically challenge what 
is with the moral imperatives of what should be. 
Theological statements are also social 
constructions, and they have an immediate effect 
on the social and political as well as the 
religious lives of individuals and communities.] 
Church leaders have mentioned or admitted that there is a 
prophetic role for the Church, but challenges and 
theological statements to the state as to what should be 
have been few and far in between, and when they occur tend 
to be in response or as a reaction to a crisis or situation 
brought about by the Government itself. As has been 
mentioned, fear is a factor here - fear of the Government 
coming down harshly on churches perceived to have crossed 
the boundary of what is permissable discussion or reaction 
in the eyes of the PAP. But to truly believe - or more to 
the point, have faith in the fact that Church 
proclamations or statements can make a difference or carry 
~Alistair Kee, Domination or Liberation (London: SCM Press 
Ltd., 1986), p.90. 
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weight in the total lives of individuals, or governments, 
can surely be an aspect of inspiration itself; it can 
surely help the Church to start trusting itself again and 
to trust in the mandate from its Sovereign God to aean 
something in Singapore society. It can start preaching the 
Good News that "life in all its fullness", the truly Good 
Life, can mean more than rampant consumer ism or 
materialism. And the Church, before any theological 
statements from it can be treated with respect, will have 
to start with itself; to evaluate the possible presence of 
false gods "money theism" within its own affluent 
circles. It will have to show that it itself is not captive 
to the civil religion or a national ideology that demands 
allegiance and devotion to the nation in order to bring 
about more economic "goodies" to enable more "money theism" 
to be worshipped. Affirmations like these for the nation 
are affirmations that all in society can accept, including 
any member of any denomination or sect. Such is the style 
and genius of the civil religion. Again, where is the 
prophetic element from the Churches, warning of the dangers 
in such uncritical affirmation of the State and its civil 
religion? 
One will surely hope that this process of looking anew 
and of practised discernment is taking place slowly but 
surely in some parts of the Singapore Church, and with it 
the hope also that there can be a consistent and meaningful 
role for the Church vis-a-vis the Government and society. 
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The Shared Values/National Ideology, Family Values, and the 
Religious Harmony campaigns may have been put forward on 
social and moral grounds, but they are also political 1n 
ultimate goals and nature. The Church can be aware of this, 
and can embrace the political nature of it, remembering 
that "political" involves the community too. If the Church 
is part of the community, or has proved it is worthy or 
responsible enough to be taken seriously as part of the 
community, then it can speak of and for the community; it 
can then make "political" statements on behalf of, and for 
the benef it of the community. In other words, it can be 
said to be theologising "politically" and it is presenting 
a form of political theology. 
Political theology wants to know how the Church 
understands its social and political role. How is 
it related to the society, and in particular to 
the structures of power? What is the class 
composition of the Church, and how does this 
affect its public role? But the central question, 
of course, is how the empirical manifestation of 
the Church relates to the Kingdom of God, and how 
far it fulfils its calling to witness to and 
prefigure that Kingdom. 4 
As the Church continues to understand, and by the 
power of the Spirit, accepts such social or political roles 
it may have with a more critical and discerning attitude, 
it may remind itself that the Kingdom of God is not already 
here and embodied in the country of Singapore, orderly and 
peaceful and rich and wonderful as it may seem to be. It 
will remember that there is a God, calling all His 
4Forrester,op.cit., pp.153-154. 
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followers to work for the coming of His Kingdom, who stands 
over and above all earthly principalities and powers. And 
if the state in Singapore would advocate a civil religion 
with Confucianist foundations to serve nationalism and its 
economic effects, He stands in judgement over that too . 
•.• the sovereignty of God is a caution against 
idolatries. The ancient Hebrew commandment "You 
shall have no other gods before me" expresses an 
enduring theological conviction of Christians (as 
well as Jews and Moslems). It certainly applies 
to the worship of material things - always a 
tendency in materialistic cultures. It also 
applies to the deification of social groups, 
including the nation. Whatever appreciative 
things may be said about patriotism or civil 
religion, nothing less than God can be turned 
into an ultimate objective of devotion. 5 
The Church can fight against such idolatry by insisting 
that the state and its civil religion stand under the 
higher judgement and sovereignty of God, for not to have it 
so would make the practice of having a civil religion 
dangerous indeed. The danger is that the civil religion 
would serve only to sanctify the status quo and the current 
social structures, whether or not they are good and just 
for society as a whole. And we have seen that the 
Government wants to preserve the stauts quo; all 
"campaigns" are to maintain things as they are because they 
function well for the ruling party - and the PAP would seek 
to emphasise, for the nation too. The status quo is a 
Government that has remained in power by delivering 
economic progress, and it wants to continue doing so. The 
~J.Philip Wogaman, Christian Perspectives on politics 
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1988), pp.114-115. 
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future of the nation, so says the PAP, is linked to the 
Government continuing in power to t'serve" the nation by 
doing what it is doing. And so a civil religion 1S set up 
to focus the citizen's undistracted loyalties to the nation 
(and the ruling Party) so that the Government can continue 
as it is, looking for and hoping for the devotion that 
should come to it if the civil religion is working well. 
The state has always been aware of what can happen if 
one has complete and whole-hearted devotion to God, rather 
than devotion to one's nation or the values it is supposed 
to have. It may have tried to teach religious knowledge in 
schools, but it was diffused thus that students were taught 
about religion with the aim of instiling correct moral 
attitudes and behaviour so that good, loyal, obedient, 
hardworking citizens can be produced rather than 
encouraging in any way a major revival in religion itself. 
The twin fears, expressed so well in the Religious Harmony 
Act, of religion possibly causing communal conflict and as 
a rallying point for anti-government expression and 
activity are always present in the halls of government. For 
the Government to therefore define what is "religious" and 
permissable, and what is "political" and a no-go area; to 
rule arbitrarily what is Caesar's and what is left to God 
is to usurp the power and sovereignty of God. This then 
prevents or makes it difficult for one to start questioning 
whether the current ruling political authority is just, 
moral and right in what it does, or whether its policies go 
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against higher religious duties and obligations. The 
singapore Government has pre-empted the potential tension 
that could arise from the conflicting demands for the 
loyalty and devotion of a citizen for his religion, and his 
nation, by institutionalizing and formalizing a National 
Ideology (with religious elements) as a civil religion. 
This form of civil religion is thus a special type of 
solution not just to any religio-political problem, but 
also a way to encourage devotion to the nation and a 
nationalism which includes economic growth as an aspect of 
it. 
The process goes on. As Government ministers have 
admitted, the inculcation (and imposition) of the Shared 
Values will take some time, presumably before they have 
been sufficiently internalized for the civil religion to 
become more obvious or overt. And again the question 1S 
posed to Singapore churches: is it important enough to you 
to want to think about it, and ponder what a theological 
response would be? Or is it too late? Has the privatisation 
of your religion and faith neutralised you so much that the 
possible idolatry of a civil religion provokes no proper 
theologising? If the Church is so held in captivity by 
affluence that it is in effect worshipping the "golden 
calf" rather than waiting, watching for and acting on the 
demands of God, then let it produce a theology to justify 
even that for Singapore churches! Bad theologising may just 
produce enough awkward responses and questions to start 
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leading to good thinking. 
The notion of privatisation refers to the process 
whereby religion is located in the private sphere 
of the family and sexual morality. Religious 
values are seen as irrelevant to economic, 
political, military or wider social issues and . , 
any cla1ms to apply morality to these areas are 
seen as ill-founded by most key groups in these 
activities - unless the religious leaders are 
willing to legitimate that which the ruling 
groups do. In this way, privatisation may be said 
to operate in ways which help to legitimate the 
power structures in a society and to remove the 
critical edge of Christianity from general 
circulation. 6 
Speaking about "the critical edge of Christianity" 
brings us now to the different levels at which the church 
can exercise its political responsibility - remembering 
again the understanding of "political" as involving 
attempts by the community to improve itself. Wogaman 
suggests seven levels: 
Levell: Influencing the Ethos 
Level 2: Educating the Church's Own Membership about 
Particular Issues 
Level 3: Church Lobbying 
Level 4: Supporting Particular Candidates for Office 
Level 5: Becoming a Political Party 
Level 6: civil Disobedience 
Level 7: Participating in Revolution. 7 
These levels progress from the most indirect and 
general to the most direct and specific. This is not the 
6Bocock, "Religion in modern Britain", op.cit, p.209. 
7Wogaman, op.cit., pp.200-207. 
303 
place to discuss them all at length, but enough has been 
said about Singapore so far to make us realise that at 
most, the churches can only be at Levels 1 or 2. 
"Levell: Influencing the Ethos" aff irms that the 
church is one of the influences setting the boundaries 
within which politics has to function. If so, then the 
proclamation of certain values, or what it stands for in , 
response to public policies and programmes will have deep 
political effects. This is similiar to the earlier 
statement by Alistair Kee that theological statements can 
have immediate effect on the social, political and 
religious lives of individuals and communities. There is 
thus a clear responsibility for the churches to address 
carefully the ethos, the cultural values and the spirit of 
the times in their societies. What can this mean in the 
Singapore situation? Well, in the context of a civil 
religion the Church could say that ultimately God 1S above 
Caesar, that the Sovereign God is the only Lord to hear, 
trust and obey - and that in context could challenge the 
idolatry of this civil religion that incorporates 
nationalism and economic post-confucianism. Is the Church 
aware enough to even think of saying something like this? 
If the Church is not aware, then it should be informed of 
the dangers of not being aware: that there 1S idolatry 
involved here, that the Church is being used to promote a 
civil religion whose precepts are in opposition to its own, 
that by its affluence it is being lulled into maintaining 
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a status quo which has economic well-being as the ultimate 
goal of the nation, and that ultimately this nationalism or 
civil religion will be the over-riding ideology of the 
nation, and a Christianity made harmless will have to take 
its place below it in the overall structure of society. 
"Level 2: Educating the Church's Own Membership about 
Particular Issues" would help bring about such "awareness" 
as needed. Here the responsibility 1S to relate the 
church's more general faith to partcular political issues; 
the implications of such beliefs and values is spelled out 
more concretely. A method to be used might be that of study 
courses, or discussions or seminars where issues can be 
explored in detail, analyses can be brought up for debate 
and contrast, and efforts to inform participants on the 
factual and theological aspects of public 1ssues can help 
them to be more suitably informed citizens (and as such, to 
act more "politically"). It is obvious that if the church 
wants to operate on Level 2, then it has to be informed as 
completely as possible, especially if the issue is a 
controversial one. 
It is equally obvious that in the singapore situation, 
the churches will have to go very carefully; they will have 
to tip-toe very gingerly through a minefield of possible 
infringements against the Religious Harmony Act in what 
they choose to discuss. The aforementioned "climate of 
fear" would operate here. will there be enough trust in the 
Government's sincerity and judgement in evaluating whether 
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theological and moral soundings on public issues need not 
be "political" in the negative Government-defined sense? 
will the churches care enough to want to talk and discuss 
with the Government about politics 1.n a positive sense? 
will the Churches be aware enough to be educated about the 
particular issue of civil religion, and in turn educate its 
membership into greater awareness, for the true good of the 
nation? 
Finally, we return to the question of whether civil 
religion is a violation of the religious integrity of those 
who do not accept it. 
It certainly can be, if it takes the form of a 
set of tenets to which all must subscribe or a 
set of rituals which all must observe. But I 
think the essence of a defensible civil religion 
... is the commitment by most if not all of the 
people to the proposition that people do have 
transcendent meaning and that society can have 
purposes that truly do matter. Such a common body 
of conviction includes the affirmation of the 
bonds uniting people within society.8 
This reminds us of earlier comments made by Foo Kim Boon, 
similiar to the need of people to have transcendent 
meaning, where he stressed that the Shared Values should be 
"manifestations of a deeply held belief in our basic 
humanity" as well as having "respect" and a recognition of 
the individual's "inherent dignity". The strength of the 
Values will lie in their historical, philosophical, social 
and moral soundness, and not in their expediency. How does 
this reflect on society neeeding purposes that really 
IIIbid., p.197. 
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matter? Can economic growth or progress be sa id to meet 
that criterion of truly "mattering"? Or do we agree with 
Foo when he went on to say that Christians share such a 
concern with the future economic well-being of Singapore, 
but "we go further: We believe that all the world's goods 
would not make up for the lack of fellowship with God, our 
Creator and Redeemer".9 In other words, worship the 
Creator, not things created. An evaluation like this would 
call the defensibility of the civil religion into question 
- if you were a Christian. 
A civil religion has been set up by the Government, 
however, and it represents a programmatic vision about how 
to achieve a social and political order that will survive 
into the next century. But the nature of this civil 
religion - the way the meaning of the nation and the core 
values that unite the people is def ined, the way the 
ultimate significance of the nation is explored - will be 
of critical importance to those of us who are Christians 
working and serving in Singapore. We do need to beg in 
considering seriously the implications of having a civil 
religion, and moving away from basic and stereotyped 
(although important) issues of Church and State into the 
issue of idolatry possibly being practised by the Church 
towards the State. We do need to ask what the role of the 
Church can be - prophetic or otherwise - in the face of the 
steady promotion and inculcation of the civil religion, 
9Foo , op.cit., p.9. 
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with the Government demanding and expecting all 
institutions and people in Singapore to accept the civil 
religion being offered. What questions can we ra1se 1n 
return? What response will we give? 
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